



**CIA FILE ON**  
**REINHARD GEHLEN**  
**VOL. I**



@fileandclaw322

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

# BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH ON GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN

General Reinhard Gehlen is a professional military and intelligence officer. Until his retirement on 30 April 1968, he was President of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the West German Federal Intelligence Service, as well as chief of its predecessor organizations formed at the end of World War II.

General Gehlen was born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt. He currently lives in Berg on the Starnberg Lake near Munich. He finished his formal schooling in 1920 and entered the military service directly. He received his commission as second lieutenant in 1923 and served his initial tours of duty in the horse artillery. He married in 1931 and in 1935 he attended the War Academy in Berlin. At that time he held the rank of captain. By 1939 and shortly before the outbreak of World War II, he was promoted to major. He participated in the Polish campaign, but by 1940 he was transferred to a headquarters post. At that time he became an aid to General Halder, who was Chief of the General Staff. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1941 and became chief of Fremde Heere Ost in 1942. (Fremde Heere Ost / Foreign Armies East/ was that section of the German High Command charged with responsibility for charting the enemy order of battle on the eastern front. It was essentially an evaluation unit and worked closely with the Abwehr. It did engage in line crossing operations as the war progressed, however.) Gehlen received his promotion to colonel soon after taking over Fremde Heere Ost and by 1944 was promoted to brigadier general. In the course of preparing estimates on enemy order of battle, he reached the conclusion as early as 1943 that the German cause on the eastern front was lost, and his continued pessimistic evaluations led to a reprimand from Hitler, and in the last days of the war he was relieved of command by order of Hitler. Long before that day General Gehlen had already consulted with senior members of his staff and made plans to continue their efforts against the Russians after the inevitable capitulation of the German Army, but in cooperation with the American Army. General Gehlen consequently cached his files in the Bavarian Alps and withdrew to that area in the final days of the war. He subsequently surrendered to the Americans, and after his initial POW debriefings, he presented his plan for the continued collection of order of battle information of the Soviet Armies. General Gehlen was motivated by his strong view that the position of the Soviet Army so deep in Europe constituted a

S E C R E T

8131 Berg bei Starnberg  
Waldstrasse 68  
Obb. / BRD



S E C R E T

real threat to Western civilization. His views were so strong that he was able to convince his captors of these views. He was then flown back to Washington in 1946 for further debriefings, and the decision was made at the G-2 level to allow General Gehlen to reform his unit and to permit him to engage in a collection effort against the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe. Some two and a half million dollars were appropriated for this effort. General Gehlen succeeded in reforming his unit and retrieving most of his files. He operated under G-2 sponsorship from 1946 until 1949 when CIA assumed responsibility for the Gehlen organization as it was then known. From 1949 until 1956 General Gehlen devoted his full energies to legalizing his organization as the West German Federal Intelligence Service. He achieved this goal in March 1956 and thereby became its first president. He became directly responsible to the Chancellor's officer. After legalization he strove to develop his organization into a world-wide intelligence service having collection capabilities and liaison on a world-wide basis. He has gone a long way toward accomplishing this goal.

As a personality General Gehlen still remains essentially a professional military officer in habits and attitudes though he never entered on active duty after World War II. He is, however, a lieutenant general in the reserve. At one time he was an accomplished horseman though he no longer permits himself this luxury, primarily because of time considerations. He is a family man and has four children. It is believed General Gehlen leads a quiet life outside of his official duties. In all things he is essentially conservative. He rarely entertains, and he does not drink. His English is fluent, and he is socially poised and very much at ease among senior American officials. Since his retirement he has been engaged in writing his memoirs and compiling a history of the BND.


General Gehlen was succeeded on 1 May 1968 by General Gerhard Wessel, his adjutant in Fremde Heere Ost, who was instrumental in assisting in the formation of the Gehlen organization. Wessel has served with the BND, the West German Ministry of Defense, and the NATO Military Committee in Washington and Brussels.

S E C R E T

SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

General

FOUO

SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005



BEST AVAILABLE COPY


SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)

7

7




GEHLEN

SECRET

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

FOR USE BY CONTINUED BY CALIFORNIA




BEST AVAILABLE COPY



SECRET

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)





SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



GEHLEN

BEST AVAILABLE COPY


3768

SECRET (When Filled In)

SECRET

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GEH:DA

SECRET

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)

7

4




SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

7

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



BEST AVAILABLE COPY


GEHLEN



SECRET

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)




GELLEN


SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



BEST AVAILABLE COPY





GEHLEN



**SECRET** (When Filled In)

# PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



FORM 3768 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

**SECRET** (When Filled In)

GEHLEN

EXHIBIT 10

30  
GEHLEN, Reinhard

geb. 3.4.02 Erfurt

Adresse: Berg/Krs.Starnberg, Waldstr. 68

Pass: 849/51

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY:  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

ATTN TO ECL 4848

SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)



GEHLEN, HEYTA CHARLOTTE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
E/TE 2005

NOT FOR RELEASE COPY

30  
GEHLEN, Herta

geb.17.4.04 LEOBSCHÜTZ/Schlesien

Adresse: Berg/Krs.Starnberg, Waldstr. 68

Pass: 858/51

Kinder: Maria-Therese GEHLEN geb.4.9.40

Dorothee GEHLEN, geb. 28.2.43

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE'S METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

87  
GEHLEN, Christoph

geb. 11.2.37 Berlin

Adresse: Berg/Krs. Starnberg, Waldstr. 68

Kennkarte: BY I 656502 3

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

ANT TO ECLA 4958

ANT TO ECLA 4958

GEHLEN, Herta

DATE: 17 Mar/Apr 1904

BIRTHPLACE: Loobschuetz, Silesia

RESIDENCE: Bergstr. Sternberger See

Waldstr. 68

RELIGION: Protestant

GEHLEN, Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene  
nee: von SEIDLITZ-KURZBACH  
SCHNEIDER, Frau

ALL SOURCE: \_\_\_\_\_

VEHICLE: \_\_\_\_\_

LICENSE # (s): \_\_\_\_\_

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AS OF \_\_\_\_\_

HEIGHT: \_\_\_\_\_

WEIGHT: \_\_\_\_\_

EYES: \_\_\_\_\_

HAIR: \_\_\_\_\_

PHOTO DATE: prob pr 51



BUILD: \_\_\_\_\_

TEETH: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FAMILY BI DATA

FATHER: Friedrich-Wilhelm von SEIDLITZ- DOB/POB: \_\_\_\_\_

MOTHER: Meta von SEIDLITZ-KURZBACH KURZBACH DOB/POB: \_\_\_\_\_

SPOUSE: Reinhard GEHLEN (who see) DOB/POB: 3 Apr 1902 in Erfurt

CHILDREN: Katharina DUERRWANGER (who see) DOB/POB: 19 Jan 1934 in Berlin

(NEE: GEHLEN) DOB/POB: 11 Feb 1937 in Berlin

Christoph GEHLEN

Marie Therese GEHLEN DOB/POB: 4 Sep 1940 in Liegnitz

Dorothee GEHLEN 28 Feb 1943 in Liegnitz

OTHER RELATIVES w/UPSWING: \_\_\_\_\_

UPSWING EMPLOYMENT

BOB: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK: \_\_\_\_\_

POSITION: \_\_\_\_\_ SECTION: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: TO:  
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

DATE TERMINATION OR SEPARATION: \_\_\_\_\_

NEW STATUS: \_\_\_\_\_



GEHLEN, Herta

CHILDREN OF Reinhard and Herta GEHLEN:

Christoph



Marie Therese



Dorothee



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1. Gehlen van Vaernewyck  
2. ---  
3. Reinhard  
4. Erfurt-Germany  
5. 3 April 1902  
6a German  
5b ---  
7. German  
8. Walther - German  
9. Katharina - German  
10. 1937 - 1945 German Wehrmacht  
1946 - Present: merchant  
11. 10, Guentherburg Allee  
Frankfurt a/M.  
c/o Dr. Erhardt  
12. married  
a) ---  
b) ---  
c) ---  
13. ---  
14. 174 darkblond  
blue  
none  
15. ---  
b) ---  
16. Switzerland, Italy, Austria  
b) Authorized Crossing Points  
c) 20 June 1949  
d) one year  
17) ---  
18) on business  
19 no  
20 ---  
b) ---  
21 no  
22 none  
23 Armed Forces, Brigadier General  
NSDAP : n o  
24 classified: not concerned  
25 none  
b) none  
26 ---  
27 expenses will be paid by friends  
28 ----  
29 H 519 712  
3 March 1947  
Frankfurt a/M.  
Police President

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

Annex.

1.) Personal Background

Full name: Reinhard Gehlen  
Date of birth: 3 April 1902  
Place of birth: Erfurt/Thuringia  
Nationality: German, no previous nationalities.

2.) Marital Status

Name of wife: Herta Gehlen, nee von Seydlitz-Kurzbach  
Date of birth: 17 April 1904  
Place of birth: Leobachwitz/Silesia  
Nationality: German

3.) Children

Katharina Gehlen	Age 16
Christoph Gehlen	Age 13
Marie-Therese Gehlen	Age 9
Dorothea Gehlen	Age 7

4.) Father

Full name: Walther Gehlen  
Date of birth: 24 July 1871  
Date of decease: 1943  
Nationality: German

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 382E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

5.) Mother

Full name: Katharina Gehlen, nee von Vaernnewyck  
Date of birth: 12 June 1881  
Date of decease: 1921  
Nationality: German

6.) Father-in-Law

Full name: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach  
Date of birth: 15 October 1873  
Nationality: German

7.) Mother-in-Law

Full name: Herta von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, nee Fickner  
Date of birth: 29 July 1882  
Nationality: German

8.) Education

1908 - 1920 Humanistisches Gymnasium Breslau, with graduation.

9.) Military Service

April 1920	Entered military service (artillery)
Dec. 1923	Promotion to Lieutenant
1928	Promotion to First Lieutenant
1933 - 1935	General Staff Academy
1934	Promotion to Captain
1935 - 1938	General Staff assignment
1938 - 1939	Battery Commander
1939	Promotion to Major
Sept. - Nov. 1939	Chief-of-Staff 213. Inf. Div.
Nov. 1939 - Spring 1940	Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff
Spring 1940 - Fall 1940	Adjutant to Chief of General Staff
Fall 1940 - Spring 1942	Section Chief within the Department for Plans and Operations (Operationsabteilung)
Spring 1942 - Spring 1945	Chief of the Department "Fronde Heer's Ost"

10.) Political Background

No membership to any political party or affiliated associations at any time.

SECRET CONTROL  
US OFFICIALS ONLY  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Biographic Data Report on ex-General Reinhard GEHLEN

GEHLEN, Reinhard (ex-Brigadier General )

Personal data: Born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt, Thuringia. Protestant.  
Married; four children.

Education: Graduated from Humanistisches Gymnasium, Breslau, 1920.

Languages: English, some French.

Career:

1920 Entered military service (artillery).  
1923 Commissioned Second Lieutenant.  
1928 Promoted to First Lieutenant.  
1933-1935 General Staff Academy, Berlin.  
1934 Promoted to Captain.  
1935-1938 General Staff assignment.  
1938-1939 Battery commander.  
1939 Promoted to Major.  
Chief of Staff, 213th Infantry Division.  
1939-1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff.  
1940 Adjutant to General HALDER, Chief of General Staff.  
1941 Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.  
1940-1942 Section Chief in Department for Plans and Operations.  
1942 Promoted to Colonel.  
1942-1945 Chief of Department Fremde Heere Ost.  
1944 Promoted to Brigadier General.  
1945 Dismissed by special order of HITLER on 9 April 1945.  
American PW, 27 May 1945.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET CONTROL  
US OFFICIALS ONLY  
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SECRET CONTROL  
US OFFICIALS ONLY  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Remarks:

Reinhard GEHLEN was born the son of German Army First Lieutenant Walter GEHLEN. His father left the military service a few years after Reinhard was born and became a moderately successful business man, and spent the majority of his years as Director of a Publishing House in Breslau until his death in 1943.

Up until 1942 Reinhard GEHLEN followed a routine career pattern similar to other professional army officers. His promotions can be considered consistent with other officers. His highest tactical command function was that of a company commander.

In April of 1942 GEHLEN, then a Colonel, was assigned to take over the intelligence group "Freunde-Heere Ost" or "Foreign Armies East" under the High Command of the Army. His mission with this unit at that time was to obtain all possible intelligence material dealing with the military, political and economic situation existing in the USSR and the south eastern European countries. He gave an able demonstration of himself until in March/April 1945 he was relieved of his post upon the personal order of HITLER.

GEHLEN reportedly has never been a member of any political party or faction. He has a fear and hatred for communism. According to the 7th Army interrogation report dated 21 June 1945 GEHLEN was reported to anticipate a Russian-allied conflict.

He professes to stand for a united Western Europe built around a Franco-German Axis, for collaboration with England and the United States, for social reform but not socialism, for the review of such occupation and post-war "injustices" as War Criminal Trials and some aspects of denazification. He does not favor the remilitarization of Germany, except as part of Western European Defense. In the intelligence field he believes that a small country such as Germany should have a unified service.



EXCERPTS FROM ES BEGANN AN DER WEICHSEL by Jürgen Thorwald

References to General Gehlen

page 10 - re launching of Russian Offensive 12 January 1945.

"The General Staff of the German Army built up no illusions for itself concerning the scale of this offensive. General Gehlen, head of the Eastern Army, ~~who consolidated~~, who consolidated the reports concerning the eastern foe, was both a skillful and a conscientious man in his work, whose estimates of the deployment of Soviet Troops and the Soviet plans for attack carried an incontestible weight. Underian had no reason to question the reliability of his colleague. The Soviet dispositions were all the more alarming inasmuch as now only the remnants of the areas conquered during 1941 and 1942 separated the Soviet armies from Germany itself. In East Prussia, Russian troops already were on German territory, and the fate of the German civilians who were overtaken by surprise in the late autumn of 1944 in Memmersdorf and Goldap, including murder, rape, looting and deportation, forced consideration of the imminent developments with anxiety....."

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

page 25

"The reports which Gehlen presented since November in regard to the numerical strength of the Soviet forces and their artillery, armor and planes, had at first impressed Guderian as improbable. However, they were repeatedly demonstrated as being true and as early as December 1944, the numerical ratio had risen to 9:1 between the Russian and German divisions on the Vistula front; to 6:1 between the Russian and German armor; to 10:1 between the Russian and German artillery and in some sectors had even reached a ratio of 15:1. The ratio of air power between the two could not any longer be gauged in terms of numerical ratios....."

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

page 32-33.

"Guderian was startled out of his trend of thought as the door of the compartment opened. In the doorway stood General Gehlen. He had come in once more to discuss the general presentation of the situation to the Führer.

"Gehlen's sharply chiselled face was pale, with a yellowish undertone. He suffered from stomach ulcers, the occupation disorder common to numerous overworked General Staff officers.

"Herr Generaloberst", he said, "I have completed an additional special report concerning the respective ratio of military strength of the area surrounding the Baranov bridgehead, which takes into consideration the very latest substantiating data. According to this information the enemy is deployed on a 90 kilometer front with five infantry armies, six armored corps, two self-contained armored corps and five armored brigades. The ratio of infantry strength now amounts to 11:1 in favor of the enemy; in armor it is 7:1 and in artillery it is 20:1. The Russian artillery deployment at many points amounts to 250 artillery pieces per kilometer. The conclusions are so evident that they should convince even the Führer of the fact that we are facing a catastrophe at the Baranov bridgehead unless something is done. . . ."

"Guderian looked square into Gehlen's face. Even Gehlen still judged the situation on the basis of reasoning. He had no contacts with a world in which decisions are reached on the basis of instinct, inspiration and moods. Guderian stood up and began to pace back and forth.

"Gehlen", he said, "today is our last chance. If the armored

COPY  
ALL  
RIGHTS  
RESERVED  
BY  
THE  
LIBRARY  
OF  
CONGRESS  
SERIALS  
ACQUISITION  
DEPARTMENT  
GEORGETOWN  
UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY  
SERIALS  
ACQUISITION  
DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON  
D.C.

-4-

divisions in the West are set on the march as late as tonight, they still could arrive in time to avert the worst....'

"In his mind's eye he still saw the Christmas Eve of 1944, in which he had resumed the battle for the armored units in the Ardennes. The Ardennes Offensive had begun December 16th. On the 22nd of December it was already clear that the offensive had been shattered.

"For this reason, on Christmas Eve, the 24th of December, Guderian had attempted to effect with Hitler the immediate transfer to the Eastern Front, a move promised in this event, of the assault divisions which were no longer required for a defensive action in the West.

"Hitler's attention, however, with the obstinacy of the frustrated, had remained fixed on the Ardennes. He insisted that the initiative remained in his hand both now as heretofore. He (Guderian) had misrepresented the magnitude of the danger from the East. The statistics concerning the Russian concentrations were simply invented. Allusions to the fate threatening the East German populace he had at first ignored, then refuted with a remark that the Prussians in the days of Frederick the Great had also been called on to make sacrifices, and that he also could demand that the Germans make sacrifices for his sake. The atmosphere of that Christmas Eve still were vivid in Guderian's memory - along with the willfully desired lack of familiarity with conditions in the East, not only on the part of Hitler, but also in the case of Jodl, who had never visited one of the fronts; their clinging to long obsoleted concepts, and — as Guderian felt intuitively — in Jodl's case, with a lack of comprehension on the part of the South Germans for the fate of the East.

"During the same night, Guderian had returned to Zossen. Enroute he

received the news that Budapest had been lost. Arriving in Zossen, he received a further communication to the effect that the Panzerkorps Gille, which had been stationed as an assault reserve force behind the Vistula front in accordance with a direct order from Ziegenberg, had been ordered transferred to Hungary for purposes of recapturing a foreign capital. This, however, was the crown point of the defeat (for Guderian), to have a part of the Reserves, which had been painfully retrieved from the Eastern Front, simply transferred, by order originating above Guderian, to another position....."

UNCLASSIFIED COPY

page 34

"Then the contest had started. As on Christmas Eve, Hitler refused to ~~acknowledge~~ the threat from the East. He refused to recognize that his bitterly hated opponent, Stalin, had the power to order out such great forces. With the lack of restraint of someone who inwardly senses his error, he still expounded the illusion of the insufficiency of the Russian armies, which had been pursuing him since 1941. He had never relinquished the belief that Stalin's reservoir of manpower must someday run dry. Now he again was of the opinion that this had occurred. Again he spoke of the "randomly conscripted rabble" and of the "Plunderdivisions" which Stalin still could muster up. He screamed that General Gehlen, in company with his estimates, belonged in an insane asylum. He ignored Guderian's objections that Hitler, on that basis, could have him, Guderian, committed to the same asylum, since he concurred in Gehlen's opinion.....

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

page 35

"Guderian stopped his pacing. 'We must achieve it today', he reiterated, 'This is the last chance left for us. Gehlen, don't let yourself be swayed by anything during our conference. Remain calm and collected, even if the Führer permits himself to be drawn into insulting the General Staff and you personally..'"

"Gehlen understood. He spread out his cards and papers. While he was thus occupied, Guderian continued his pacing up and down. 'I repeat once more, the most important points of our presentation,' he said.

1. Immediate relinquishment of the Kurland Front.
2. Transfer of the armored forces from the West to the East before the night is over.
3. In event of refusal, a minimum of withdrawal of the over-extended sector of the 4th Army in East Prussia and saving of some divisions as reserves.
4. Operation "Schlittenfahrt" of Heeresgruppe A - withdrawal of our curved frontal position between the Vistula bridgeheads at Pulawy and Baranov and the Vistula, shortly before the Russian attack. Assault type defense before the Pulawy bridgehead. A fending off type of defense from the Baranov bridgehead to the Silesian border.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



page 38

"Guderian, with a face revealing the inner emotion which now gripped him, took his place at Hitler's left side, a practice that had been adopted since the bomb explosion of July 20th, which had destroyed Hitler's right eardrum. During this time, Hitler gazed across at Gehlen, who just stood upright with an uncommunicative expression on his face. Hitler sensed in Gehlen the personification of cold, unyielding reality, which he did not want to hear or recognize, or to which he did not want to surrender before it finally engulfed him and his pawns paid the price of his obstinacy in the East, South or West. His face took on an expression of rejection. Then he heard Guderian's voice....

"My Führer, "began Guderian, "I came back here again today to present the facts to you personally, since it has been established with certainty, according to all our information, that the Russian winter offensive, target Berlin, will open in three days on the 12th of January. I should like once again, as on the 24th and the 31st of December, to report to you in full candour, the details of the situation ~~on~~ the eastern front and for this purpose, have brought with me General Gehlen himself, who can present to you all corroborating details you may desire....."

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

I, Friedrich-Wilhelm Ruebesamen, do hereby acknowledge that I have this date received the sum of DM 10,024.00 (ten thousand and twenty-four Deutsche Marks) from the Government of the United States of America. In accordance with the agreement under which these funds were entrusted to me, I have purchased with these funds on behalf of the United States Government one Opel Kapitän, motor number 2,5152-09000, license number B 55-3563. This vehicle was purchased by me in the name of Sinduer G.m.b.H., located at Nikolaistr. 1, in the city of München.

In consideration for the delivery of these funds to me and for the subsequent granting of this vehicle into my custody, and in consideration for such other benefits as I have received or shall receive from the Government of the United States, its Agencies or representatives, I do hereby agree as follows.

It is understood and agreed that this vehicle, although officially registered in the name of Sinduer G.m.b.H., is now and will remain the sole property of the United States Government; and that it is to be held subject to the direction of the United States Government or its authorized representatives and that I have no personal proprietary interest in or claim upon this vehicle; and that in the event of my death or disappearance, or at such other time as the United States Government or its authorized representatives shall designate at its discretion this vehicle shall be returned into the possession of the United States Government, and that neither I, nor my estate, nor my heirs, shall have any claim upon it.

It is further understood and agreed that this vehicle may not be sold, pledged, or otherwise obligated by me or my representatives or agents for any reason whatsoever, without specific authorization in writing from the United States Government or its authorized representatives.

7

It is further understood and agreed that this contract shall not be construed to grant to me, or my agents or representatives any rights or privileges not specifically stated herein; and that I shall be personally responsible and liable to the United States Government for the proper custody of this vehicle.

*F.W. Ruebesamen*

Friedrich-Wilhelm Ruebesamen

*R. von Gehlen*

Reinhard von Gehlen  
Borg am Starnbergersee

DATED:

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET  
(When Filled In)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF  
INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE &  
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 73701

SOURCE  
AND  
APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. GENERAL GEHLEN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WAS CALLED TO BONN UNEXPECTEDLY ON THE EVENING OF 3 FEBRUARY FOR CONFERENCES ON 4 FEBRUARY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHROEDER AND OTHER SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS. THE TOPIC OF DISCUSSIONS IS GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. GEHLEN WILL COUNSEL THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AVOID ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT OVER ULBRICHT'S VISIT TO CAIRO.

2. GEHLEN TOOK WITH HIM A REPORT FROM A BND SOURCE IN EGYPT WHO IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY RELIABLE. THE REPORT STATES THAT NASSER DOES NOT INTEND TO RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY AND WILL HANDLE ULBRICHT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

**SECRET**

(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 73701

PAGE 2

APPROXIMATELY AS HE DID GROTEWOHL IN 1959. NASSER PREVIOUSLY TOLD GERMAN AMBASSADOR FLEDERER ABOUT THE SAME THING, AND THE BND BELIEVES THAT THEIR REPORT CONFIRMS THAT NASSER WILL ACT AS HE STATED. GEHLEN WILL CITE THE BND REPORT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AS A REASON FOR FOLLOWING A MODERATE LINE WITH THE EGYPTIANS.

3. EVEN PRIOR TO GEHLEN'S TRIP THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS DISINCLINED TO TAKE ANY SPEEDY ACTION ON THE EGYPTIAN PROBLEM AND IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT ANY IMPORTANT DECISIONS WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER ULBRICHT'S VISIT TAKES PLACE.

4. RECENTLY THE BND CONDUCTED A STUDY ON THE PROBABLE REACTION OF OTHER ARAB STATES IF GERMAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS WERE BROKEN. THE STUDY CONCLUDED THAT VERY FEW OF THE ARAB STATES WOULD FOLLOW THE EGYPTIAN LINE AND BREAK WITH GERMANY. THIS STUDY HAS BEEN SENT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND MAY BE DISCUSSED DURING GEHLEN'S TRIP TO BONN.

5. FIELD DISSEM: NONE (ALSO SENT BONN, CAIR, GMMY, FRAN, BRN).

END OF MESSAGE

**SECRET**

Memorandum Slip

TO:

RE:

27.0

I have returned the document  
to 30 w/o art service  
[ ] felt his art  
work should not be  
wandering around Europe.  
Please that a new  
document w/o the USA  
Embassy be obtained.

~~14~~

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

UNRECORDED COPY



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ANN, WEST GERMANY, MAY 17, (REUTERS) - THE WEST GERMAN MAGAZINE DER SPIEGEL CLAIMED TODAY THAT FORMER CHANCELLOR ADENAUER SUGGESTED IN 1962 THAT THE HEAD OF COUNTRIES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BE ARRESTED. THE MAGAZINE SAID ADENAUER, SUSPECTING THAT A MEMBER OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD TIPPED OFF DER SPIEGEL'S STAFF, A POLICE RAID ON THE MAGAZINE, SUGGESTED TO WOLFGANG BERGER, THEN JUSTICE MINISTER IN THE WEST GERMAN COALITION GOVERNMENT, THAT INTELLIGENCE CHIEF REINHARD GENLEN BE ARRESTED. ADENAUER DENIES THE MAGAZINE'S STORY, BUT STAMMBERGER, A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR THE OPPOSITION SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, SAID TODAY "IF ADENAUER SAYS THAT THE SPIEGEL REPORT IS FALSE, I SAY THAT IT IS CORRECT." STAMMBERGER ADDED THAT WHEN ADENAUER SUGGESTED HE ARREST GENLEN HE REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR DOING

THE INCIDENT WAS IN CONNECTION, THE MAGAZINE SAID, WITH THE "GENLEN AFFAIR" IN WHICH CHARGES OF TREASON WERE LAID AGAINST THE MAGAZINE'S PUBLISHER RUDOLF AUGSTEIN AND EMPLOYEES CONRAD AHLERS FOR PUBLISHING ALLEGED MILITARY SECRETS ON GERMANY'S DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS.

THE CHARGES WERE DISMISSED FRIDAY BY THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE, BUT ADENAUER REMAINED IN THE COURT OF PROVIDING THE SECRET INFORMATION FOR THE ARTICLE.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

in the German government to exert on the Chancellor, ~~xxx~~ on the Ministers, on the ~~press~~ German Press, on the German Radio etc...

3. Utility considers himself a political realist who, though an Eastern German himself and an officer whose formative years were spent under the von Seeckt influence, considers ~~Germany's integration with the Western Atlantic Community~~ ~~Germany's integration with the Western Atlantic Community~~ Germany's integration in a Western defence alliance as an absolute prerequisite for <sup>successful and coexistence</sup> negotiations with the Soviets ~~xxx~~. Also, he has always attached the utmost importance to French/German understanding and recognized the need for cautious cooperation with the British. Utility is simply

incapable for taking a detached and disinterested view of internal German events that touch upon the issue of (a) Germany's foreign policy or (b) ~~communist infiltration~~ <sup>infiltration</sup>

in the Federal Republic. Possessing a strong political conviction and

Since he is a man with political ideas of his own and because he fears that the Western cause could be lost in Germany through political infiltration, ~~alone~~ <sup>infiltration</sup>

~~Utility is extremely fearful of the political situation~~ Utility finds it difficult to stick to the business of quietly building a GIS that will eventually find a place in an unpenetrated and integrated and unpenetrated Federal Republic.

4. In this connection, we ~~xxx~~ have credited [ ] with completely accurate reporting of recent internal UDDUSY political discussions (GSSB).

Independently we have learned of all the items reported. Utility's current views on the political advisers surrounding UPTRIHUST had not come to our attention is that form; however, recently ~~Utility's current views on the political advisers surrounding UPTRIHUST had not come to our attention is that form~~ verbal

Utility ~~xxx~~ offered a gratuitous analysis of the SPD foreign experts.

This seemed to be an appropriate ~~xxx~~ moment to seek confirmation of the [ ] report; Utility's ~~xxx~~ reply ~~xxx~~ provided this but did not include the ~~xxx~~ fact that an independent approach via the Bavarian Catholics was involved. Recent intercepts available to us provided information of a meeting between

[ ] and [ ] which may be related to this move.

5. UTILITY has in the past responded ~~xxx~~ to our specific recommendation in the political field. Nevertheless, I am not optimistic that

general reproaches and warnings on the dangers inherent in the UNDRIZZLY, and related political matters will ~~seriously~~ seriously effect his actions and might, on the other hand, ~~may~~ result in our being denied information of his activities in this field. There have been and will be in the future specific political matters in which Utility will seek and probably be influenced by our ~~advice~~ information and advise.

6. Several years back in the KUBARK policy file on ZIPPER is a clear cut statement that we would never admit responsibility for ZIPPER's political activities. I think this was a wise decision at the time and one that should continue to govern our position vis a vis Utility and his organization. I realize, of course, that there are ~~some~~ very definite limits to our capability of shed the political responsibility <sup>with definite political aspects</sup> ~~fact~~ that, in the final analysis, KUBARK does have an overall responsibility for ~~all~~ both the direct and indirect effects of ZIPPER's existence. ~~recognizing that~~ Recognition and acceptance of this fact does not, however, deny KUBARK the right to refuse either recognition or support to specific political activities which we feel ~~are inimicable to~~ are inimicable to ~~harm~~ our intelligence and political our own interests. ~~Within~~ Within the existing world political ~~climate~~ In the existing political atmosphere at home and in Europe, a justification of KUBARK ~~general~~ support ~~of ZIPPER's activities~~ of ZIPPER ~~can, we feel, be made.~~ can, we feel, be made. The individual political acts of Utility and other Zipper personalities should be examined as they arise and supported or denounced as our own interests may dictate.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

WASH DC  
JAN 29 1967

5. Not long ago Utility noted that several members of the U.S. Commissioners staff had expressed to Germans in Bonn their apprehension ~~xxx~~ regarding Zipper. Utility recalled that, following his own meeting with ~~Ranking~~ the deputy ~~Mr. Rank~~ Also Commission ~~about xxxxxxxx~~ noted that, some months ago, following Walter Dowling's visit to Munich and his dinner with Utility at ~~r~~ ~~his~~ home, a German acquaintance of Utility's quoted Dowling as having labelled Utility a "man who, under certain circumstances, might be a dangerous ~~man~~". I pointed out to Utility that many intelligent Germans and Americans undoubtedly turned this thought over in their minds from time to time; that ~~any such expression could hardly be considered as a serious~~ ~~had been~~ the political wisdom of KUBARK's ZIPPER policy ~~was~~ a subject of continuing debate; that our support of ZIPPER as a project and Utility as an individual had not, however, wavered. While I doubted that Mr. Dowling had ever made such a remark, ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~neither with the Commission nor reflected in the report~~ to a German, I could well imagine that his sentiments are as expressed.

6. Utility reminded me that I should not forget that KUBARK has in its files documents signed by him which unequivocally align him the West against the USSR and World Communism; that whatever other doubts we might have about ~~himself~~ him, he trusted that on this issue his position was ~~being~~ accepted.

7. This seemed to be an appropriate moment to ask Utility just what his personal ambitions ~~were~~ are and under what circumstances he hoped to achieve them. ~~From~~ ~~establishment~~ previous occasions, the creation of a ~~Government~~ strong GIS headed by him. He replied without hesitation that his only personal ambition was to ~~work in the~~ establish and for some years head a GIS.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E-  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

INDEXED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE <b>A</b> TOTAL COPIES <b>27</b>													
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> <b>SECRET</b> </div>													
X-REF TO FILE NO.															
FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/>															
DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.															
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED </div>													
ACTION <b>6</b>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>1</td><td>E/C</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>2</td><td></td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>3</td><td></td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>4</td><td></td><td>8</td></tr> </table>		1	E/C	5	2		6	3		7	4		8
1	E/C	5													
2		6													
3		7													
4		8													
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY		ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBED													
INFO FILE <u>VR, VDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/ICZ, FI, FI/INTZ, FI/D4</u> <u>CDC</u>															

SECRET 081159Z CITE VIENNA 4035  
DIRECTOR INFO BONN, FRANKFURT, MUNICH  
KEYWAY  
FROM **C**

1) CE/MAB, APP IN 89237  
2) X/BSY  
3) CE/MAB  
**ACTION**

CS. copy of 132W-2-28/1

1. DISCUSSED DEFECTOR HANDLING QUESTION IN SOME DETAIL  
DURING THREE QUARTER HOUR MEET WITH UTILITY 7 NOV. ATTACHED  
BY ALIAS WENDT, ALIAS CAESAR AND **C**

2. KEY POINT WHICH EMERGED AND DOMINATED ENTIRE DISCUSSION  
WAS UTILITY'S VISIBLE PLEASURE WITH NEW STATE SECRETARY  
APPOINTMENTS IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY CARSTENS IN  
CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE AND DUCKWITZ IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ALTHOUGH  
ALSO INDICATED PERSONAL SATISFACTION IN APPOINTMENT VON HASE TO  
DEFENSE. BROAD GRIN WITH WHICH UTILITY RESPONDED TO MY  
COMPLIMENTS ON THESE APPOINTMENTS SUGGESTS UTILITY MAY WELL HAVE  
HAD HAND IN THEM AND CERTAINLY ANTICIPATES GOOD SUPPORT FOR  
CATUSK.

3. ALIAS WENDT OUTLINED JOINT CATUSK/CAVATA/ASBW POSITION  
RE DEFECTOR HANDLING IN FEDREP TO BE THAT CATUSK SHOULD BEAR  
RESPONSIBILITY ON FEDERAL SIDE FOR CONDUCT OF PROGRAM JOINTLY  
WITH WOFIRM, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

**SECRET**

GEHLEN 201

**SECRET**

PAGE 2 VIENNA 4035 S E C R E T

FOR ISSUING VISAS TO DEFECTORS BROUGHT INTO GERMANY FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER MAKE THEIR PRESENCE ACCORD WITH GERMAN LAW, AND FINALLY THAT PROGRAM SHOULD CONTINUE UNDER PRIMARY AUSPICES OF AMERICANS FOR PRESENT. (IT MY UNDERSTANDING FROM DISCUSSION WITH STATION OFFICERS BONN THAT THIS RECOMMENDATION NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION AT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL ALTHOUGH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN EXACTLY WHAT SUBSTANCE OF JOINT RECOMMENDATION WAS).

4. IN DISCUSSING POLITICAL ASPECTS UTILITY STATED IT HIS LONGSTANDING PRINCIPLE AVOID DEALING POLITICAL LEVEL MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. (HE CITED ~~C~~ ~~1~~ CASE AS EXAMPLE NOTING HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY UPON HIMSELF AND DID NOT INFORM FOREIGN OFFICE.) IN RESPONSE MY REQUEST HOWEVER, IN VIEW EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION DEFECTOR MATTERS WHICH HAD ALREADY OCCURRED AT GERMAN AND AMERICAN POLITICAL LEVELS BONN, UTILITY STATED WOULD UNDERTAKE TO HAVE DUCKWITZ, AFTER HE HAS COMPLETED CURRENT ROUND OF EXTENSIVE BRIEFINGS INCIDENTAL TAKING OVER NEW JOB, MAKE STATEMENT TO ~~L~~ ~~1~~ TO EFFECT THAT FOREIGN OFFICE AWARE OF AND SATISFIED WITH DEFECTOR PROGRAM IN FEDREP. UTILITY BELIEVES CAN GET DUCKWITZ DO THIS IN

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

PAGE 3 VIENNA 4035 S E C R E T

ABOUT SIX WEEKS TIME.

5. EXPLAINED TO UTILITY WE WISHED ELIMINATE TERM "CENTER" TO GET AWAY FROM IMAGE OF PHYSICAL INSTALLATION AND INSTEAD REGARD [ ] AS GROUP SKILLED INTERROGATORS CAPABLE HANDLING DEFECTORS ON AD HOC BASIS. INDICATED WE WILLING DISCUSS ANY CHANGES/RECOMMENDATIONS UTILITY MIGHT WISH MAKE RE [ ] AND/OR DEFECTOR HANDLING BUT HE INDICATED CATUSK DID NOT NOW HAVE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL TO ADD TO PROGRAM AND HE SATISFIED CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT WITH ALIAS LORING REPRESENTING CATUSK. [ ] MADE SPECIAL POINT OF EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND BOTH COB FRANKFURT AND CHIEF [ ] POSSESS IN DEFECTOR HANDLING QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED CATUSK STAFF OFFICERS REVIEW PROGRAM WITH THEM FOR ORIENTATION PURPOSES (WHICH UNDERSTAND ALIAS CAESAR PLANS DO IN NEAR FUTURE).

6. ON LEGAL/POLITICAL QUESTION OF ALLIED RIGHT TO CUSTODY SOVIET DEFECTORS ENTERING FEDREP DIRECTLY ALIAS WENDT STATED FEDREP LAW REQUIRES (UNDER PRINCIPLE OF FREIZUEGIGKEIT) THAT DEFECTOR WHO REQUESTS AMERICAN ASYLUM BE PERMITTED BE TAKEN OVER BY AMERICANS. IF HE REQUESTS FEDREP ASYLUM MUST UNDER GERMAN LAW BE SENT TO D.P. CAMP WHERE CATUSK WELL

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE 4 VIENNA 4035 S E C R E T

REPRESENTED SO WILL COME CATUSK ATTENTION. UTILITY DISMISSED QUESTION WHETHER TURNOVER SOVIET DEFECTORS TO AMERICANS REPRESENTED INFRINGEMENT GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY STATING SUCH CONCEPT NOTHING BUT POLITICAL TOOL, AND HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY BE TO POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FEDREP FOR SOME TIME TO COME TO TURNOVER SUCH DEFECTORS. ALSO AGREED HUEBNER/MALININ AGREEMENT CONTINUES HAVE IMPORTANCE TO FEDREP IN VIEW RECIPROCAL ASPECT OF HOLDING SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE IN EAST GERMANY FOR AMERICAN DEFECTORS.

7. IN ADDITION STRONG SUPPORT FOR CONDUCT DEFECTOR PROGRAM IN GERMANY INDICATED ABOVE, IT OF INTEREST THAT ALIAS REICHLIN DURING SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH C      J ON 6 NOV. STRESSED THAT FROM CATUSK'S STANDPOINT PRIMARY INTEREST LAY PRECISELY IN THOSE SOV BLOC DEFECTORS WHICH WERE BROUGHT TO FEDREP AFTER REQUESTING AMERICAN ASYLUM IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND WHICH REPRESENTED SOURCE OF INFORMATION CATUSK WOULD PROBABLY NOT OTHERWISE HAVE. (REICHLIN NOTED THAT CATUSK CLEARLY COULD OBTAIN ACCESS TO SOV BLOC DEFECTORS WHO CAME DIRECTLY TO FEDREP SO THAT COLLABORATION WITH WOFIRM IN DEFECTOR MATTERS PRIMARILY TO ACHIEVE DIRECT ACCESS TO CASES

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE 5 VIENNA 4035 S E C R E T

COMING INTO AMERICAN HANDS WORLDWIDE.)

8. IN SUMMARY, OUTLINED TO UTILITY OUR INTENTION BE MORE SELECTIVE IN DEFECTORS WE PROPOSE BRING FEDREP FOR EXPLOITATION, AND AGREED WOULD DISCUSS HANDLING EACH CASE ON AD HOC BASIS TO INCLUDE ON OCCASION ULTIMATE RESETTLEMENT WHEN FEDREP APPEARED BE GOOD RESETTLEMENT POSSIBILITY IN SO FAR AS CATUSK MIGHT BE ABLE ASSIST. UTILITY LITERALLY EXUDED CONFIDENCE HIS ABILITY OBTAIN SUPPORT FOR CATUSK ACTIVITIES VIA DUCKWITZ AND CARSTENS AND CLOSED MEETING ON NOTE THAT HE EXPECTED "BE AROUND FOR NEXT YEAR OR TWO."

S E C R E T

**SECRET**

*Sweetness and light in  
Munch. But Brown  
seems to remain another  
matter.  
J*

18. 11. 39

H. 6 72 100 5. 7. 11. 39

Befehl

dem Chef des Generalstabes der vorgesetzten Kdo.-Behörde:

Wiederholungsantrag auf Erlassung eines  
mündlichen Befehls und eines Spillungsbeschlusses  
über die Angelegenheiten der  
in der Anlage 1 aufgeführten Angelegenheiten in der  
Anlage 2

1. 11. 39

*[Signature]*  
Generalstab  
H. 6 72 100 5. 7. 11. 39

Zusatz:  
vorgesetzter Dienststellen

*[Signature]*

He was promoted  
to Brig General  
in 1944

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

ANNAIS. T. 1111.

Neeressellung. Personalamt.

Neeressellung.

Neeressellung.

Copy made from original  
Jewelry from 1920 and the same  
is now in the hands of the  
author.

NWJ-003821



Gen. May  
Nr. 18

# Personal-Nachweis

Gehlen, Johann, Kaufmann

geb. 3. April 1902 in Erfurt Kreis Erfurt

Land: Preußen Religion: evangelisch

Vater: Walther Gehlen, Major a. D., Berlin

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Mutter: Käthe Gehlen, geb. von Linsing, + 1. März 1910, geb. in  
Kruppen-Gelmerode, Kreis Hünfeld, Hesse-Nassau, am  
Jah. 1927

Bildungsgang: Erziehung im Elternhaus, 1908 bis 1910  
Wilhelms-Gymnasium in Berlin, anschließend das  
Hochschulstudium

Berufsweg: Studium der Rechtswissenschaften in Berlin  
geb. 1904, Aufnahme in das Studium in Berlin  
am 1. April 1904, Aufnahme in das Studium in Berlin

am 1. April 1904, Aufnahme in das Studium in Berlin

am 1. April 1904, Aufnahme in das Studium in Berlin

1902	3.4		Geburt	
1920	20.4		+ Rev. Carl P. O. einget.	
1921	1.1		+ Carl P. O. einget.	
1922	29		Geburt	
1923	1.8		Geburt	
	18.12		Lauter in 18.12.23 (4)	214/12.23-879
1926	8.9		in 18.12.26 auf 1 Jahr alt Lauter einget.	
			Rev. Carl P. O. - einget. Rev.	214/12.26-879
1927	22.8		in 1.10.27 Geburt auf 1.10.27 einget.	214/12.27-879
1928	1.2		in R. A. A. 1.2.28 (20)	214/12.28-879
1929	12.8		in 1.10.29 Geburt auf 1.10.29 einget.	
1933	8.8		in 1.10.33 Geburt auf 1.10.33 einget.	
1934	1.5		Geburt (17)	
			in 1.10.34 Geburt auf 1.10.34 einget.	
1935	5.7		in 10.7.35 Geburt auf 10.7.35 einget.	
			Geburt 1.10.35 auf 1.10.35 einget.	
			1.10.35 Geburt auf 1.10.35 einget.	
	15.10		in 15.10.35 Geburt auf 15.10.35 einget.	
			in 15.10.35 Geburt auf 15.10.35 einget.	
1936	7.7		in 7.7.36 Geburt auf 7.7.36 einget.	
1937	8.1		in 10.1.37 Geburt auf 10.1.37 einget.	
			in 10.1.37 Geburt auf 10.1.37 einget.	
	31.5		in 31.5.37 Geburt auf 31.5.37 einget.	
1937	7.6		in 7.6.37 Geburt auf 7.6.37 einget.	
	8.7		in 8.7.37 Geburt auf 8.7.37 einget.	
1938	10.4		in 10.4.38 Geburt auf 10.4.38 einget.	
1939	1.3		in 1.3.39 Geburt auf 1.3.39 einget.	
	1.4		in 1.4.39 Geburt auf 1.4.39 einget.	
	26.8		in 26.8.39 Geburt auf 26.8.39 einget.	

[illegible]



Op.Abt, Gen St d H.

Op. 1311/417  
O.U., den 7.11.42

### Beurteilung

(für Offiziere in Gen.St. Stellen)

über den

Oberstleutnant i.G. (akt.) G e h l e n Reinhard, Operationsabteilung

Geboren am: 3.4.02

Letzte Friedensdienststelle: 1. Regt. 18

Laufbahn: Offizier mit Kriegsschul-B.D.A. 1.7.41 (2)  
ausbildung

Art der Verwendung: Gruppenleiter	seit: 7.10.40
Kurze Beurteilung: (Persönlichkeitswert, Bewährung vor dem Feinde, dienstliche Leistungen)	Bescheidene, sympathische Persönlichkeit. Sehr strebsam. Vor dem Feinde voll bewährt. Ein weitaus über dem Durchschnitt liegender Generalstabsoffizier, der operativen Aufgaben vorzuziehen hat und einer Reihe von schwierigen Aufgaben, wie sie ihm in der letzten Zeit zugefallen sind, mit großer Fähigkeit zu meistern vermag.
E.K. 2.Kl. 2.10.39. Kr.V, Kr. 1.Kl. 21.5.41.	
Sprachkenntnisse: (dabei abgelegte Prüfungen (Jahr))	Französisch: Schulkenntnisse
Wie wird jetzige Stelle ausgefüllt?	Sehr gut.
Eignung zur nächsthöheren Verwendung:	Korpschef oder Armeestabschef.
Eignung für besondere oder anderweitige Verwendung:	
Wann und zu welchen Punkten einer etwaigen ungünstigen Beurteilung ist Eröffnung erfolgt?	

Generalmajor i. R. 1. Regt. 18

ratons-Abteilung O.K.R.  
(Dienststelle)

05.11.38

O.V. den 10. Februar 1941

## Beurteilung

(für Offiziere in Gen. St. Stellen)

über den

Major i.G.

(Dienstgrad)

G e h l e n

(Name)

Reinhard

(Beförderung)

Op. Abt.

(Dienststelle)

kt. Truppenoffz.

born am: 3.4.1902

ffahrt: Offz. mit Kriegsschulaus-  
bildung

Rechte Friedensdienststelle: Art. Rgt. 18

(bim. III. B. R. u. St. Tr. Teil)

A. D. R. 1.6.38 (1a)

(m. Ordn. Rzt.)

der Verwendung: Gruppenleiter

St. 7.10.40

Beurteilung:

Persönlichkeitswert, Bewährung vor dem  
Feinde, dienstl. Leistungen)

Ein Generalstabsoffizier, wie er sein soll.  
Nach Persönlichkeit, Können und Fleiß weit  
über dem Durchschnitt stehend, vor allem  
sprechender operativer Begabung und voraus-  
schauendem Denken.  
Vor dem Feinde voll bewährt.

Schulkenntnisse:

abgelegte Prüfungen (Jahr)

Schulkenntnisse in Französisch

wird fehlge Stelle ausgefüllt?

Sehr gut.

ung zur nächsthöheren Verwendung

Korpsschef oder Abteilungsschef.

ung für besondere oder anderweitige Ver-  
wendung

nn und zu welchen Punkten einer einfolgen  
ngAnstigen Beurteilung ist Eröffnung erfolgt?

05.11.38

ST AVAILABLE COPY

*Jan. 1941*

Oberst und Abteilungsschef

(Dienstgrad und Dienststelle)

Des Chefs des Generalstabes der kaiserlichen Arm.-Schlacht:

[illegible]

34140

### Geographische Beschreibung:

vor der Bildung von ...  
abnehmenden ...  
agronomischer ...  
Ueber den ...  
Nach ...  
Ein ...

100 112

የግንዛቤ ምረቃ

[illegible]

၁၂၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့၊

*[Faint, illegible handwriting]*

shown to hold for any principle.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840.

Humanities Center, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1110 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, IL 60607-7171, USA

071



# Dienstlaufbahn.

| Nr. | Datum |     |       | Dienst-<br>grad | Truppen-<br>teil usw. | Inhalt der Verfügung, Art der Veränderung usw.                                                                                                 |
|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|     | Jahr  | Tag | Monat |                 |                       |                                                                                                                                                |
| 26  | 1935  | 10  | 8     |                 | R. d. M.              | versetzt, nach gleich. Zeit. zum Gen. Stab<br>auf dem Rhein. u. a. d. 1. Inf. Div. u. a. d.<br>Leibf. f. d. 1. Inf. Div. u. a. d. 1. Inf. Div. |
| 27  | 1936  | 2   | 3     |                 |                       | Leibf. mit 6. 10. 36 für d. 1. Inf. Div.                                                                                                       |
| 28  | 1937  | 8   | 1     |                 |                       | am 21. 1. 37 in den Gen. Stab 1. Inf. Div.                                                                                                     |
| 29  |       | 8   | 7     |                 |                       | Leibf. mit 2. 8. 37, 10. 37. 37.                                                                                                               |
| 30  | 1938  | 10  | 11    |                 | Br. 1. 11             | Leibf. 1. 11. 38. 11. 38. 11. 38. 11. 38.                                                                                                      |
| 31  | 1939  | 28  | 2     | Major           |                       | bes. m. W. V. 13. 39 / 11.                                                                                                                     |
| 32  |       | 20  | 4     |                 |                       | ausw. R. d. M. 1. 6. 38 (10.)                                                                                                                  |
| 33  |       |     |       |                 | Inf. Div.             | Gen. Stab                                                                                                                                      |
| 34  |       | 6   | 10    |                 |                       | Leibf. mit 6. 10. 38. 10. 38. 10. 38. 10. 38.                                                                                                  |
| 35  | 1940  | 15  | 10    |                 |                       | Leibf. mit 15. 10. 40. 10. 40. 10. 40. 10. 40.                                                                                                 |
| 36  | 1941  | 14  | 6     | Staffel         |                       | Leibf. mit 14. 6. 41. 6. 41. 6. 41. 6. 41.                                                                                                     |
| 37  | 1942  | 16  | 4     |                 |                       | Leibf. mit 16. 4. 42. 4. 42. 4. 42. 4. 42.                                                                                                     |
| 38  |       | 17  | 12    | Staffel         |                       | Leibf. mit 17. 12. 42. 12. 42. 12. 42. 12. 42.                                                                                                 |
| 39  | 1944  | 1   | 12    | Staffel         |                       | Leibf. mit 1. 12. 44. 12. 44. 12. 44. 12. 44.                                                                                                  |

[illegible]



[illegible]

# Antrag

des Oberleutnant und Adjutanten der 1./A.R.3 Reinhard G. a. h. l. a. n.  
auf Erteilung der Heiratserlaubnis

|    |                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                 |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | Geburtsdag des Antragstellers                                                                                                   | 3. 4. 02 zu Erfurt, evgl.                                                                       |
| 2. | Ruf- und Familien-<br>namen der Braut                                                                                           | <u>Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene v. Seydlitz-Kurzbach</u><br>geb. 17. 4. 04                      |
| 3. | Vor- und Zunamen<br>Beruf und Wohnort<br>des Vaters oder<br>gegebenenfalls der<br>Mutter und Braut                              | <u>Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach</u><br>Oberstleutn. a. B., Blogau, Neue Wallstr. 18. |
| 4. | Name und Beruf<br>des verstorbenen oder<br>geschiedenen Ehegatten<br>der Braut, falls diese<br>verwitwet oder<br>geschieden ist |                                                                                                 |

5. Erklärung  
gemäß § 18a und b  
der Heiratsordnung

Ich erkläre pflichtgemäß, dass

a) ich und meine Ueberzeugung noch auch keine  
Braut schuldensfrei sind, den 3. August 1903

b) Ich und meine Braut über alle unsere  
Führung eines schuldensfreien Lebens  
selbst verfügen. den 3. August 1903

Anmerkung: (Die erforderlichen Unterlagen sind  
dem Regiment mit dem Antrag an die Heiratskommission  
der Verlobung eingereicht.)

Beurwortung v. Schweidnitz, den 1. August 1903  
Anmerkungen der Kaiserl. Heiratskommission sind  
nicht vorhanden.

Die Heiratskommission hat die Verlobung der  
oben genannten Personen, die sich als  
ledig und unverheiratet erklären, in Zusammenhang mit  
ihrem Leben und Beruf als einvernehmlich und  
schuldensfrei befunden. Die Heiratskommission hat  
keine Bedenken, die Verlobung zu genehmigen.

den Kommandeur der 1. Abteilung 3. (Preuss.) Artill. Regiments

Herrn Oberst von O n d a r z a, Hochwühlgeboren


Schweidnitz

Berlin, den 15. Juni 1937.

Oberquartiermeister I.

Herrn Generalmajor von Manstein.

Anliegend wird ein Urlaubsgesuch des Hauptmanns G e h l e n  
befürwortend weitergereicht.



über G. Z. an

P. A. mitgezogen.

J. A.  
Hampel.

UNRECHTLICHE KOPIE

Anhang  
zur Personalakte

Der vorerwähnten Wirkung werden versetzt:

pp.

die Majore

pp.

Chef d. n. Im Generalstabe der 213. Infanteriedivision, in den  
Generalstab des Heeres als Leiter der Gruppe Landes-  
befestigung;

pp.

H.Qu.O.K.H., den 6. Oktober 1939

Der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres

I.A.

ggz: von der Chevallerie

Verteiler: pp.

Az: 21 c PA/GZ (1) Gen St d n

Nr. 473/39 (1. Staffel)

erf. Mitte

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



Berlin, den 8. August 1931

La

1894

...*... vorgelagt*

Reichsmeßm

Generalmajor.

Barbara M. 68, den  
Katholikentage 68/69.  
Fernsprecher B 5 Barbarossa 9001

Frankfurter B 5 Barbarossa 0001  
*Handwritten signature: Peter Paulus Romig*

Ben Thompson

1 Anlage

and person.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3. (Proust) Art. 1, Regt.

Art. 1, Regt. Nr. 1352/31 geh.

Frankfurt (O.), den 5. August 1934.

Heiratsverlaubnis Oberleutnant Gehlen

**Geheim!**

Artillerie-Führer III

Abt. 1, Regt. 1352/31

Abt. 1, Regt. 1352/31

Abt. 1, Regt. 1352/31

Die Voraussetzungen der Ziffer 3 der Heiratsordnung sind

als erfüllt anzusehen. Nach den persönlichen Verhältnissen der Verlobten mindestens Vorhandensein der ersten Einkünfte, Einkommen, Lebensansprüche und Charakteranlagen in Zusammenhang mit den örtlichen Lebensverhältnissen besteht die Aussicht, daß die beachtliche Lage der Soldaten nicht abträglich sein wird.

- 1. Anlager -

Oberst und Regimentskommandeur

Jan 17 1944  
Berlin, 17.1.44

Berlin, 18.1.44

Ant.

M

P. A. (3)

1/1  
2/1

in vor- und  
weitergeleitet.

Polmann

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

19. Juni 1937.

ab 19. Juni 1937

Hauptmann W. H. J. E. H. in der 1. Abt. des Gen. St. d. H.  
wird von 21. bis 24. Juni nach Schweden beurlaubt.

Beurlaubung mit 2 Anlagen

1. Abt. Gen. St. d. H. 3. Abt. Att. Gr.  
mit Kenntnis.

|                  |
|------------------|
| Gen. St. d. H.   |
| 3. Abt. Att. Gr. |
| 21. Juni 1937    |
| St. 1421/37      |

3. Abt. Att. Gr. III  
durch 22.6.37

I. A.

V. Albrecht

BEST



100

*Handwritten signature*

**Abstract**

SECRET

**Der Parteiführer des Monats**

44- van Breda 1200

CONFIDENTIAL

Perf. 204e

**KANSAS**

General

Mit dem 1. Mai 1942 werden ernannt:

die Oberleutnante

Cochran im Generalstabe des Heeres (Operationsabteilung), zum  
Abteilungschef im Generalstabe des Heeres (Abteilung  
Heere Ost).

H. Qu. O. K. H., den 26. April 19

**Oberkommando des Heer**

**RECEIVED**

As. 216 RA/Gen Bt d H (G3 I)

13625/12 2014

**Aussug**

Mit sofortiger Wirkung werden ernannt:  
die Obersten

**Allmendinger**, Abteilungschef im Generalstab des  
Heeres (Abteilung Landesbefestigung), zum Chef  
des Generalstabes des V. Armee-Korps

**Rohrlich**, Chef des Generalstabes des V. Armee-Korps, zum  
Abteilungschef im Generalstab des Heeres (Aus-  
bildungsabteilung)

Mit sofortiger Wirkung werden versetzt:  
der Oberstleutnant

**Krebs**, Abteilungschef im Generalstab des Heeres (Ausbildungs-  
abteilung), in die Führerabteilung des Oberkommandos des  
Heeres; seinen Dienst regelt der Oberquartiermeister IV,  
als Major

**Gehlen**, im Generalstab der 213. Infanterie-Division, in den  
Generalstab des Heeres als Leiter der Gruppe Landes-  
befestigung;

**Hass**, im Generalstab des Stellvertretenden Generalkommandos  
VII. Armee-Korps, in den Generalstab der 213. Infanterie-  
Division

pp.

H.Q., G.H., den 5. Oktober 1939  
Der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres  
I.d. ganz v.d. Cavallerie

Verteiler: pp.

**Anst. d. G.H. (I) Gen. St. d. H.**  
**St. 37/39 (I. St. d. H.)**

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

**St. 37/39 (I. St. d. H.)**

Auszug

G e h e i m

A Truppenoffiziere

Mit Wirkung vom 1. Dezember 1942 werden befördert:  
Friedenstr. Teil Mob. Tr. Teil R.D.A.  
1. April 1942

Name

zu Obersten:  
die Oberstleutnants:

Gehlen

*Reinhardt*

d. Gen. St., zuletzt im Gen. St. d. H.  
1. Art. Rgt. 18  
(RDA als Obstdt. 1.7.41(2))

Führerhauptquartier, den 18. Dezember 1942

Der Führer  
Gen. Adolf Hitler

Oberkommando des Heeres

Im Auftrage  
Gen. Schmundt

Generalmajor

und Chef des Heerespersonalsamts

Nr. 8769/42 PA/AG P 1/1. Abt. (G)

Pers. Akte

Auszug

G e h e i m

Mit dem 7. Oktober 1940 tritt ein  
der Major

G e h e i m Leiter der Gruppe Landabteilung  
Adjutant des Chefs des Generalstabes  
Operationsabteilung im Generalstab

Verteiler pp

Az. 21c PA/GZ(I) Gen. St. d. H.  
Nr. 2396/40, geh. (1. Staff.)

ref. Mitte

Auszug

G e h e i m

A Truppenoffiziere  
Mit Wirkung vom 1. Dezember 1942 werden befördert:  
Friedenstr. Teil Mob. Tr. Teil R.D.A.  
1. April 1942

Name

zu Obersten:  
die Oberstleutnante:

Gehlen

Reinhold

d. Gen. St., zuletzt im. Gen. St. d. H.  
i. Art. Rgt. 18  
(RDA als Obstlt. 1.7.41(2))

(144 a)

Führerhauptquartier, den 18. Dezember 1942  
Der Führer

gez. Adolf Hitler

Oberkommando des Heeres  
Im Auftrage

gez. Schmuntz

Generalmajor

und Chef des Heerespersonalamts

Nr. 8769/42 PA/45 P 1/1. Abt. (c)

Pers. Akte

Auszug

G e h e i m

Mit dem 7. Oktober 1940 tritt über  
der Major

G e h e i m Leiter der Gruppe Landesbesetzung, zur Zeit  
Adjutant des Chefs des Generalstabes der Heeres-  
Operationsabteilung im Generalstab des Heeres

REST

Verteiler pp

H. Qu. d. H., den 25. Oktober 1940  
Der Oberbefehlshaber  
gez. von Brandt

Az. 21c PA/GZ(I) Gen. St. d. H.  
Nr. 2396/40 geh. (1:Staffel)

ers. Akte

~~SECRET~~ CONTROL

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT/WAR DEPARTMENT  
MISSION TO GERMANY  
APO 757

G-5115-532

#1

~~X-115-2014~~

LBX-005-106

LBX-005-108

8 January 1946

TO: SAINT, Washington  
FROM: SAINT, AMZON  
SUBJECT: Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service

1. In October it was learned that the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USFET, had in protective custody several former staff officers of Fremde Heere Ost. This office was naturally interested and through discreet inquiries learned some details of the situation.

2. It appears that the Fremde Heere Ost staff under General von Gehlen retreated successfully from Warsaw through Eastern Germany south to Memmingen and thence to the vicinity of Obersdorf near the Austrian frontier. Von Gehlen, having had control of Fremde Heere Ost intelligence echelon responsible for German intelligence on the Eastern front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, decided to turn himself in to the American forces rather than risk capture by the Russians. This he managed to do, together with seven of his staff officers, most of whom were experts on Russian order of battle both of the Ground Forces and Air Forces.

3. When his American captors suggested that he leave Germany and come to the United States to work with the experts on the Russian Army of the War Department in Washington, he promptly agreed to do so, recommending that the chief of his secret intelligence operations, Major Herman Baun (subject, unnumbered SHAF card, copy attached), who had become separated with a few other officers from the old Stab Walli, be contacted to join the party. Active efforts were made to locate Baun to no avail and the original group set off with von Gehlen for Washington where it is presumed they still are.

4. Baun had meanwhile escaped to the area of southwestern Germany which ultimately became the French Zone. When he realized this, he arranged through a contact with the American Consular authorities in Switzerland to turn himself in to the CIC in AMZON. This was done and the CIC processed him like a normal automatic arrestee through the Third Army cage at Freising, publishing his name on the daily arrest sheets and giving the PIR the normal dissemination.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED OR CHANGED TO

~~SECRET~~ CONTROL

by AUTHORITY OF

24 APR 1992

~~SECRET~~ SECRET CONTROL

- 2 -

5. The arrival of the PIR at USFET caused a considerable uproar and immediate efforts were undertaken to get Baun to Oberursel under an assumed name and to cover what was from G-2 USFET point of view a breach of security involved in publication of the news of capture. The damage, however, had been done and it is understood that the Russian Liaison Officer was immediately instructed by his superior officers to ask for transfer of Baun, von Gehlen and several other members of the same command, to Russian custody for interrogation. Needless to say, this request was not granted.

6. Baun had with him a Lt. Colonel Fesel (FNU) and three or four minor non-coms formerly belonging to Stab Walli. These men are now living at Oberursel in a private house under cover names. They have not been interrogated by any CI personnel and every effort has been made to keep their presence a secret not only from outsiders but also from officers of Counter-Intelligence Branch, USFET. They are in the custody of three junior officers of the G-2 Section, who are using them as advisors on incoming intelligence which concerns the Russian Army or intelligence structure.

7. Also at Oberursel but strictly apart from Baun and his colleagues are several other former Russian officers, including General Malishkin. Malishkin is likewise giving "expert" advice on the Russian military situation. An example of the type of material being provided by Baun is the attached Appendix A, which was furnished at the request of G-2 as a check on Malishkin by Baun himself.

8. It seems apparent from frequent conversations with the officers responsible for Baun, that G-2 originally contemplated setting him up with funds and personnel to run an intelligence net against Soviet Russia. They soon realized, however, that they had neither the facility nor experienced officers competent to run such an enterprise and have therefore asked on a very informal level for the advice of X-2 Branch as to what they should do next. Since the whole situation was a delicate one, we have kept our contact with the responsible officers in G-2 in this matter on an informal level and have advised them to interrogate Baun at length and have nothing to do with his schemes for further intelligence activity. G-2 has so far not followed the first of our recommendations but I believe they will follow the second. We have further recommended that Baun draw up a list of his principal assistants whom he now believes to be in AMSON and that efforts be made to contact these men with a view to interrogating them and discovering if they have any documents. This was done in early December but the results so far are not known here.

9. From the point of view of the X-2 Branch, the most important member of Stab Walli was not Baun nor in fact any of his colleagues but rather Oberstleutnant SCHILLER-SCHWABER @ Dr. WILLER (subject CHAFF card # 4056), who was head of Section 3 at Stab Walli after August 1941. Frequent rumor stated that he had been captured by the British, but through a contact in the Munich area he was discovered living under an assumed name in Nurnburg. He was taken to Munich where he was interrogated at length by Sgt. Holtsman and a good deal of valuable information

~~SECRET~~ SECRET CONTROL

~~SECRET~~ SECRET CONTROL

- 3 -

was extracted. (See MALT material.) Schmalschlaeger has now been arrested by the CIC owing to an indiscretion of his in visiting his home in Nurnburg, and he is now in an internment camp in the Nurnburg section. Efforts are being made, however, to obtain his transfer to Oberursel where he will be subjected to a thorough interrogation. The reason for his not being sent to Oberursel in the first place was that we were anxious not to get him mixed up with the Baun group, and that the original contact with him was made with the understanding that he would not be immediately sent to an internment camp; it was felt that certain documents belonging to Fremde Heere Ost, which have been recovered and are mentioned in the MALT reports, might be jeopardized if he were not carefully handled.

Encs: 2 cc Appendix A  
2 cc Baun SHAEF card

~~SECRET~~ SECRET CONTROL

2/15/45



APPENDIX A

General MALISHKIN was Chief of Staff of the 6th Soviet Army, in which VLASSOV held the position of Commanding General. After the VLASSOV Army had been activated, MALISHKIN became VLASSOV's adjutant and G-3 of the army. While he travelled for the purpose of organizing the VLASSOV Army, he made preparations for the re-activation of the Communist Party in PARIS.

An agent who might be able to give more detailed information on this subject is at present detained in an American prison in WALEBURG; this agent could be approached if so desired. G-2

While General MALISHKIN held important staff positions in the VLASSOV Army, he was in constant contact with MOSCOW. He used the following channels:

1. Through General FENSHIN, Chief of Staff of the VLASSOV Army and former head of the recruiting area (KRAVIGOV). General TRUCHIN has been a member of long standing of the N.T.S. (usually referred to as Natzmalchiki, National Labor Association); this organization was formed by General KUTJEPOV in 1923 - who was kidnapped in PARIS in 1939 and taken to LENINGRAD - with the purpose of unifying the youth of the Russian emigrants in the BALKANS. Headquarters of the N.T.S. was in BELGRADE. The GPU built its own organization into the N.T.S.; headquarters of this branch of the GPU was in BERN. It was the task of this branch of the GPU to control the Russian emigrants and to build up an additional intelligence net in EUROPE. Through the N.T.S. the GPU had its agents in all important German government offices where Russian youth was employed as interpreters (Ostministerium, RSHA; see SCHULLENBERG report by CSBIC UK). MALABANOV was a leader of the GPU within the N.T.S. in GERMANY.

2. Through JELINKOV, Chief of Propaganda of the VLASSOV Army and former G-4 in the Soviet 6th Army (see above); also through ARUPNI, Chief of Civil Administration of the VLASSOV Army. JELINKOV's uncle is one of the outstanding personalities in the Defense Council in MOSCOW. JELINKOV, his uncle and ARUPNI were regional commissioners in MOSCOW in 1918, when only persons considered absolutely trustworthy were appointed to such positions. Communication between JELINKOV and his uncle was maintained through Madame KOLONIAI in STOCKHOLM; however, not the Soviet Embassy but the Soviet Trade Delegation in STOCKHOLM was used as agency in this operation. A Soviet agent by the name of MALINOV in PRAGUE is MALISHKIN's liaison in this connection.

Contacts with PRAGUE are available through a person detained by the American Army in BREISGau.

~~SECRET~~ SECRET CONTROL



C  
O  
P  
Y

NAME BAUN (Ger) A GERMANY *c/R*

STATUS Major at Ast Warsaw I H. (Apr 44)

ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION

MISC.

CAREER Promoted Hauptmann. (1 Jul 34)  
At Ast Warsaw, directing I H activities on the Eastern Front, under SCHMALSCHLAEGER (q.v.) (from Jul 41)  
At Sofia. (May 43)  
In Berlin. (Jun 43)  
Back in Warsaw. (Aug. 43)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

ODD1 FILE

WAR DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT  
APO 797 US ARMY

21 January 1948

TO: Col. R.L. Mohr, Deputy Director of Intelligence,  
KUCON, APO 797, U.S. Army  
FROM: Chief, War Department Detachment, KUCON, APO 797,  
U.S. Army  
SUBJECT: RUSSIA

1. The following reports are of varying interest and reliability. They are passed to you in accordance with our SOP, and it is hoped that they will be of some value in controlling subject operation.

2. A report dated 1 December and evaluated B-2 states that a former German Foreign Office official had expressed himself as follows:

"German public opinion is severely affected by evidence of lack of faith on the part of the United States in demilitarizing the country. Responsible politicians are fully in sympathy with demilitarization and feel that Germany can only put on her feet again if she remains aloof from the dispute between the US and the USSR, and especially if she keeps an entirely neutral position toward the problem of a future war. Responsible Germans are therefore shocked to find the US intelligence service using the services of a large organization of former German Abwehr officers in what to them must appear as the preparation for the next war. The facts of American use of the Abwehr for espionage are generally known and widely discussed among Germans, and are kept out of the press by the fear of action against responsible editors."

"The subject's own experience was that one young Abwehr officer attempted to recruit him, and three others boasted to him about their new job, even mentioning the chief of their organization by name. He feels certain that the Russians also are fully informed. He himself fears exposing himself by talking too freely about this subject, but is planning to discuss the matter with Mr. Middleberger at the next opportunity, from the point of view of the effect of this action on German faith in its political intentions."

3. A report dated late December and evaluated C-3 states that a former German Foreign Office official located at Ficktostr 4,

SECRET

MGKA 26544

8 Feb 51

Composite Group

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Germany, has in his possession through Communist in-  
formation to the effect that the German General was  
in a ready intelligence organization which is being run for  
the Americans.

Gordon M. Stewart

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

Von Gehlen

MGL-A-138 Subject offered Behrens of sub-organization 102 the position as coordinator or actually leader of 101, 102, and 103. Since Behrens was reluctant to accept, subject suggested that he take over the three groups, but for the present continue to spend most of his time with his own group.

\*\* 1837 XX 9667 11/2/45 Until 2/45 Subject was "Chef Fremde Herre Ost", SCHELLENBURG'S STRONGEST SUPPORTER IN THE army. Subject lost his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack of the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Posen *this is wrong*

\*\* 2014 LBX- 005-108 1/8/46 CONTROL The "Fremde Herre Ost" staff retreated successfully from Warsaw through E. Germany to Memmingen and thence to the vicinity of Obersdorf. Subject, having had control of the intelligence echelon responsible for German intelligence on the Eastern front decided to turn himself in to the American forces rather than risk capture by the Russians. He agreed to leave Germany and come to the U. S. to work with the experts on the Russian army in the War. Dept., Washington, where he is now presumed to be.

LE-003-110 1/10/46 Subject was last heard of by SCHMALSCHLAEGER shortly before the end of the war at Cham/ Bavaria where he stayed with his relatives. Subject stated that he wanted to try to make some kind of a deal with the British (not the Americans). Might have left his papers with his relatives.

IN 43907 Vienna 4 Nov 1946 Poss. id/w Subj. this cable: "Please contact soonest Capt. ~~WALIMAN~~ WALIMAN, MISO Frankfurt 22685 Interno 133 regarding Hans GEHLEN or GEHLENBAUM arrested by CIC in Gorizia 16 October. GEHLEN says WALIMAN will vouch for him. If WALIMAN does not ~~remember~~ remember mention Berndt and VON LOSSOW to him.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

34.1/S

26 May 1949

SUBJECT: Application for Temporary Travel Document in Lieu  
of Passport and/or Military Exit Permit.

TO : 23.3

It is requested to procure a Temporary Travel  
Document for the following person :

Reinhard GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK.

± S

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET  
(Classification)

# INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Request for Temporary Travel Document

DATE: 31 May 1949

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

| No. | From | Pass to         | Date              | HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----|------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1   | TIB  | ID<br>Ops<br>Br | 31<br>May<br>1949 | 1. Request a Temporary Travel Document be issued for Mr. GEHLEN VAN VAERHUYCK, whose application is inclosed.<br><br>2. This document is required in order that necessary travel be performed in connection with this operation.<br><br>FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER: |

1 Incl: a/s

LRD/KB/ir

Telephone: MUNICH 2321

S No. O-2358 Copy 1 of 3 copies

*Edward Bray*  
EDWARD BRAY  
Capt Cav  
Adjutant

2 DD/ID TIB 9 June 49

Temporary Travel Document, requested in Minute 1, handcarried by Captain Ridsen, your organization, this date.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

*RE Kilzer*  
R. E. KILZER  
Capt WAC  
Asst. Control Officer

1 Incl w/d  
BPM/bd/Heid 04255

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Dep Dir Intel TSC  
CD-205  
1

SECRET  
(Classification)

24.17E

SECRET

COUNCIL

TO

HEADQUARTERS  
FBI COMPOSITE GROUP  
COMBINED  
OF ARMY

From:

8 July 1949

SUBJECT: Allied Force Permit

TO : Combined Travel Board Munich  
Attn: Mr. UHLER

1. It is requested that an Allied Force Permit  
for the American State of Austria be issued for

GUTHRIE, Robert

Passport No. 184070

*alias of Gehlre*

3 of 8 copies

WILLIAM R. PHILL  
Colonel FA  
Commanding

*Guthrie*  
MCKA 38544

8 Feb 51

Composite Group

*Reinhard Gehlre*

201.

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

6. Juli 1949

File  
Schneider  
240. K 34  
Drause  
12/23

Ich bin im Besitz folgender Auslandspaesse:

Pass No. 186070 auf den Namen Robert GONTARD  
Pass No. 0006329 auf meinen Klarnamen

Saemtliche Reisen habe ich bisher auf den Namen Robert GONTARD durchgefuehrt, den Pass auf meinen Klarnamen bisher nicht benutzt.

Ausserdem bin ich im Besitz einer AGO Card No. D-147996 auf den Namen Hans HOLBEIN, die jedoch nicht im Ausland benutzt werden kann.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005



7 July 1949

TO : 20  
FROM : 34  
SUBJECT: Cover Names of 34

Ich benutze folgende Decknamen:

1. In Verbindung mit deutschen Papieren:

- a. Dr. Richard SCHWEIDER - geboren 4.3.1905
- b. Richard GARNER - geboren 3.4.1902
- c. Robert GONTARD - geboren 4.3.1905

2. In Verbindung mit einer AGO-Card (D-147996):

Hans HOLBEIN - geboren 21.1.1905

Diesen Namen benutze ich nur in Einzelfaellen, z.B. bei den aeusserst seltenen Reisen nach Oesterreich.

3. Gelegentlich ohne Ausweispapiere:

Dr. GROSS  
Dr. ERNST

Beide Namen werden dort benutzt, wo besondere Vorsicht notwendig ist und gegebenenfalls Verwechslungen mit einer Reihe anderer Persoenlichkeiten, welche die gleichen Namen benutzen, erwuenscht sind.

34

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

den 27. August 1949

Von einer Seite, deren Glaubwürdigkeit schwer zu beurteilen ist, gingen Nachrichten ueber die Errichtung eines sowjetischen ND-Netzes in OESTERREICH ein.

Mit Feststellungszeitraum Mitte Mai bis Ende Juni 1949 wurde berichtet:

- A. Die Sowjets errichten in OESTERREICH eine ND-Organisation aus solchen Deutschen und oesterreichischen Abwehrangehoerigen, die noch nicht ND-maessig gegen die Sowjetunion taetig waren.

Ziel dieser Organisation: Bei einem etwaigen Abzug der sowjetischen Besatzung eine ND-Organisation zu haben.

Personen, die Agenten anwerben, machen angeblich folgende Angaben:

Die "PAULUS/SEYDLITZ-Armee" hat das Recht, eine besondere ND-Organisation aufzustellen, die in OESTERREICH und ueber OESTERREICH in DEUTSCHLAND, JUGOSLAWIEN und ITALIEN taetig wird.

Angeblich sind die Mitglieder dieser Organisation verpflichtet, ihre Meldungen mit richtigem Namen zu unterschreiben.

Die Taetigkeit der Angehoerigen dieser Organisation wird durch Mitglieder des geheimen ND der KP kontrolliert.

- B. I. USIA sorgt fuer den materiellen Bedarf dieser Organisation, sie unterstuetzt sie durch Ausfertigung von Transportscheinen, durch die Errichtung von Handelsverbindungen und Zweigstellen zu Tarnzwecken.

Jun 7, 1949  
Box: 1000  
Poster to: 2-10

2-

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

ATTACHMENT "A" (SL2/1976)

This report was given to ☐ by ☐ ☐  
in the week of 4 - 10 September.

Source of this report is ☐ ☐ ☐

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

- 2 -

II. Sowjetische Direktionsgruppe :

Diese hat folgende Mitglieder:

- 1.) /JELLAGIN, sowjet. Oberstleutnant, ca. 60 Jahre alt, 178 cm gross, mager, dunkle Augen, graue Haare, spricht fließend deutsch.
- 2.) ---- sowjet. Major, ca. 54 Jahre alt, 175 cm gross, kahl, graue Augen, spricht perfekt deutsch.
- 3.) /GRIGORIAN, Adjutant, ca. 35 Jahre alt, etwa 173 cm gross, schwarz, helle Augen.

III. Oesterreichische Gruppe:

1.) Mitglieder:

- a) Dr. RIEDL, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehöriger ca. 55-60 Jahre alt, mittelgross, beleibt, schütteres Haar, graue Augen, hat viele Decknamen, u.a. Dr. PAULUS. Wird als Fachleiter der Gruppe bezeichnet.
- b) Dr. POSCH, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehöriger, Rechtsanwalt, wohnhaft WIEN I, Schwarzenbergstr. 3/1.

2.) Aufgabengebiet:

- a) Allgemein:  
Durchführung der ND-Fachaufträge,  
Deckung der materiellen Bedürfnisse der oesterr. und jugoslawischen Gruppe,  
Bezahlung und Belohnung.
- b) Spezielle Aufträge der österreichischen Gruppe:  
Feststellung der amerikanischen ND-Gruppen,  
Feststellung der Agenten dieser Gruppen, welche aus Raum SALZBURG nach WIEN und in die Satellitenstaaten arbeiten.  
Verbindungsaufnahme mit diesen Agenten, sie entweder zur Mitarbeit gewinnen, oder vernichten (es soll Agenten geben, auf deren Kopf 100000 Schilling gesetzt sind).

Feststellung und Klärung der Agenten, die nach Abzug der Westmächte aus OESTERREICH zurückbleiben. Klärung der Aufgaben dieser Agenten.

Einbau einer ND-Gruppe in OBEROESTERREICH fuer die Fuehrergruppe.

Klärung der in die KP und in die sowjetischen Dienststellen eingebauten Agenten.

Klärung der Verbindungsleute der amerikanischen und britischen ND-Stellen.

Klärung der in NIEDEROESTERREICH arbeitenden "Grossagenten".

Einbau von Mitarbeitern bei CIC.

Klärung der Taetigkeit des CIC hinsichtlich Erfassung von Agenten.

Klaeraktionen

Auf die Taetigkeit der Franzosen wird weniger Wert gelegt, da deren Taetigkeit durch sowjetische Agenten geklaert erscheint.

#### IV. Jugoslawische Gruppe:

- 1.) Leiter: Dr. BOEHM, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehoeriger, ca 180 cm gross, schwarz, dunkle Augen, traegt staendig einen Ledermantel. Jurist, hochintelligent, hat angeblich in MOSKAU an einem dreijaehrigen Ausbildungskursus teilgenommen.
- 2.) Aufgaben: ND-Taetigkeit in JUGOSLAWIEN.

#### V. Spezialkommando:

- 1.) Leiter: Major / FUEHRER, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehoeriger, wohnhaft in WIEN, sehr intelligent und sehr gefaehrlich.
- 2.) Aufgaben:
  - a) Ausbildung von Partisanen aus deutschen und oesterreichischen Abwehrleuten. Umsiedlung dieser nach Deutschland, damit diese im Kriegsfall die Partisanenarbeit leiten und Sabotageaktionen durchfuehren koennen.
  - b) Aufbau einer ND-Gruppe in OBEROESTERREICH, die Angehoerigen dieser Gruppe sollen sich nur aus deutschen und oesterreichischen Abwehrangehoerigen und SD-Angehoerigen mindestens im Range eines Hauptmannes zusammensetzen.

VI. Trefforte mit der Fuehrungsgruppe:

Die unter II genannte sowjetische Direktionsgruppe trifft am 7. und 24. jeden Monats mit dem unter III/1a genannten Dr. RIEDL in WIEN I, Opernring 12, II. Stock rechts in einer Zweizimmerwohnung.

Verhandlungszeit: 11 - 16 Uhr und von 19 Uhr bis in die Morgenstunden.

Bei diesen Besprechungen waren bisher nur die Mitglieder der sowjetischen Direktionsgruppe und Dr. RIEDL anwesend.

Ein weiterer Treffort ist WIEN II, Praterstr. (Hausnr. unbekannt).

VII. Hauptagent:

Als einer der Hauptagenten der oesterreichischen Gruppe in WIEN wird ein gewisser Kriminalkommissar (Hauptmann ?) MATTL genannt.

Mit Feststellungszeitraum Anfang bis Mitte Juli 49 werden ergaenzende und weitere Angaben mitgeteilt:

I. Das Kontor des Dr. POSCH befindet sich ebenfalls in WIEN I, Schwarzenbergstr. 8. Tel.: R-26-4-19.

Am Telefon meldet sich die Sekretaerin, eine Frau namens SVOBODA.

II. Dr. RIEDL:

1.) Im Kontor des Dr. POSCH haelt sich auf und verhandelt Dr. RIEDL unter dem Decknamen Dr. BOJKOV.

2.) Dr. RIEDL ist bestrebt, mit der Zentrale des Westeuropaeischen Nachrichtendienstes Verbindung aufzunehmen. Er beabsichtigt, einige Agenten in die ND-Organisation der Westmaechte einzubauen, oder bereits arbeitende Agenten zu gewinnen. Diese sollen dann ihre Mel-

dungen ueber JUGOSLAWIEN ihm, Dr.RIEDL, uebergeben und die ND-Organisation der Westmseechte sollen aus aus diesen Meldungen nur das erhalten, was er fuer notwendig erachtet.

- 3.) Dr.RIEDL ist bestrebt, in TRIEST eine Exportfirma zu errichten. Sie ist als Tarnfirma der gegen JUGOSLAWIEN arbeitenden Spionagezentrale gedacht.
- 4.) Ein Treffpunkt des Dr.RIEDL mit seinen Agenten ist in WIEN, Cafe "PRUECKEL" (naechere Anschrift unbekannt).

### III. Aufgaben der Gruppe des Dr. RIEDL:

1.) Feststellung der genauen Anschriften, Lebensverhaeltnisse und Gewohnheiten folgender - wahrscheinlich im amerikanischen ND stehender - Personen:

#### a) in OESTERREICH:

|                    |                                                                                    |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| /ORTNEY, Karl      | wh. THALGAU b.SALZBURG,                                                            |
| Baron Dr.SAAR,     | Bezirksrichter, wohnh.THALGAU b.SALZBURG,                                          |
| /JURANKA, Aribert, | wohnh.MAXGIAN, Kaiser Karl Gasse Nr.2                                              |
| Dr.KITTL,          | wohnh. SALZBURG,                                                                   |
| Eleonor NAGY,      | wohnh. SALZBURG, Linzergasse 32                                                    |
| HARSHEGYI,         | wohnh. SALZBURG, Hotel Gablerbraeu, DP.                                            |
| Ing. KAUTERS       | (Deckname KLATT), wohnh-St.GILGEN, Heim 38 und Kontor in SALZBURG, Schwarz-Str.30. |

#### b) in DEUTSCHLAND:

|                 |                                                       |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Oberst SENSBURG | wohnh. WIESBADEN, leitet ein angebliches ND-Netz,     |
| KRASO           | angebl.Hauptagent von SENSBURG, wohnh. TRAUNSTEIN (?) |

2.) Aufklaerung der Anlaufstelle der nach der GSR arbeitenden GIC-Agenten. Die Anlaufstelle soll angeblich

in MARKTREDWITZ sein.

IV. Mitarbeiter des Dr. RIEDL:

Ein Mitarbeiter des Dr. RIEDL ist ein Gutsbesitzer Josef DUERFELD, wohnhaft MORZG bei SALZBURG, etwa 40 Jahre alt, 174 cm gross, graue Augen, spaerliche blonde Haare, mager, schlechte schwarze Zaehne. Traegt dauernd kurze Lederhose und faehrt immer mit Fahrrad.

Von anderer, zuverlaessiger Seite ging mit Feststellungszeitraum Ende Juni, Anfang Juli folgende Nachricht ein:

Ein gewisser Johannes BERGER, wohnhaft MUENCHEN, Katzmeierstr. 75-IV b. BAADER, hat einen fruerehen Angehoerigen der Abwehr II angelaufen. Er berief sich hierbei auf zwei Personen, welche jedoch nicht erreichbar sind, da der eine noch in russ. Kgf. und der andere vermutlich in der Ostzone wohnhaft ist. Persoenlich war BERGER dem angelaufenen II-Mann nicht bekannt. Als Legende hat BERGER Verwechslung mit einer anderen Person angegeben.

C. C. 2-11614



1.11.49

Betrifft: Bericht über Kominform Salzburg

1.11.49

1./ Laut 61 ist der Leiter des Kominformbüros in Salzburg Professor GRIMM, Vorsitzender der Freunde der Sowjetunion und Redakteur des KP-Tagblattes in Salzburg.

2./ Die Freundin des GRIMM ist Fräulein Margit NESSLER, die als Buchhalterin bei den Amerikanern beschäftigt ist und in der Lage ist für die KP interessantes Material von den Amerikanern zu beschaffen.

3./ Der Verbindungsmann zwischen Kominform-Büro und Professor GRIMM ist der Jude GRÜNBERG, dessen Sitz in Wien ist, der aber viel im Ausland, wie z.B. Schweiz und Frankreich herumkommt.

Betrifft: Neue Bohrungen in Zistersdorf

Im Jahre 1945 hatte ein russischer Major den Auftrag die genauen Pläne über 12 neue Bohrungen in Zistersdorf, die sich damals in Händen der deutschen Verwaltung in Zistersdorf befanden zu erlangen. Der Auftrag mißlang, der Major wurde erschossen. Nun soll angeblich GRÜNBERG diese Pläne haben. Zu bemerken ist, dass auf Grund dieser neuen Pläne der Ertrag in Zistersdorf um das 5-fache gesteigert werden könnte. Bei den Geheimverhandlungen in London spielen diese Pläne eine große Rolle. GRÜNBERG soll die Absicht haben, diese Pläne an die Schweiz um den Betrag von 20.000 Schilling zu verkaufen. Von der Schweiz aus sollen sie dann den Russen angeboten werden. Der französische Nachrichtendienst ist dieser Sache auf der Spur. Ein ehemaliges Mitglied der Verwaltung Zistersdorf Dr. PHILIPPOVICH (arbeitet angeblich für die Russen) ist der Meinung, dass Grünberg die Pläne nicht hat, sondern nur gute Nachahmungen derselben an den Mann bringen will. Zurzeit sind alle Agenten russischerseits damit beschäftigt die Pläne in die Hand zu bekommen. Angeblich hat der Russe 20.000 Schillinge geboten.

Grünberg soll auch mit dem CIC zusammenspielen und sich mehr auf diese Seite fixieren, da man Juden gegenüber von Seiten der Russen eher mißtrauisch ist. Laut 61 hat aber Grünberg noch sehr viel im Kominform-Büro in Wien zu reden.

CH. G. 1442-3878

ATTACHMENT "B" (S12/1976)

These reports were given to Bureau by Grapefruit-IV.

Source: Subject of BGR/100

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Betrifft: Dr. GILGSAU, Innsbruck

1./ Landesleiter des VdU in Tirol, kämpfte auf Seiten der Franzosen gegen Deutschland, ist heute V.M. der Franzosen und als solcher in den VdU gegangen. Die Sache flog auf und Ritschnau mußte gehen.

Betrifft: Dr. KRAUS

1./ Dem Russen ist bekannt, dass Dr. KRAUS mit dem Amerikaner arbeitet. (siehe Dr. HÖTTL)

2./ Die Russen werden Dr. Kraus nicht unterstützen, wenn er seine Beziehungen zum CIC nicht aufgibt. Der Versuch des Dr. Kraus auch mit den Russen auf einen guten Fuß zu kommen, ist vorläufig gescheitert.

3./ Die Russen wollen die Verbindung des Dr. Kraus zu Otto von Habsburg kennenlernen.

Betrifft: Dr. Willi HÖTTL

1./ Dr. Willi HÖTTL, SS Sturmbannführer, Leiter des Amtes VI E (Ungarn und Balkan). Chef des Höttil war WEISEK vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Höttil ist politischer Ratgeber des Dr. KRAUS. Sein Sitz ist Gmunden, Villa LUI E. Höttil hat das Bestreben die deutschen und österreichischen Gruppen, die nachrichtendienstlich arbeiten in einen europäischen N.D. zusammenzufassen. Engster Mitarbeiter des Höttil ist Erich KERNMEYER. Kernmeyer hat im Jahre 1945 viele Nazi denunziert und ist heute ein sehr unverlässlicher, aber sehr gut bezahlter Agent des CIC.

2./ Wie der russische N.D. 61 mitteilte und wie auch 61 von Agentenkollegen in Wien weiß, fahren russische Agenten des öfteren nach Gmunden und erhalten dort das für den Amerikaner bestimmte Material in Durchschrift für Geld.

3./ Höttil ist mit DULLES in Verbindung, den er hin und wieder an der Schweizer Grenze trifft. Höttil wird bei diesen Gelegenheiten vom französischen N.D. beobachtet.

Betrifft: Legitimisten

Der Russe will wissen, was LOVREK macht, wie oft er nach Paris zu Otto von Habsburg fährt und was dieser macht und welche Verbindungen er hat.?

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

Betrifft: Österreichisches Bundesheer

Der Personalreferent des Bundesheeres soll Major SEDLIZKI sein??  
ehemaliger Adjutant General VAUGOIN. Die Russen interessieren sich  
für die hier bekannten Leute, die für das Bundesheer arbeiten.

Betrifft: Pole namens ??

61 hat Auftrag einen bedeutenden Polen, der zurzeit in Salzburg  
ist den Russen auszuliefern, er hofft, dass er diesen mittels Hilfe  
seines CIC-Verbindungsmannes und dem französischen ND (Die werden  
aber falsch unterrichtet) fassen kann.

Betrifft: Triester Firma

61 arbeitet zurzeit an der Triester Bache, einer Im- und Export-  
firma des Dr. POSCH, welche von den Engländern finanziert werden  
soll. Besprechungen finden zurzeit in Innsbruck statt.

Betrifft: Ing. KAUDERS (KLATT), Salzburg, Schwarzstrasse 30, Wohnung  
St. Gilgen, Leim 38 mit seiner Freundin IByola KALMANN.

Klatt arbeitete bis April dieses Jahres mit den Amerikanern,  
wurde aber dann von diesen herausgeworfen.  
Sein Chef war Oberst WAGNER (DELIUS war damals sein Deckname).  
Auf diesen haben die Russen besonders viel gesetzt.  
Grund: Klatt war derjenige, der mittels Funksprüchen im russischen  
Text die Russen in Rumänien und Bulgarien zum Narren gehalten hat.  
Er gab russische Order durch, wodurch die Russen verschiedentlich  
an vollkommen falschen Stellen angegriffen haben und in ihrer  
Taktik irregeleitet wurden. Man weiß, dass er mit einem ND arbeitet  
und russischerseits wird vermutet, dass er jetzt wieder mit Oberst  
WAGNER arbeitet, der in LÖRACH in Baden sitzt und mit den Franzosen  
arbeitet.

Betrifft: Siegfried KAHN, geb. 17.8.1920 in Lechheim, Deutschland  
neutr. Amerikaner

KAHN ist bekannt durch seinen Hass gegen alles Deutsche (in  
eigenen Kreisen als Deutschenfresser verschrien). Leiter der Brief-  
zensur in Salzburg. Laut 61 ist er Chef des 69 vom CIC aus.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

KAHN will größere Position im CIC erringen. Auf Grund einer sehr vagen Äußerung des 61 (war schon betrunken) arbeitet Kahn über 69 mit den Russen zusammen.

Betrifft: Dr. Hugo KITTEL, ehemaliger Adjutant Mjr. FEY,

KITTEL lebt in Salzburg, hat Elektrohandel, arbeitet mit den Engländern und trifft sich mit Dr. ALTMANN, englischer Offizier bei der Kontrollkommission Berlin, in London. Sein Mitarbeiter ist ein gewisser Franz GROH ?, bis vor einem Jahr noch russischer Agent, der heute noch via Kittel mit den Russen arbeitet.

Betrifft: Ersuchen des 61 an Rudolf

61 ersucht Rudolf Herrn BAUER (Dr. BÖHM) vor 69 zu warnen. <sup>Rudolf</sup> ~~BAUER~~ könne zwar mit 69 zusammenarbeiten, jedoch solle er ihn nicht in alle jene Sachen einweihen, die 61 mit Rudolf bespricht.

61 behauptet nicht zu wissen, wo sich 62 zurzeit befindet. (vergleiche Bericht 83)

61 betrachtet Rudolf zurzeit als seinen Verbindungsmann zu BAUER Deutschland und will ihn dann überhaupt ganz in seine Triester Organisation einbauen.

Betrifft: Philipp GARON, nicht KORON (76)

61 behauptet, dass jener einer der besten Bearbeiter der östlichen Staaten und der DP-Lager ist, auf den er sehr viel hält. Es dürfte sich dabei um den Mann handeln, über den auch 69 seine guten Beziehungen zu Prag etc. hält. 83 behauptet, dass 76 ebenso wie 62 für die Kominform arbeiten. Wenn 76 im Westen eine Russland-feindlich Organisation ausfindig macht, die noch Verbindung mit Personen im Osten hat, so führt er selbst dorthin und läßt sie dann hochgehen. Hier in Salzburg arbeitet 76 mit einem unbekannten CIC-Mann zusammen.

~~XXXXXXXX~~ Betrifft: 61 und CIC

Im Gegensatz zu 69, der Rudolf sagte, der CIC-Mann des 61 sei Herr LEHN R von CIC Salzburg, behauptet 61, dass er nur mit den CIC Wien arbeitet und sein Mann auch nach Salzburg kommt, um mit ihm Aktionen zu besprechen und Material entgegenzunehmen.

Graf protestiert gegen Moskau  
WIEN (APA). Staatssekretär Graf  
protestierte Dienstag energisch dage-  
gen, daß gewisse sowjetische Be-  
tragskommandanten eine Zensur über  
die Wahlplakate, -flugschriften und  
Versammlungen der ÖVP ausüben  
und erklärte: „Österreich muß freie  
Wahlen haben“. Nachdem er auf die  
Gefahr hingewiesen hatte, die durch  
das Bündnis der Linksozialisten mit  
den Kommunisten entstand, warnte  
er den VdU, den „Beauftragten jener  
Kreise, die sich um den ehemaligen  
Reichssicherheitsdienst scharen“  
sowie seine „Anhänger“, die „nicht  
glauben sollen, das NS-Problem  
könnte dadurch geregelt werden, daß  
sie sich in einer Partei sammeln“.

41.3.2.3878

6. 6. 2 - 11614

61 behauptet Rudolf gegenüber an Staatssekretär GRAF für Geld eine wichtige innenpolitische Nachricht gegeben zu haben.

In seiner Rede vom 2.8.49 warnte Staatssekretär GRAF den VdU vor der Zusammenarbeit mit Menschen vom ehemaligen Reichssicherheitsdienst. Diese Redewendung ist unrichtig. Am 30.7.49 war 61 mit Dr. Gustav CANAVAL zusammen im Cafe "BURGUND". Bei dieser Gelegenheit erzählte 61 dem Chefredakteur der "Salzburger Nachrichten", dass KRAUS mit Dr. HÖTTL, dem ehem. Leiter des Amtes VI E vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt zusammenarbeite, und Höttil der politische Ratgeber von Dr. Kraus sei. Dr. CANAVAL hat davon noch in der Nacht seinen Mitarbeiter in Wien in Kenntnis gesetzt mit dem Auftrag Staatssekretär zu benachrichtigen. Hörfehler im Telefon ergab, dass Graf vom Reichssicherheitsdienst sprach und das Sicherheitshauptamt gemeint war.

Interessant: Die Nachricht eines russischen Agenten kommt durch einen russischen Major an 61 und dieser wiederum übergibt sie an den Chefredakteur einer unabhängigen Zeitung und der wiederum an den JVP Mann Staatssekretär für die Sicherheit GRAF.

Es wird auf die Behauptung des 69 verwiesen, dass KRAUS drei Unterredungen mit General ~~SE~~ SWIRIDOW hatte.

61 befreit dies und spricht von untergeordneten Organen der Russen.

Jedenfalls ist KRAUS von Agenten aller Richtungen umgeben, die teilweise sogar sehr maßgeblich den Kurs bestimmen, wahrscheinlich sogar ohne Wissen des Dr. Kraus selbst.

## Betrifft: 83

83 ist sehr böse auf 61 und seine Mitarbeiter, da er seit Wochen von ihnen kein Geld bekommen hat. Er erzählte Rudolf, dass 62 nun in Reichenhall sitzt und mit 69 in Verbindung steht. 83 weiß es ganz sicher, dass 62 mit den Russen arbeitet. Er vermutet dasselbe von 69, 83, der im Hotel "Zum Hirschen" gewohnt hat, droht die ganze Gesellschaft auffliegen zu lassen. Man wäre ihm noch 3.700.-- schuldig, die er für 12 Fragen bekommen sollte, welche er im Auftrag des 69 an KAUDER zu stellen hatte und deren Antwort er auch von Kauder erhalten hat. 83 arbeitet angeblich geschäftlich mit Kauder zusammen und überlegt, ob er die ganze Organisation des 61 und 69 dem Kauder oder der Polizei übergeben sollte. Und zwar will er 62 wegen Betrug und falscher Papiere anzeigen. 62 schuldet 83 angeblich noch S 20.000.--. Rudolf machte 61 auf den Wunsch des 83 aufmerksam und warnte 61 vor eventuellen Schritten des 83 gegen seine Gruppe. 61 zeigte sich vollkommen desinteressiert an 83 und behauptete, dass 83 genügend zum Leben habe und schweigen mußte.

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Salzburg, 7.8.1949

Betr.: M I S

Quelle: Rudolf.

Die Leitung des Westeurop. Gen. Stabs hat unter dem Namen MIS (Montgomery Intell. Service) für ihren Bereich einen Nachrichtendienst aufgezogen, der hauptsächlich unter Leitung von Franzosen und Engländern bestehen soll. Dieser ND besteht aus 2 Abteilungen a) Abwehr (setzt sich aus ehem. deutschen Abwehro ffz. zusammen: wie Oberst Sensburg, Oberst Wagner (Dellus) (z. Zt. noch mehr im franz. ND) Raabe etc. b) pol. Polizei (setzt sich meist aus ehem. höheren SS-Führern im SD zusammen. Der Leiter des deutschen Büros scheint der bereits bekannte Böhm (Bauer) zu sein. Dieser ND arbeitet auch nach Öst. herein und zwar hauptsächlich über den franz. ND nach Tirol und Vorarlberg. Bauer versuchte jedoch über die Gruppe 61, 62 und 69 einen Stützpunkt in Salzburg zu errichten. Es wurde ihm jedoch, wie dieser Gruppe wieder bekannt wurde, mitgeteilt, dass es sich bei dieser Gruppe um rein komm. Agenten handelt und so durfte er es vorgezogen haben diese Verbindung abbrechen. 61 nimmt zwar an, dass er sicherlich auf Rudolf zurückkommen wird, doch steht auch dies in Zweifel, da ihm Rudolf ja durch 62 gebracht wurde. 61 versucht nun über den franz. ND wieder an diese Gruppe heranzukommen.

Betr.: franz. ND (Sensburg)

Wie 61 an 69 vertraulich weitergab sollen nun auch Oberst Sensburg und Raabe Verbindung mit seiner russ. Dienststelle aufgenommen haben und sich dort angetragen haben besondere Nachrichten der Franzosen zu verkaufen. Aus dem nicht nur Gänze vernommenen Gespräch zw. 61 und 69 dürfte hervorgehen, dass 61 vom Russen den Auftrag erhalten hat Näheres von Sensburg über seine Verbd. zum franz. ND in Erfahrung zu bringen.

Betr.: Dr. Höttl - Oberst Sensburg.

Zu den Nachrichten des 61 über die Verbindung dieser Personen zu den Russen wäre in Erwägung zu ziehen: entweder

1. Höttl und Sensburg arbeiten tatsächlich nur des Geldes wegen in Abwehrorganisationen und beziehen daher vom Westen und Osten
2. Höttl und Sensburg versuchen nur auf Grund ihrer westl. Tätigkeit mit dem Osten in Verbindung zu kommen.
3. 61 und seine Auftraggeber erhoffen sich durch diese Gerüchte



deutsche Leiter westlicher Nachrichtenorganisationen bei ihren vorgesetzten Dienststellen in Misskredit zu bringen und dadurch von diesen fallen gelassen zu werden.

Betr.: jugosl.-ND.

Lt. einer Mitteilung des 62 61 wurde diesem vom Chef des Königl.jugosl.ND (Name unbekannt, itz Innsbruck) mitgeteilt, dass anlässlich eines Besuches Königs Peter bei Präs.Truman, der Präs. dem König mitgeteilt habe, dass er ihn vorläufig nicht mehr unterstützen könne, da er gezwungener Massen (gründe allg.bekannt) Tito habe anerkennen müssen und auch diesem seine volle Unterstützung zugesagt habe im Kampfe gegen den Osten. Tito erhalte daher jetzt Geld, Waffen und wirtsch.Hilfsmittel. Dafür habe aber Tito seinerseits zugesagt, dass er nach bestandenen Kampfe mit Russland Freie Wahlen in Jug.durchführen lassen werde. Da der Ausgang dieser Wahlen schon mit Sicherheit einen Sturz des Titoreg.bedeutet, müsse der Präsident König Peter bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt ersuchen keine irgendwelche gearteten Aktionen zu unternehmen und sei daher bis dorthin auch nicht in der Lage die Exilregierung anzuerkennen.

Betr.: 61, 62, 69 und Rudolf.

Bei den Besprechungen von 10.11. und 12.8. wurde zwischen den 4 Gennanten ein int.Abkommen getroffen, auf Grund dessen man seine Verbindungen zu den Nachrichtendiensten aller Richtungen dazu benutzt, zu Geld zu kommen. Es wurde daher beschlossen alles, was bisher besprochen wurde für null und nichtig zu erklären und mit Datum den 12.9.49 einen Vierernachrichtendienst aufzuziehen und zwar in der Art dass 62 und Rudolf einzig und allein für den Russen arbeiten, während 61 und 69 mit dem Westen arbeiten. Die endgültige Besprechung mit dem WestlND, sowohl Franzosen und Engländer findet am 16. und 17.8. in Innsbruck statt. Die Einreihung der 62 und Rudolf in den Ostl.ND wurde am 13.8.49 in Wien festgelegt. Chef dieser Gruppe ist 61, Finanzier 69. Sämtliche Nachrichten werden jedoch in gemeinsamen Besprechungen der 4 vorgelegt und begutachtet. Dabei wurde von vorn herein die brüderliche Zusammenarbeit gleich dadurch gestört, dass 61 dem Rudolf ohne Wissen des 62 und 69 den Auftrag gab die Verbindung mit dem MIS auf alle Fälle wieder zu suchen bzw.aufrechtzuerhalten, ferner 61 dem Rudolf erachte auf 62 besonderer

... zu haben, damit hier keine Dummheiten mache. Ferner  
 61 mit 62 ein Abkommen getroffen, dass 62 und Rudolf nicht über  
 ... informiert werden, was diese dem Westen melden bzw. verkaufen.  
 Die Gehälter sollen folgendermaßen festgelegt werden:

61 .. S 4.000,-, 62 .. S 3.500, 62 und Rudolf je S 3.000. Alles  
 was überdies hereinkommt wird in eine gemeinsame Kasse gegeben und  
 aufgeteilt. Vorläufig bleibt auch 61 der Chef für den Osten, da er  
 auf den Wunsch von 62 noch 1/2 Jahr dort bleiben soll. 61 selbst  
 will aber nur noch ganz kurze Zeit untenbleiben und sich baldmöglichst  
 auf Krankenurlaub begeben.

Über 69 kann nur festgestellt werden, dass er wohl nie Schulfabrikant  
 in Wien gewesen ist. Er war Vertreter und nach eigener Angabe einmal  
 Direktor in einer Kärntner Fabrik. Er beherrscht Technischitzu voll  
 und ganz, ist belasteter Nazi und hat dieses Monat eine Volksgerichtes-  
 verhandlung. Aus den Gesprächen ist zu entnehmen, dass er den russ.  
 Major und den Kom. Peter (bei Schnerich) viel besser kennt als 61  
 und mit ihm auf einen geradezu freundschaftlichen Fuß steht, was auch  
 aus einem Schreiben, dass er dem 62 nach Wien mitgegeben hat (Lieber  
 Major.... und beste Grüße Ihr ....) hervorgeht. In diesem Schreiben  
 hat er den Major ersucht der Gruppe entsprechende Geldmittel zur  
 Verfügung zu stellen, damit die Arbeit flott vorwärts gehe. Aus  
 diesem Gespräche lässt sich auch entnehmen, dass 69 für die Agenten-  
 und CIC Listen S 800.-- bereits aus seiner Tasche als Vorstuss dem  
 VM ausbezahlt hat.

Die am. Verbindungs-Offz. sind nach wie vor für 61 .. Lehner aus Zell a.  
 See (Hierzu ist zu bemerken, dass 61 Rudolf tags zuvor gegenüber be-  
 hauptet hat, dass er nur mit dem Wiener CIC zusammenarbeitet, der  
 fast immer gleichzeitig mit ihm aus Wien nach Salzburg kommt, in  
 Wirklichkeit kommt der Herr scheinbar bloss aus Zell a. See und  
 dürfte am dortigen Sender beschäftigt sein, da davon gesprochen wurde,  
 dass er um die und die Zeit kommt, da er vorher noch die "Russische  
 Stunde" abhalten muss! Der Verb. Offz. für 69 ist Kahn Sam. von der  
 Briefzensur, über den sich 69 sehr bechwert hat, da er so lächer-  
 liches Spielmaterial gibt, dass er es jedesmal in den Papierkorb  
 werfen muss. 62 sucht wieder die Verbindung mit Dr. Proschko, Dr.  
 herzustellen, von dem er schwört alles was er braucht zu bekommen  
 da dieser innerlich sehr russophil sei, da er auch eine ...

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

Betr.: Wien-Fahrt 61, 62 und 71.

Zu Besprechung und Berichterstattung mit den Russen sind am 12.9.49 die genannten nach Wien abgereist. 61 ist für 12.9. 19 Uhr beim Russen vorgeladen, 62 für 13.9. 19 Uhr. Am 14.9. 20.03 kommt 62 wieder nach Salzburg, während 61 zu seiner Familie fährt. Am 17. fahren dann 62, und 69 nach Innsbruck wo sie sich mit 61 treffen. Aktion bekannt: Der noch am Vortag von 61 dem Rudolf gegenüber als vollkommen unzuverlässig eingeschätzte 71 tauchte auch plötzlich am Bahnhof auf und fuhr auch nach Wien. Als R. 62 nach der Aktion der 71 in Wien traute, behauptete dieser, dies sei sein grosser Freund und auch absoluter Kommunist und habe sich in Wien das Uran (Scheinbar nahm 62 an, dass K. von Lieberbach Bescheid wusste, R. konnte daher nicht mehr fragen).

Betr.: Verschleppung eines Polen aus Zell a. See.

Der Chauffeur Holy aus Niederöst. erhielt vor einiger Zeit vom Russen genauen Auftrag nach Zell a. See zu fahren und dort einen ganz bestimmten jungen Polen, ca 22 Jahre alt, blond und gross, der der Verlobte d. s. Frä. Elia Zink aus Zell a. See ist, abzuholen und nach Urfahr zu bringen. Der Holy fuhr ab und stellte sich hier dem CIC. Er befindet sich jetzt in der Zelle der Zell a. See. Nun erhielt 61 vom Russen den Auftrag diese Aktion zu starten. Da 61 dies nicht zu Wege bringt, meldet er den Russen, dass der Pole aus Zell verschwunden ist.

Betr.: Kauders.

Nach einer Mitteilung des 69 und Bestätigung des 61 hat der Russe auf den Kopf des ihm lebend übergebenen Kauders 8 100.000 gesetzt. (Man bezweifelt jedoch dass der Russe den Betrag ausbezahlt) Auf Kauders war seinerzeit 80 angegeben. Kauders ist durch Verfat des inzwischen fallengelassenen 80 von manchen Aktionen dieser in Kenntnis und weiss jedenfalls, dass er sich vor denen hüten muss. Sowohl 69 als auch 62 haben jedoch die Absicht nicht aufzugeben sich durch ihn einiges Geld zu verdienen und arbeiten eifrigst an Möglichkeiten. Wenn Aktion weiter intressiert wird weiter gemeldet.

Betr.: Prinz Lichtenstein und Einkaufsgesellschaft.

Dem Russen ist bekannt, dass angeblich der reg. Lichtenstein eine Einkaufsgesellschaft in Österreich gegründet hat, die alle kriegswichtigen Dinge, die in Ost. hergestellt werden kauft und über

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

sein Land an die Amerikaner weiterverkauft. Für Salzburg sei ein Graf Meran beauftragt. Der Russe interessiert sich für Name und Umfang dieser Organisation, da er selbst in O.österreich eine derartige Genossenschaft aufgestellt hat und diese auch in Westösterreich Fuss fassen will, jedoch zuerst den Lichtensteinschen Konkurrenten ausschalten will und muss.

Betr.: Russ. Abwehrorganisationen:

In Wien sind ausser der Komintern und ihren Agenten und dem ZK und den Agenten noch folgende russ. Abwehrorganisationen tätig:

M V D - III

M G B - I

Schmerlach - II

Angeblich arbeitet 61 bei Schmerlach, dem in Wien ein ca 55 jähriger russ. Major vorsteht und ihm zur Seite ein ca 30 jähriger bestgeschulter Kommissar (Peter): Auffanglager Hotel ~~Adlon~~ Zimmer 161.

Verhöre: meist 5 - 8 Stunden. zu trinken und zu rauchen, soviel man will, auch immer dazwischen eine Mahlzeit. Bei Eintritt in das Zimmer wird man angeblich fotografiert. Zumeist durch oft alleingelassen und doch beobachtet. Plötzlich wird man auf 10 Min. in eine Dunkelkammer geführt, während dieser Zeit serviert ein deutsches Mädchen von Bed. Pers. des Hotels das Essen.

Betr.: Spionageschulen der Westzonen

Die MIS hat bereits 2 Spionageschulen und zwar eine in Bad Reichenhall und eine in Füssen eingerichtet. Nach Mitteilung des Herrn Kahn an 69 (als Spielmaterial) wurde von der Am. eine in Badgastein erreicht, wie jedoch 69 feststellen konnte, ist dies unrichtig und diese Schule soll sich in Zell a. See befinden.

69 teilte gleichzeitig mit, dass er von seinem Ami aufgefordert wurde auf 3 Monate nach Amerika zu kommen und dort die Spionageschule zu besuchen. Es wurde daher dem Russen mitgeteilt, dass die Amerikaner ihre Schulen fast durchwegs in Amerika haben. 69 will momentan nicht nach Wien und hat 61 beauftragt Russ. zu fragen, ob er das Angebot der Amerikaner nach Am. auf Schule zu gehen annehmen soll! (Beweis, dass also auch Russe über das Doppelspiel informiert ist!!)

Betr.: Lilo W o h l .

W. war ehemals Sekr. bei Klatt, verliebte diesen, war jetzt lange in einem ital. jud. DP-Lager, ist jetzt hier und Agentin einer der Gruppe 61 unbekannten Macht.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

Salzburg, 14.8.1949

Betr.: Nachrichten aus der KPO

Quelle: Rudolf

Bei diesem Bericht handelt es sich um Mitteilungen der Eleni Gregorian, Gattin des Albert Gregorian, beide wohnhaft Wien und beide inoffizielle Mitglieder des ZK. Frau E.G. befindet sich öfters in Begleitung des Ernst Fischer und soll eine intime Freundin desselben sein. Frau G. ist aber auch die intime Freundin des 62 und 62 hat nun aus den Gesprächen mit ihr aus letzter Zeit ein geheimes Gedächtnisprotokoll abgefasst (a) Zum Verkauf von Einzelheiten an den Westen b) als Spielmaterial für 61 und 69 c) Zur gelegentlichen Vorlage an die russ. Abwehr!!) Wie gut die Zusammenarbeit der "4 geschworenen Freunde" ist, geht wiederum daraus hervor, dass Rudolf weder 62 noch 69 von der Kenntnis dieses Protokolls etwas sagen sollte noch auch Rudolf's Stl. Mitarbeiter 62 ihn von dieser Sache in Kenntnis setzte. Auch sollte R. nur einige wenige Punkte sich daraus vormerken, um dann Herrn Bauer von MIS etwas Material gebend zu können! --

1. Das ZK der KPO setzt sich aus 58 offiziellen und 56 inoffiziellen M.gliedern zusammen (offz. Koplenig, Farnberg, Fischer, Rostranetzki, Heinrich etc.) Die inoffz. Mitglieder, zu dem die Chefredakteure und Verlagsleiter der Parteipresse gehören und einige wenige besondere Personen. In Salzburg z.B. ist der Chefredakteur Lettner Mitgl. offz. des ZK, daher sein Vertreter Braunlechner inoffz. Ebenso der Verlagsleiter Aichinger.
2. Verbindungsmänner zur Kominform: Leo Schicker, Hans Fröhlich, (Redakteur der ÖZ) Dr. Fischer, Zucker-Schilling, Dr. Bruno Frey (Benedikt Freistalt) von Abentl. Verbindungsmänner werden fallweise gewechselt und dürfen nicht Mitglieder des ZK sein?
3. Auch in Österreich ist im ZK und teilweise in den Landesleitungen eine Spaltung innerhalb der KP eingetreten. In Jugosl. ist entschieden die Mehrheit National Komm., in der DDR und in Ungarn tobt z.zt. zwischen diesen Richtungen gar intern ein heftiger Kampf.
4. In Österreich liess man aus takt. Gründen in den Jahren 45 und 46 dem nation. Kom. Ernst Fischers die Oberhand (im Gegensatz zu den Kominformtreuen Farnberg und Koplenig)! Fischer behauptet noch heute noch für ein komm. über der St. Mentalität entsprechendes St.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

zu kämpfen, obwohl bereits im Jahre 1947 der Befehl von Moskau kam, die Schulungen nur mehr im lenin-stalinistischen Sinne zu halten.

5. Ein ziemlich stark antisowjet. Verhalten ist in der Führung der FÖJ zu bemerken. Es sind auch gegen die russ. Strömungen in der Partei verschiedentlich Proteste der Landesleitungen beim ZK eingegangen und vielfach auch Austritte aus den Sektionen gemeldet worden.

Selbst im ZK kam es zu Gegensätzen, bis 1948 der Befehl von Moskau kam die nation. Opp. in der KPO auszuschalten. Daraufhin fuhr Fritz Heinrich, Chef der Parteikontrolle nach Moskau und gab dort dem Kominformbüro eindeutig zu verstehen, dass dies nicht möglich sei und nur 2 Wege zur Rettung des öst. Kommunismus gegeben wären:

- a) Besetzung Öst. durch SU und Volksdem.
- b) oder bis zu den Wahlen Ernst Fischer und Gen. zu belassen.

Heinrich teilte den Moskauern mit, dass der SU Kurs gleichbedeutend mit der Erledigung der KPO sei. Darauf entschloss sich Moskau Fischer weiterhin die Propaganda zu überlassen, Farnberg war damals sehr beleidigt.

Die Schulung wurde daraufhin wieder umgestellt und es wird jetzt gelehrt und gepredigt, dass der Kommunismus rein öst. sein werde (siehe Meissnitzers Propaganda-den) und dass er mit den russ. Methoden die dort auspolit., wirtschtl. und geograph. Gründen nötig sind, nichts gemein. U.a. erklärte Lettner auf einer der letzten Sitzungen im Chiemseehof, dass die russ. Methoden hier deshalb gar nicht angewendet werden bräuchten, da Öst. für den Sozialismus viel reifer ist, als man denkt. Er erklärte weiter, dass in Öst. nur der Bergbau, die Grossindustrie, der Grossgrundbesitz und Grossbanken verstaatlicht werden und beauftragte die Propagandisten dies den Bauern ~~xxxxxx~~, Gewerbetreibenden und Kaufleuten eindringlichst vor Augen zu halten. Der Erfolg dieser Propagandawelle wird von Seiten der Sektionen mit gleich 0 bezeichnet. Man sagt der 2 jährige sowjet. Kurs habe bei allen den Glauben vernichtet.

6. Die Stimmung im FK ist in Bezug auf die Wahlen sehr deprimiert.

7. Mit 25.7.49 wurde Reliktner Itzhkeri (Ihr) Verbindungsmann zur Kominform.

8. Verbindungsmänner zum sowjet. Inform. Dienst sind Peter Achner (Weber) Strasser und Aichinger.

9.) Weitere inoffizielle Mitglieder des ZK sind: Der Verbindungsmann zur Scharfgruppe Gantzer und der Verbindungsmann zum OÖ Dr. Walter Zuzan.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

10. Die Anweisungen der Kominfor gehen über ÖZ an Zucker-Schilling und dieser gibt sie im Kurierweg an die Landesleitungen weiter.

11. Z.Zt. sind wieder einige Landesleitungen mit dem ZK sehr unzufrieden. Man beschwert sich, dass ZK zuviel in Angelegenheit der LL hineinkommt, sagt dass das ZK aus 75 % Emigranten sich zusammensetzt, die weder KZ noch sonstige Verfolgungen hier mitmachen und doch wieder abhauen, wenn es schief geht. In dieser Hinsicht tut sich besonders die Tiroler Landesleitung, aber auch Graz und Salzburg vor. Von Seiten des ZK wird die sowjet.-öst.Ges. in Innsbruck stark angegriffen und deren Auflösung verlangt, da sie alle sehr westl. Manieren an den Tag legen (Tees, und Cocktailparties.)

#### Anweisungen der Kominfor an LL.

1. Anweisung: Es sind Austritte von verlässlichen Mitgliedern der KPÖ zu forcieren und Übertritte in die SPÖ. Dort unterminieren.
2. Fall Leo Lepsky: L. veröffentlichte vor einiger Zeit im Wiener Kurier einen Artikel "Ich war Kommunist". Dieser Artikel wurde von Seiten des ZK veröffentl. L. tritt nun der SPÖ bei. (Der Leiter der Spionageabwehr der KP, Sauer war bei dieser Besprechung dabei und von diesem stammt auch die Nachricht.)
3. Es erging die Anweisung an die LL und Presse, dass offiziell der Burgfrieden mit dem VdU zu schließen sei und diese Partei mit verlässlichen Kommunisten (ehem. SA und SS Leute, die der Partei schon angehören oder eine Schulung in Russl. durchgemacht haben) zu durchsetzen.
3. Es erging die Anweisung an alle Dienststellen der Partei, dass mit den Spionageorg. und Agentengruppen der Westmächte Verbindung aufgenommen werden muss und den dort beschäftigten Leuten bei Errichtung der Volkodemokr. Staatfreiheit und Positionen zugesichert werden, wenn sie der KP Nachrichten über die Westmächte liefern. Agenten, die einmal diese Aufforderung erhielten und ihr nicht nachkommen werden nach der Errichtung der VD liquidiert.
4. Anweisung an die Partei: Wenn sich Wähler nicht entschließen können die KPÖ zu wählen, so sollen sie aufgefordert werden, die Scharfgruppe, den VdU, Linkokraten oder den Union zu wählen. Auf keinen Fall aber ÖVP oder SPÖ, denn diese beiden Parteien müssen geschwächt werden.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**



5. Anweisung: es haben Kufmacher nominiert zu werden, die aus den Reihen der Scharfgruppe deslk. Flügels der SPÖ und des sog. NS-Flügels der VdU kommen, um Öst. für einen Putsch nach Vorbild der CSR reifzumachen.

6. Anweisung: Die Kampagne gegen das Bundesheer hat langsam aufzuhören und es muss alles unternommen werden, um das Bundesheer mit möglichst viel SA und SS Leuten zu besetzen. Es sind der KPÖ nahestehende Offz. zu melden.

7. Anweisung für einen Reg. Putsch.

Nach Abzug der Westmächte und Minslingen aller anderer Aktionen sind Vorbereitungen für einen kalten Putsch in Öst. zu treffen. Ehemalige SA und SS Leute werden heute schon hierfür in Graz in besonderen Kursen geschult. Zur Sammlung solcher junger Männer für Salzburg ist Dr. Walter Zuzan beauftragt (der nach Bericht vom 61 z.Zt. noch in Wien weilt, um den VdU entsprechend zu durchsetzen)!

8. Neueste Anweisung: Sofort Agenten (die absolut verlässlich sind) als Agenten für Westmächte anwerben lassen, sowie auch Beziehungen zu Aristokraten und Gutsbesitzern aufzunehmen, die aus der CSR und Ungarn geflohen sind diesen ist zuzusagen, dass bei einer eventuellen Mitarbeit, sie ihren verlorenen Besitz und Staatsbürgerschaft wieder erlangen.

9. Weisung wegen Volksdeutsche und Sud. Deutsche:

Alle Volks und Sud. Deutschen, die sich 1/2 Jahr lang der KPÖ oder der SED zur Verfügung stellen und 10 Mitglieder angeworben haben, erhalten die Erlaubnis zur Heimreise und werden dort wieder in ihre Berufsgruppe untergebracht. Aus Salzburg sind auf diese Art im Juni 25 Sud. Deutsche aus dem Lager Maria Berg bei Lengfelden wieder in die CSR zurückgereist.

10. Anweisung:

Einstellung der Propaganda in Presse und Reden gegen die Kirche. Würde Wahl ungünstig beeinflussen. Es wird von Seiten des Kominformbüros darauf hingewiesen, dass der Kulturkampf in der CSR und in Ungarn gegen den Willen der obersten Behörde durchgeführt wurde und Stalin persönlich die verantwortlichen Männer deshalb gerügt hat.

PS.: Verb. M. zur It. KP ist Felix Bryon, Innsbruck

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

16.8.1949

Betrifft: Besprechung mit 62 und Rudolf über CIC Listen

Quelle: Rudolf

62 erzählte Rudolf, dass 61 die CIC-Listen auf der Fahrt nach Wien abgeschrieben hat, ferner hat er sie im Bericht an die Russen seiner Sekretärin diktieren (Fräulein SVOBODA) und drittens hat er die Originalliste des 62 während der Besprechung mit dem russischen Major dem 62 abgenommen und nachher behauptet, diese nicht abgegeben zu haben. 62 schenkte aber letzter Aussage keinen Glauben.

Neue Liste von Amerikanern: IV. Verwaltungsbeamte : Salzburg

|                         |            |         |           |               |
|-------------------------|------------|---------|-----------|---------------|
| 1. BUSH Blanka          | A - 410356 | CAF     | 7         | IP            |
| 2. BROMBERG Christian   | D - 096712 | EXE Civ | 5         | NG            |
| 3. BROWN Magdalena      | D - 045712 | SP      | 5         | IP            |
| 4. COWEN Ruth           | B - 279642 | CAF     | 5         | 7721 Claims   |
| 5. COGICK Edward        | D - 105100 | CAF     | 8         | Real Estate   |
| 6. CHASEK Mignone       | B - 211950 | CAF     | 4         | ZC/A          |
| 7. DEWAN James          | D - 146209 | P       | 5         | Civ Affairs   |
| 8. and wife             |            |         |           |               |
| 9. DRACHTER Mathilde    | O - 167511 | Civ     | 430th Det |               |
| 10. FIERTNER George     | D - 096638 | CAG     | 6         | IB            |
| 11. FRANCHI James       | D - 070021 | CAF     | 12        | ZC/A          |
| 12. GARANT Evelyn       | A - 407817 | Civ     |           | Civil Affairs |
| 13. GREGORY Luise       | E - 057486 | P       | 2         | teacher       |
| 14. HIMMELSBACH Francis | A - 0775   | CAF     | 9         | 5335 G        |
| 15. KAHN Virginia       | A - 410179 | Civ     |           | IP            |
| 16. KURLSCHECK William  | D - 434935 | CAF     | 10        | ZC/A          |
| 17. KOTIKI Ted          | D - 074882 | Civ     |           | ZC/A          |
| 18. KENNEDY Vernon      | C - 26915  | CAF     | 12        | ZC/A          |

62 hat noch ca. 50 Namen von Amerikanern und 25 Namen von CIC-Agenten.

Betrifft: Unterhaltung te. 61 mit russischen Major

61 war 2 Stunden beim Major. 62 wird nicht empfangen und der Major verlangt 69 zu sprechen. Weiter: verlangt er baldige Erledigung der Sache "KLATT und Holy." Im übrigen war die Besprechung nicht sehr erfolgreich, da der Kommandeur auf Urlaub ist. Major betonte nur noch, dass er 69 sprechen muß, den er besonders gerne habe, da er ein so offener, ehrlicher Charakter sei.

Rest tot

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Betrifft: 61

61 sagt 62, dass er nicht länger mit den Russen spiele, da ihm dies zuwider sei und beide geben sich in Wien das Versprechen 69 auszu-schalten und mit LEHNER (CIC) "ehrlich zu arbeiten. Im Übrigen wollen sie sämtliche NB auseinanderbringen.

Betrifft: 62

62 erhielt von 61 nur S 200.-- und ist böse. Er wird von Rudolf aufgefordert mit ihm und 70 direkt mit den Russen zu arbeiten, was dieser wiederum sagt zu tun, wenn LEHNER nicht genügend Geld gibt. 62 allein hat die guten KP-Verbindungen und sowohl 61 und 69 sind ohne ihn erledigt. Er müsse aber aus bestimmten Gründen mit 61 zusammen-arbeiten und lässt daher befehlsgemäß 69 fallen. 69 wird mitgeteilt, dass die Verbindung zur KP abgebrochen sei.

Betrifft: Eleni GREGORIAN

Der Bericht wird an Rudolf zur Auswertung für MI übergeben.

Betrifft: Besprechung des Rudolf mit 62 am 17.8.1949 über 69.

62 nimmt an, dass 69 die Sache bei den Russen gut machen wird. Wenn er wieder Geld bringt, wird er auch an 69 wieder Sachen liefern, dies auch gegen den Befehl von 61.

Betrifft: 61

62 sagt, wenn 61 tatsächlich seine russischen Verbindungen aufgeben wird, wird er auch von LEHNER, Engländer und Franzosen fallengelassen. Für den Fall dass 61 seine Verbindungen aufgibt, wird er, Rudolf und 70 eine eigene Sache aufbauen.

Betrifft: CIC-Listen

61 nimmt an, dass 61 die Listen doch in Abschrift den Russen übergeben hat, das Original aber LEHNER geben wird und hierem gegen wird, dass er es gewesen sei, der die Listen an sich gerissen hat und sie vor der Verhaftung an die Russen gettet habe.

Betrifft: 61 und 70.

Beide wohnen in Gaste der KP bei Professor GRILL, Alsbach, Bayernmannerstrasse 12. Angekündigt wurde LEHNER davon unterrichtet.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

Betrifft: KPÖ-Nachrichten

Die Nachrichten der KPÖ an 62 gehen anscheinend über GRIM oder Freunde an diesen und müssen bezahlt werden. Nach Mitteilungen des 62 existiert die Elena GREGORIAN nicht.

Betrifft: MEINWITZER Han.

MEINWITZER ist wegen Schiebererei aus der KPÖ herausgeworfen worden, er ist Edelkommunist. Er verfolgt die Linie FIOMER. (lt. Grim)

Betrifft: 70

70 arbeitet für einen ehemaligen ungarischen Generalstabs-General, der im Auftrag der Amerikaner einen MD in München aufgezogen hat. Für diesen fährt er in die Tschechoslowakei, hat 2 Spionageschulen errichtet und hat beste Beziehungen. Nach Aussage des 62 kann er berichten was er will, da es nicht überprüft werden könnte. 62 sagt, 70 sei absoluter Kommunist, halte ich in Salzburg oder Wien versteckt auf, fährt hin und wieder nach München und gibt dort Berichte ab und erhält von dem General monatlich 120 Dollar. Angeblich ist 70 in der Tschechoslowakei zu 15 Jahren Kerker verurteilt, weil er 62 aus dem Gefängnis in Prag zur Flucht verholfen hat. 62 behauptet, er sei der beste Freund des 70 und 70 habe eine separate Verbindung zu den Russen. 70 sei aber sehr geldgierig.

Betrifft: Briefmarkenhandlung | STÖCKL, Salzburg, Linzergasse

70 und 62 verkehren dort sehr oft. Entweder ist das Geschäft eine Nachrichtenzentrale, oder Stöckl Schleichhändler.

Betrifft: KPÖ

GRIM behauptet, das Anweisung gekommen sei, nach der die KPÖ bei den Wahlen mindestens 15 Mandate aufbringen müsse, da sie sonst keine finanzielle Unterstützung von der KOMINFORM erhalten werde.

Grim behauptet, der Agentenstab des Herrn AUER sei sehr klein. Zwischen der KPÖ, Kominform und Russen bestehe kein Zusammenhang. Nachrichtematerial vom Westen erhalte er nur von GR. GRIMMER hat nur 61 und 69 haben. (unglaubwürdig).

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

Betrifft: Einladung an Rudolf

Vorausichtlich wird Rudolf zusammen mit 61 und 70 am 22.8.49 zu einem Wodka-Abend bei GRIMM und Fräulein WILHELM eingeladen.

Betrifft: Dr. LOOS

Laut Mitteilung des 61 hatte Dr. LOOS am 19.8. eine Besprechung mit ersterem. Dabei wurde festgestellt, dass Dr. Loos ND-Mann von Erzbischof ROHRACHER ist und Herr v. WINCKLER ND-Mann des Stabssekretär GRAF. Beiden wurde mitgeteilt, dass sie von den Deutschen beobachtet werden. Einbau des 61 in diese beiden ND bevorstehend.

Betrifft: Verkehr des 62 und 70 mit Adelligen

62 und 70 ersuchten Rudolf ihnen den Weg in die Gesellschaft zu ebeneden. (siehe Russebefehl über Aufnahme solcher Verbindungen russischer Agenten.)

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

23.8.49

Betrifft: Gespräch des Rudolf mit 62

Quelle: Rudolf

62 wurde von Rudolf wegen seiner Verbindung zum CIC hart angegriffen und ihm die Gefährlichkeit seiner Tätigkeit vor Augen geführt. 62 hat auch Angst und will das Verhältnis mit LEHNER nur 1 - 2 Monate aufrecht erhalten, wenn er nur erst einmal die Verbindung zu den Oberkommunisten BENEDIKT ? und Gustav FRÖHLICH ? hergestellt hat. Durch diese hofft er dann von der KP so viel Geld zu verdienen, dass er den Lehner ohne weiteres fallen lassen kann. Dieser könnte dann nur mehr ab und zu ein paar Nachrichten für Geld erhalten.

Betrifft: 69

61, 62 und 70 chimpften alle maßlos über 69. Er sei ein Verräter auf allen Linien und werde kaltgestellt werden.

Betrifft: MIS

Oberster Chef des MIS soll ein ehemaliger SS-Brigadeführer JELINEK sein, Chef der Gestapo und des SD im Wehrkreis VIII (Protektorat), bei Zusammenbruch aus der CZ geflüchtet.

Betrifft: GLINSNER - RITTER

61 sucht Verbindung zu einem Mann Namens GLINSNER - RITTER, der bei den Russen in der Spionage 1 und 2 tätig sein soll. Durch diesen Mann hofft man auch für eine dieser beiden Abteilungen arbeiten zu können, um endlich die Menschenlieferungsabteilung III (Schmerz) loszubekommen.

Betrifft: Wohnung 62 und 70

62 und 70 wohnen nicht bei Professor GRIMM, sondern bei einem kommunistischen Ehepaar, dessen Adresse erst ausgeforscht wird.

Betrifft: 61 und 62

Am 23.8. fährt 61 und 62 zu den Franzosen nach Innsbruck, 62 dann zu Pfarrer GUNZ nach Feldkirch.

Da LEHNER angeblich die Adresse von 62 weiß, hat letzterer sämtliche Kommunistischen Material von dort entfernt, da er eine plötzliche Hausdurchsuchung befürchtet.

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

|               |                               |            |
|---------------|-------------------------------|------------|
| To:           | PULLACH, KARLSRUHE            | ROUTINE    |
| From:         | SPECIAL OPERATIONS            | 20 SEPT 49 |
| Confirmation: | FM (1-2)                      | OUT 89723  |
| Information:  | ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6) |            |

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5*

WASH 0316

TO: PULL INFO: KARL CITE: WASHF

CRYPTONYM "UTILITY" ASSIGNED SUBJECT PARA 2, MGMA 870.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DH

R. HELMS

RELASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1757Z 20 SEPT 49

**SECRET**

Copy No. /

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
SPECIAL DETACHMENT  
EUROPEAN COMMAND  
APO 154 US ARMY

30 November 1949

MEMORANDUM: GEHLEN, Reinhard

In case of inquiry regarding attached paper concerning subject individual, information can be obtained from the files of the Intelligence Division by contacting the Operations Branch Chief. The basic paper and its contents are classified and for US eyes only.

*W. R. Philp*

W. R. PHILP  
Colonel, FA

Telephone: Stuttgart 19002

NOTE: The above to be filed in Office of the Adjutant General, EUCOM together with their file copy of Gehlen letter.

O-3015

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

AVAILABLE COPY

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

CONFIDENTIAL

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

GEHLEN

VIA: \_\_\_\_\_  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.: MGK-A-

12714

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 8 December 1949

TO : Chief, POB  
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
SUBJECT: General —  
Specific — Reinhard GEHLEN--Direct Correspondence to EUCOM  
REF : MGH-A-3780

1. In this pouch you are being sent MGH-A-3780 which returns O-3014 and O-3015 from Colonel Philp to EUCOM and a statement that Mr. Gehlen is employed by the United States Government with permanent residence in Washington from 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949.

2. As you know, all correspondence from your unit to EUCOM is supposed to be carried on through this Headquarters. An exception was made for travel document requests, in which case an information copy would be simultaneously sent here. Since this is not such a routine matter, it should be handled in the normal channels through this office.

3. Please explain the necessity for such a statement concerning Mr. Gehlen.

Distribution:

POB 2  
COS 2

*Hold in his file - apparently no longer necessary*

*[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. This is to certify that Mr. Reinhard GEHLEN was employed as a specialist for the United States government with permanent residence in Washington from 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949.

2. Mr. GEHLEN finished his employment in order to enter private business with permanent residence in Povo, Italy, as well as in Berg, Kreis Starnberg, Germany.

3. In the event further information is desired, it is requested that the undersigned officer be contacted.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

240.15

VIA: \_\_\_\_\_  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.: MGK-A-

1275/

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 9 December 1949

TO : Chief, POB  
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
SUBJECT: General -  
Specific - Reinhard GEHLEN (No. 1) ✓  
OF : MGM-A-870

1. There are no traces in CIC or our files.
2. EUCOM files give the following:

BORN: 3 April 1902 Erfurt  
Commissioned 2nd Lt December 1923, 1st Lt 1928, Capt 1934  
Attended War Academy Berlin Fall 1933 to Jan 35  
First Gen Staff Officer, 10 Dept Fortifications 1937-38  
Major March 1939, Lt. Col July 1941 Col Dec 42, Brig Gen Dec 44  
Ia (G-3), 213th Div Sep 39-Nov 39  
OKH, GRUPPE LANDESBESTIGUNG Nov 39-July 40  
Aide to Chief of Gen Staff, Gen Halder July 40-Nov 40  
Chief Gruppenleiter I, Ost Nov 40-Apr 42  
Chief ABT Fremdheere Ost April 42-Apr 45

His highest command function was that of a company commander.  
According to a 7th Army interrogation Center Interrogation report  
dated 21 June 1945 subject is anti-Communist and anticipates  
a Russia-Allied conflict.

He arrived at the 12th Army Group IC on 27 May 1945. later sent  
to the USA, date not shown, and returned 5 June 1946. No later  
trace of him could be found.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 2528  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Distribution: DATE 2001 2005

POB 2  
FDM  
COS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

AIR

270.15  
MGL-A-1015

4 January 1950

Chief, Foreign Division M

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

ODEUM - Travel Document for Reinhard GEHLEN

1. During the past four years Subject has had a complete cover existence with no legal records under this name. We are now involved in the very complex problem of legalizing him in Germany under his real name and establishing his family (wife and four children) in a small village south of Munich.
2. Upon return from the U.S.A. in 1946, GEHLEN assumed a false identity and with many former friends developed the story that he was still in the U.S.A. We are now working on the notional return of GEHLEN from the U.S.A. to Germany where he will take a position with the Bavarian Light Metal Works. We have been able to work out all details of the cover story here but require a Military Permit issued in Washington and bearing the necessary stamps showing departure by air from the U.S.A. If this can be arranged and pouched to us, we will obtain the necessary stamps at the German air terminal where the notional flight will end.
3. Note that the attached forms are issued by the Munich Police Presidium; however, it is assumed that the data is complete and adequate.
4. The Washington address which is given under item No. 11 was provided to GEHLEN by Captain Eric Waldman, and is that of his mother-in-law.
5. It will be appreciated if this can be given some priority since completion of this step is prerequisite to making other arrangements.
6. The notional trip from the U.S.A. to Germany should occur in late November 1949.

Attachment: Application for Temporary  
Travel Document in Lieu of Passport; 3  
copies with 5 photographs.

Dist: 2 - FDM (w/attach)  
1 - COS (w/attach)  
2 - File (attach)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE: MET 1075 EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

MEMORANDUM

6 March 1950

#2

TO : FDT

FROM : FIM/ [ ]

SUBJECT: German Emigres in South America

1. It is requested that a check be made with the appropriate stations for any traces on the following individuals:

- A. FLERSKY, Franz Carl or Carl Franz & MULLER, Otto - born 23 March 1912 in Aruga Rumania. Last known address given as Seefeld, Land Tirol, Austria. Reportedly now in Argentina, city unknown.
- B. VON GEHLEN, Barbara - born in Germany in 1912. Married distant relative, Walter von GEHLEN, a former lawyer and civilian official of the German Navy. In 1947 he was employed by the British in Kiel, Germany. Both are now said to be living in Brazil. Barbara von GEHLEN is the daughter of Walther GEHLEN, a former German Army officer born in Koblenz, Germany in 1870 and who died in 1943. The mother Katharina, nee von VAERENWYCK, died in 1922.
- C. ERNST, Imma - Hungarian national who went to Italy from Transylvania as a war refugee and founded the firm of MERKUR-ERNST Co. in Bolzano, Italy in 1945. ERNST and family emigrated to Argentina on 22 February 1949.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Air

MGL-A- 1419 ✓

Chief, Foreign Division M  
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
Operational

7 March 1950

News Story - GEHLEN Possible Candidate to  
Head Verfassungsschutz

1. The Frankfurter Neue Presse for 17 February 1950 carried a UP story and an editorial entitled "Amt für Verfassungsschutz" and "Politische Polizei" respectively, and on 16 February the Frankfurt Abendpost also carried a UP story under the title "Der Bock als Gärtner?"

2. In all three articles GEHLEN, HAHN and BEHNKE were mentioned as possible candidates to head the new organization which was to be considered an "Admiral Canaris Abteilung" instead of a "Neue Gestapo".

3. Although we presume that [ ] and [ ] also noted these items, we are attaching photostatic copies since the editorial in particular contains several interesting statements, including a reference to an American source of this information.

Dist:

2 - FDM w/3 photostats  
1 - COS w/3 "  
1 - EOR w/3 "  
2 - File w/3 clippings

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET





Frankfurt  
Herausgeber und Chefredakteur: B. Bantz  
Chefredakteur: Karl Brinkmann  
Verantwortliche Redakteure: Hans R. ...  
Hans R. ...  
Ernst ...  
Karl S. ...  
Verlagsleiter: Otto Eberltsch

# Der ... als ...? Heißbegier ... Amt ... für Verfassungsschutz

BONN (up) ... diese Stelle ...  
einmal besetzt ... der Bun-  
des-Innenminister ... auf-  
atmen, denn es ... fast-leich-  
te ... zu fin-  
Aussicht ...  
eigener Initiative ... das Amt  
bewerben, soll ... nicht mehr  
von einer „neuen Gestapo“ spre-  
chen, sondern ... von einer  
neuen „Admiral-Canaris-Abteilung“  
behaupten. Drei von  
ihnen hegen ...  
Da ist Herr ... General-  
major a. D., der ... Hahn, den  
man „aus ...  
Gründen den ...  
und weiter ...  
mehr als Fachmann ...  
Außer diesen ...  
Ansicht gut ...  
noch sieben ...  
aus der gleiche ...  
links kommen ...  
Rennen gewon-

el  
le  
st  
K.  
sc  
zi  
di  
el  
C  
n  
a  
j  
k  
li  
d  
k  
u  
A

ESTIMABLE COPY

## FRANKFURTER Neue Presse

Jahrgang 5, Nr. 41 Freitag, 17. Februar 1951

### „Amt für Verfassungsschutz“

Bonn, 17. Februar (UP) — Es scheint fast leichter zu sein, einen Bundespressekopf zu finden als einen Leiter des „Amtes für Verfassungsschutz“. Nach den Kandidaten zu urteilen, die bisher mit mehr oder weniger Aussicht auf-  
fordert wurden oder sich aus eigener Initiative um das Amt bewerben, sollte man nicht mehr von einer „Neuen Gestapo“ sprechen, sondern von einer neuen „Admiral-Canaris-Abteilung“, behaupten Eingeweihte. Drei Kandidaten haben noch gute Aussichten: Generalmajor a. D. von Gehlen, ein Bewerber namens Hahn, der der „Rote Hahn“ genannt wird, und ein „Fachmann für Rechtsfragen“ im Stabe Canaris, Behnke.

## ANKFURTER Neue Presse

17.2.50 -

### Politische Polizei

Das Gesetz zum Schutze der Weimarer Republik, das am 23. März 1930 erlassen wurde, hat weder den Ausgang der September-Wahlen jenes Jahres noch die politischen Wirren der Zeit der Wirtschaftskrise vermeiden können. Es gilt daher, aus der Geschichte die Lehren zu ziehen und die Demokratie lebendig und die Republik stark zu machen. Das wird kaum erreicht, indem die Gerichte dem Vorwurf der politischen Ineffektivität ausgesetzt bleiben, solange man von ihnen in besonderen Fällen Spruchkammerentscheide und keine juristischen Urteile erwartet. Der Staat soll und kann sich vorbeugende Gesetze geben, dazu eine unbestechliche Justiz und eine kräftige Exekutive. Denn das Ziel ist der Rechtsstaat, dessen Symbole ebenso unantastbar zu bleiben haben wie seine unabhängigen Richter, die vor dem „gesunden Volksempfinden“ jeder Observanz geschützt werden müssen. Das scheint die SPD bei ihrem Antrag gegen die Hedler-Richter außer acht gelassen zu haben.

Das neue „Amt für Verfassungsschutz“, das soeben beim Bundesinnenministerium vorbereitet wird, ist von vornherein mit einer großen Hypothek belastet. In einer Zeit, in der — überall in der Welt — die Agenten- und Spitzeltätigkeit der „Sicherheitsorgane“ ausgeklügelter und verfeinerter gehandhabt wird, soll es den Charakter der politischen Polizei vermeiden. Eine amerikanische Nachrichtenagentur berichtet, daß „Eingeweihte“ nicht von einer neuen Gestapo sprechen, sondern von einer neuen „Admiral-Canaris-Abteilung“. Das eine kann in seiner propagandistischen Wirkung so gefährlich wie das andere sein. Der Begriff der Gestapo ist unmißverständlich, aber die Figur von Admiral Canaris ist umstritten. Man weiß, welchen bedeutenden Anteil er an der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung hatte, man kennt seine Freundschaft mit Goerdeler und den Männern des 20. Juli, aber man kennt ebenso seine Beziehungen zu dem Reichskriminalrat Nebe, die Tätigkeit der Sabotageeinheiten, die ihm unterstanden und die deutsche Agententätigkeit im Ausland, für die er weitgehend verantwortlich war. Es wäre zu wünschen, daß die Männer, die an der Spitze des neuen Amtes für Verfassungsschutz stehen, weniger schillernd sind als es Canaris war. Zwei Männer, die für die Kandidatur in der Leitung des neuen Amtes genannt werden, verfügen zwar über sachliche Befähigung und über einen bewährten Charakter: der ehemalige General von Gehlen, der früher die Informationsabteilung „Fremde Heere“ im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht leitete, und das frühere Mitglied der Spionageabwehr unter Admiral Canaris, Behnke. Aber, — welcher Personal-mangel an qualifizierten Persönlichkeiten muß in Bonn herrschen, wenn man auf diese Kandidaten für einen der interessantesten und wichtigsten Posten zurückgreift. Denn der Leiter dieses Amtes muß man es zu tun haben.

Das Ziel der „Nationalen Front“ sei es — so sagte der der SED ergebene Nuschke —, Westdeutschland zurückzugewinnen. Dutzende von Agenten aus der sowjetischen Zone kommen, in den Westen, um propagandistische Vorarbeit zu leisten, Spione sitzen in öffentlichen und privaten Kanzleien: das ist die organisierte Gefahr für die Bundesrepublik. Der zersetzende Radikalismus auf der „Rechten“ ist verworren, aber nicht weniger gefährlich. Das „Amt für Verfassungsschutz“ wird auf beide Seiten zu achten haben, um das zu schützen, was im Gesetz festgelegt ist. Und nur das. Es liegt an der lebendigen Kraft der Demokratie, ob er sich dabei als „Nachwächterstaat“ wird beschimpfen lassen müssen, oder ob er sich kraft seiner Disziplin gegen die „Verfassungswidrigkeiten“ durchsetzen kann. Die wichtigsten Stützen des Staates sind nicht seine Polizisten, sondern seine Bürger. Zie.

File - UTILITY

Reinhard Gehlen

18. Maerz 1950

Lebenslauf.

Copy of document  
forwarded by C 1 to  
McCloy March 1950

Ich wurde am 3.4.1902 in Erfurt als Sohn des damaligen Oberleutnants Walther Gehlen und seiner Ehefrau Katharina, geborene van Vaernowick, geboren. Noch waehrend meiner ersten Lebensjahre schied mein Vater aus dem Heeresdienst aus, um sich kaufmaennisch zu betaetigen, und war nach kurzer Taetigkeit in Leipzig bis zu seinem Tode als Verlagsdirektor in Breslau taetig.

In Breslau besuchte ich das humanistische Gymnasium, welches ich 1920 nach abgelegter Reifepruefung verliess. Im April 1920 trat ich als Freiwilliger zur Zeit der Oberschlesienkämpfe in die damalige vorläufige Reichswehr ein, kam nach zweijähriger Mannschaftsdienstzeit auf die Waffenschule und wurde am 1.12.1923 zum Offizier befördert. Nach nunmehr dreijähriger Dienstzeit in der Front absolvierte ich eine zweijährige Ausbildung auf der Kriegsakademie und war danach bis zum Kriegsende wechselnd in Front- und Generalstabsverwendungen taetig.

Im April 1942 uebernahm ich die "Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost" im Oberkommando des Heeres mit der Aufgabe, die Abteilung auf das Niveau eines mit wissenschaftlichen Methoden arbeitenden Instruments zu bringen. Die Aufgabe der "Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost" war es damals, aus saechtlichen in Osten anfallenden Nachrichten fuer das Oberkommando des Heeres ein militaerisches, politisches und wirtschaftliches Lagebild Russlands und des Suedostens zu schaffen. Der Aufgabenbereich umfasste zunaechst den Feindnachrichtendienst (IC-Dienst), es wurden mir aber bald auch die im Osten arbeitenden Teile des geheimen Meldedienstes (Abwehr) unterstellt, mit Ausnahme des Sabotagesektors, dessen Uebernahme ich ablehnte.

Fast die gesamte Zeit stand unter dem Zeichen eines unter der Decke gefuehrten Kampfes mit dem SM, der bestrebt war, zunaechst alle Einrichtungen des geheimen Meldedienstes und als zweiten Schritt den uebrigen Feindnachrichtendienst zu schlucken. Dieser mit ungleichen Waffen gefuehrte Kampf um die Erhaltung des gesamten Feindnachrichtendienstes in sachverstaendigen Haenden, der insbesondere nach Wegfall der Unterstuetzung durch den Admiral Canaris und Aufloesung des Amtes Ausland-Abwehr immer schwieriger wurde, fuehrte nach wiederholten Kontroversen mit Hitler einige Wochen vor Kriegsende zu meiner Entfernung aus meinem Amt. Ich habe es lediglich dem mannhaften Eintreten des letzten Generalstabschefs zu verdanken, dass ich mich so lange halten konnte, der sich nicht scheute, gelegentliche Wutausbrueche Hitlers gegen meine Person mit ebensolchen zu erwidern, bis er selbst im Zusammenhang mit anderen Ringen entfernt wurde. Nach dem Kriege erfuhr ich, dass ein noch zuletzt von Hitler gegen mich gefordertes Verfahren wegen Defaetismus und angeblich langdauernder zersetzender Taetigkeit durch meine offenen Lagebeurteilungen nur infolge des nacheinandere der letzten Kriegsmomente nicht zur Ausfuehrung gekommen sei.

File  
UTILITY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Meine Tätigkeit nach Kriegsende ist bekannt.

An politischen Angaben habe ich zu machen: Ich war nie Mitglied irgendeiner politischen Partei, insbesondere nicht der NSDAP oder einer ihrer Gliederungen; im Verfahren vor der Spruchkammer (Urteil anliegend) wurde ich als nicht belastet bezeichnet.

Seit 1931 bin ich verheiratet mit Herta von Seydlitz-Kurzbach. Ich habe drei Töchter und einen Sohn im Alter von 16, 13, 9 und 7 Jahren.

*G. Herta*

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DETACHMENT

AGO 403

WCK-A-15432

20 March 1950

TO : Mr. Benjamin Shute  
Director of Intelligence  
HICOG, APO 757  
U.S. Army

FROM : Gordon M. Stewart

SUBJECT: Rainhard Gehlen

We believe that Gehlen is chiefly motivated by a desire for personal success and personal security, a sense of duty, patriotism, and a fear of and hatred for Communism. These characteristics are common to many former German officers, but in Gehlen's case they play a singularly important role. He is intensely and self-consciously "ideological" in his outlook. A surprising amount of his time is devoted to reading and discussing social, political, moral and religious issues. He keeps himself very well informed. Unfortunately, his lack of academic training deprives him of critical judgment, with the result that he is sometimes taken in by those warmed-over and carefully garnished variations of fascism, corporate democracy, and the like, so popular in Western Europe at the present time.

We suspect that his decision to save his organization by collaboration with the Western Allies (taken before the end of the war) and his subsequent position as the leader of a German organization, acting on behalf of the Americans, have had a lot to do with the development of his strong ideological bent. He has had to justify his position to the Americans, to the Germans who work under him and to himself.

The political position which he has worked out is quite unexceptional despite the occasional flaws noted above. He professes to stand for a united Western Europe built around a Franco-German axis, for collaboration with England and the United States, for social reform but not socialism, for the review of such occupation and postwar "injustices", as war crimes trials and some aspects of denazification. He does not favor the remilitarization of Germany, except as a part of Western European defense. In the intelligence field, he believes that a small country such as Germany should have a unified service.

The question now remains whether, once in office, Gehlen would serve the interests of the government and remain loyal to the Western Allies. It is our firm opinion that he would serve Adenauer loyally. As an officer, he is extremely well disciplined and has a strong respect for

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

## SECRET

properly constituted authority. He is horrified by the romantic nationalism and indiscreet behavior of some of his former colleagues. He is not one to become involved in the cabals of officers and senior bureaucrats. He is cautious in political matters to a fault.

We think he will take direction well. He is a man of independent mind, more by force of circumstances than by choice. Adenauer and other senior German officials will experience no difficulty in handling him.

He will not be an American or Allied puppet in office. If he thinks that it is in the German interest to resist the Allies, he will attempt to do so. We are convinced, however, that he is sincerely interested in harmonious cooperation between the Germans and the Western Allies, and that he is capable of rising above petty dogmatism when the broad issues at stake are properly presented to him. We have always found him to be tractable.

We believe that he will try to avoid becoming involved in party politics. This does not mean that he is indifferent to politics but, rather, that he is ambitious only as an intelligence official. A review of his record shows that his most impressive trait is his ability to survive the storms around him in this capacity. During the war he managed to keep his organization intact and relatively undisturbed despite the furious vendetta which developed between the Abwehr under Canaris and the RSHA under Kaltenbrunner. The defeat of the Abwehr left Gehlen untouched although he certainly was a Canaris man. In 1945, Gehlen converted Germany's defeat into an intelligence alliance with the Americans in short order. In working with us under the occupation, Gehlen has made no secret of his desire to survive the end of the occupation as the head of an important intelligence activity.

One final word. Gehlen is an intelligence operator. The means he employs to achieve his ends are not always straight-forward. Like all other operators of any importance, he has a high regard for the security of his own operations and will lie like a gentleman, if need be.

Gordon M. Stewart

Mr. Shute-2

COS

POB

✓ FDM

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
SPECIAL DETACHMENT EUCOM  
Munich Office  
APO 407, US ARMY

23 March 1950

SUBJECT: Extension of Temporary Travel Document


TO: Director of Intelligence  
European Command  
APO 403, US Army  
Attn: Operations Branch

It is requested that the enclosed Temporary Travel Document of Reinhard GEHLEN be prolonged and extended to include SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA, ITALY, SPAIN, and FRANCE.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Incl: 1  
Passport No. 0006440

Tel: Munich Mil 4821  
S No. R-192 Copy 1 of 4 Copies

  
EDWARD BRAY  
Captain CAV  
Adjutant

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

  
**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

FOR COORDINATION WITH US ARMY

SECRET

170.1

P08

SECRET

MGFA-3636

MGFA-2886

(78)

3 April 1950

Chief, Foreign Division "M"

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Intelligence Directors' Comments on Gehlen

Attached hereto are the comments by the Allied Intelligence Directors on  
the candidacy of General Gehlen at the meeting of 28 March 1950 at Mainz.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

Diat:  
FIM-2  
COS  
POB ✓  
POB  
POB-2  
POB(B)-1

240 Gehlen  
C. A. Schuler



SUBJECT: Comments by the Allied Intelligence Directors on the Candidacy of General Gehlen at the Meeting of March 28, 1950 - Mainz

French: We are convinced that Chancellor Adenauer took all precautions that the man he is placing in charge of this Agency (Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) meets with our requirements. I am convinced the names proposed have been submitted after severe selection. Aside from the personalities of the candidates, I would like to examine if they do not give rise to questions of principle. First of all, I would like to examine the personality of Gehlen. Isn't this candidate in opposition to the principles of our directives? We are faced with a General who did not participate in the NSDAP, but who nevertheless belonged to Section III Ost. Do you think that his participation in this Organization, and his connection with Intelligence, might bring forth opposition from the German public? I would like to know your opinion so that after exchange of information, we can let the General Committee know what our views on this candidate are. The Germans gave us no background information on this personality. Ritter Von Lex merely told us that he was an ex-General of the General Staff of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres). The inquiry Lex made reveals that he is above all suspicions of having tendencies to the extreme Right or extreme Left. He adds that he is absolutely incorruptible. He is also above all political parties. This is a very important point as far as the Germans and the Allies are concerned. Our attitude with regard to him is, of course, important, because the other six candidates may have already been approved by Gehlen. Two of them have also belonged to the Abwehr. This, in itself, is not a crime or a particular obstacle. But to put at the head of this Agency three members of the Abwehr inspires some fears as to the possible reorganization of the Abwehr in another form. What do you think of General Gehlen and of his application?

British: We do not support his application. We agree with you that the appointment of a General who for some years was a member of the Abwehr, and one of the youngest Generals, would give rise to adverse public comment. Further, and this is an important point, his war record is concerned with the field of External Intelligence. It is in that field that he is more expert than in others. He is suggested as the head of an agency which is to deal with internal affairs and is to be of a defensive character. Taking into account his past record and the work he would do in the future, we think there is danger at some time in the future -- if he got this appointment -- of the development of combined internal and external intelligence services. It would be entirely contrary to British practices and principles to permit the concentration of both internal and external intelligence services to be concentrated in one pair of hands. It is on these grounds that we object to the proposal made by the Germans.

French: We are faced with a firm and clear position on the part of the British.

U.S.: First, we know General Gehlen, and we have known him for some time. We believe that personally he would be a very able man in this position. The only possible disqualification in our mind is the point raised by our British colleague with reference to the placing in this position of a man whose past experience has been in external intelligence. We recognize the force of this argument and are inclined to weigh it against the need

SECRET



Encl. - 1 (Dupl)  
MGF-A-3636

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

would

SECRET



✓ P80

MGFA-3035  
MOFA-3435

(B)

3 April 1950

Chief, Foreign Division "M"

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Meeting of Allied High Commission with Chancellor

Attached hereto is the verbatim report of the meeting on 23 March 1950 of the Council of the Allied High Commission with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which General Gahlen was discussed as a candidate to head the Federal Verfassungsschutz.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Dist:  
FM-2  
FOB ✓  
COB  
EOB  
FOB-2  
FOB(B)-1

10PG  
R. Gahlen 240  
R. Schneider

VERBATIM OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION  
with the  
CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

E X T R A C T

\* \* \* \* \*

BRUDERSCHAFT

Now we come to another point in respect to that organization - a lot has been said about it - the Bruderschaft; whether you have any information which could give us some clarification on the matter. It is rather difficult to form an opinion of an organization which is composed of some good elements and some not so good. This organization in taking up some ideas which have unpleasant memories - that is, the formation of an order of a chivalrous type or something of the kind. Have you any information in this respect?

GER: I have no information on this matter. The statement made by Major General von Manteuffel has appeared in the press. I don't know any more about that myself than what has appeared in the press.

FR: You are probably aware that some statements have appeared in the press. I believe the Sud Deutsche Zeitung; those statements are in absolute contradiction with statements made by von Manteuffel in that respect.

GER: I have read this newspaper cutting and I must say that such a lot of very precise information about my own person is circulated which is completely incorrect that under the circumstances I prefer to believe what General von Manteuffel has said.

FR: The reason why we are raising that subject is because, rightly or wrongly, public opinion in our respective countries has noted its existence and it might be useful to have some clarification. (French, not translated)

GER: Before we go on to the next point, may I ask the Ambassador how he imagines that the Federal Government could clear this matter up? We are not entitled to institute any enquiry; and, in view of what I know about the Land institutions which could be charged with such an enquiry, I really wouldn't like to ask them to do it because I feel that - I am pretty sure that there is some KPD influence there. Particularly if my information is correct that the wife of one of the members of this institution in one of the biggest Laender in the Western Zones is one of the registered members of the KPD, then I do hesitate to put the matter in the hands of one of these Land institutions.

FORMATION OF FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY

FR: Of course, Mr. Chancellor, we are not expecting Bonn to give us official notification about a thing of that kind, but nevertheless we think it sufficient to remind you that we have already agreed on the establishment of an agency for the suppression of activities contrary to the Constitution. I suppose this office is already in existence, or I think it will be soon, and this is a particular case where this agency might deal with this matter in liaison with our own services in this respect.

SECRET - R. Gehlen 240  
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GER: I would like to say here that the establishment of such an office is a difficult matter, none the less we will do it; we will set one up. Much, of course, will depend on who is put at the head of this organization, and I myself am looking into this matter very carefully. After a great deal of enquiries and searching, we have decided to appoint General Gaylund (?); this appointment has already been discussed with the gentlemen of the Allied High Commission. On the American side, where Gen. Gaylund has been well known for a long time, this appointment is welcomed. The French delegation was not so enamoured of the idea and, so enamoured of the idea, and so far as the British were concerned, they said that they would first have to ask Dr. Schumacher.

UK: I don't think I support the idea that we should first have to ask Dr. Schumacher, for whom I have the greatest respect. But I don't think that's a matter of very great interest to us, and I was aware of this proposed appointment.

FR: Of course, no confusion should be made between the opinion expressed by a Committee and a opinion expressed by the High Commission to which the Committee have to report. That is where we stand, the High Commission has not talked on the subject, and as far as I am concerned I never heard about Gen. Gaylund. Although this agency doesn't yet exist, they give you an idea of what they will be able to do in the future as long as they have already informed you that the wife of one of these members is a Communist.

GER: Perhaps I can be allowed to say a few words about this Gen. Gaylund. I have not met him so far personally. I have asked him to come and see me next week. I think he contacted my staff on the suggestion of the Americans. The enquiries I've made about his person, especially what I have been told about him by the Bavarian Minister President Ehrhardt who knows him very well personally, have been very good and have had a very good result. Evidently if he is appointed and if his appointment becomes known abroad and at home, immediately the argument of remilitarization will arise. For several months now, and I can safely say that for several months we have been looking for a civilian who would be suitable for the appointment, and we have been unable to find one.

Also, I am not too ready - and I hope that Gen. Hays won't take this amiss if I say this - to appoint a man who has too close contact with American officers. But I don't think that any objections need really be raised because I've heard that if Gen. Gaylund were really appointed to this post, then any future return to his American associations would be precluded.

. . . . .

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VIA: AIR  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MCK-W-4735

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

DATE: 18 April 1950

FROM : Chief, Foreign Division M

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

SPECIFIC: Interrogation of Dr. Walter Friedrich SCHELLENBERG

Extracts of the Final Report on SCHELLENBERG relating to his negotiations with General von GEHLEN are inclosed. Reference is made to these extracts in MCK-W-4705.

Enclosure: 1  
(3 copies)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

XX-11885

Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich SCHELLENBERG

Appendix VI

Ant VI - Post Defeat Plans

"The sudden deterioration of the military situation of Germany in the last months before defeat did not, according to SCHELLENBERG, allow German leadership to develop any post defeat plans. SCHELLENBERG maintains that the whole working method of the National Socialist system prevented any such premeditated schemes taking shape. \*\*\*\*\*

"Of great importance in this connection were SCHELLENBERG's discussions with Major General von GEHLEN. GEHLEN was until February 1945 'Chief Fremde Heere Ost'. He was an excellent general staff officer who enjoyed all round esteem. He possibly possessed the greatest understanding amongst the members of the 'Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab' for the 'Geheime Meldedienst'. He was SCHELLENBERG's strongest supporter within the army. This was shown by the acceptance of SCHELLENBERG's suggestion that all military attaches and I.C.s. of the Wehrmacht were to pass through the school of the 'Geheime Meldedienst'. The preparations for this were complete when GEHLEN was deprived of his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack by the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Berlin as well as Pomerania. Hitler had one of his usual attacks of rage and KALTENBRUNNER was delighted when he was able, addressing himself to SCHELLENBERG to declare in the course of a lunch party: 'This little sausage of von GEHLEN now has got to go West too - he probably relied too much on your poor intelligence service. Don't forget I don't dream of courting one day reproaches by the Fuehrer owing to your reports. In that case you would be most speedily dismissed'. SCHELLENBERG describes this particular performance as one of the many attacks of KALTENBRUNNER against him.

"Major General von GEHLEN in March 1945 asked SCHELLENBERG for a quiet talk in private. One evening he spent three hours with SCHELLENBERG. In the course of this talk GEHLEN estimated that military resistance would last another two months. Then the end had to be counted with. GEHLEN said that preparations had to be made for this case. The only man with the necessary imagination and energy to undertake this task was HIMMLER. HIMMLER, should, as Commander of the home Army, authorise SCHELLENBERG to build up, together with GEHLEN and the best general staff officers, a resistance movement and army on the lines of the Polish resistance. GEHLEN said that the army had the fullest confidence in SCHELLENBERG as an organiser and he, GEHLEN, and his best general staff officers, as well as many whom SCHELLENBERG did not yet know, would put themselves voluntarily under SCHELLENBERG's command. GEHLEN added that he would now pretend that he was taking four weeks holiday, but in reality he was going to 'Frankenstrupp' (a cover name standing for a prepared evacuation quarter of the OKW) in order to prepare his plan quietly. He had already asked for a comprehensive survey regarding the Polish resistance army. GEHLEN requested SCHELLENBERG to prepare the same on his side. The evening ended with SCHELLENBERG's assurance that he would think it all over thoroughly and then secure the decision of HIMMLER.

"SCHELLENBERG promised GEHLEN strictest secrecy. GEHLEN attached above all great importance to KALTENBRUNNER not being put into the picture. SCHELLENBERG discussed the matter with Dr. RAPP and asked for a report on the whole issue.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

SECRET

Not more than ten days after SCHELLENBERG's talk with GEHLEN RAPP brought with him an excellent survey of the whole structure of the Polish resistance army, together with GEHLEN's request to transmit as soon as possible, preferably by the same courier, the written consent of HIMMLER. The courier explained orally that as GUDERINA was no longer chief of the OKH and as WENK was his successor, it would be a good thing if HIMMLER initiated WENK into the plan.

"SCHELLENBERG explained the whole plan to HIMMLER who declined it abruptly. He said verbatim to SCHELLENBERG: 'This is complete nonsense, if I should discuss this plan with WENK I am the first defeatist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to the Fuhrer. You need not tell this to your GEHLEN. You need only explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. Besides - it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in Frankenstrupp nursing post war plans instead of fighting'. SCHELLENBERG quickly changed the subject; otherwise, he thought, HIMMLER would not have stopped talking and no-one could have predicted what orders HIMMLER might have given inspired by a momentary mood. SCHELLENBERG informed GEHLEN and Dr. RAPP of the negative attitude of HIMMLER. As far as SCHELLENBERG knows no further development occurred."

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET



112

11-1

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

15 April 1950

Chief, Foreign Branch X

Operational

Brigadeführer u. Oberregierungsrat  
Dr. Walter Friedrich SCHILLERBERG

1. A check of the British allegation (BARI 2012) that UTILITY had offered his services to HERRMANN in setting up post defeat resistance turned up SCHILLERBERG's account of the incident. An extract is being pouched separately of that part of the Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich SCHILLERBERG (II-11635) which relates the story of UTILITY's offer. Despite SCHILLERBERG's unsatisfactory mental condition while under interrogation, his account of UTILITY's offer is both lucid and credible. Certainly we would seem justified, on the basis of SCHILLERBERG's statements, at least in assuming that the two were well acquainted. Since UTILITY has never to our knowledge mentioned this connection, and had even once in conversation with Donald C. Woods conveyed the impression that he did not know SCHILLERBERG, we were mildly alarmed.

2. In considering how we might best verify SCHILLERBERG's story and toying with the idea of at some point confronting UTILITY with SCHILLERBERG, we read with some interest certain references to SCHILLERBERG, too, in operational correspondence. Possibly the most startling vista opened by the assumption of an acquaintanceship between UTILITY and SCHILLERBERG is that presented by the involvement of an unidentified SCHILLERBERG in HERRMANN's activities. Is it possible that the central adviser of HERRMANN, Dr. SCHILLERBERG, is Dr. Walter Friedrich? We would like, if possible, to have a preliminary report from other than OGC sources on the routine aspects of the TITEX affair. For example, is the SCHILLERBERG concerned identified in the articles of incorporation or related papers, or in the rent agreement with Price and Company, and, in the form of a neighborhood check, who is the occupant of the 3 1/2 room apartment at the disposal of SCHILLERBERG?

3. Could we, in addition, be brought up to date on the current overt situation and activities of Dr. Walter SCHILLERBERG? A reference in WISA-5163 to the possible advisability of querying a Brigadeführer SCHILLERBERG on the background of a person of possible operational interest indicates him to be more or less available.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

I. Intelligence Estimate

MAY 1950

1. Part one of the following speculations constitute an attempt to evaluate the significance to our intelligence interests in Germany of the possible appointment of UTILITY to head the Verfassungsschutz, or Office for the Protection of the Constitution, of the Bonn Government. This memorandum is admittedly reflective and introspective, dealing as it does with imponderables which cannot successfully be removed from their context of the fluid situation created by the emergence of a strong German government, the field of reference must be arbitrarily selective. We have attempted to resist exploring the enticing vistas opened up by viewing the present problem in all its global and long range implications, and, believing the strategic consequences to be largely unpredictable, have considered the tactical pros and cons. Part two is a consideration of the probable political implications of UTILITY's appointment, and will be passed to the Office of the High Commissioner in Germany for their decision on the political advisability of the appointment.

2. By the act of assuming the responsibility for the maintenance of this operation in July 1949, CIA also became the responsible custodians of the major assets of post-war German intelligence. It was recognized that CIA thus put itself in the strategic position to assume control of future German intelligence as a major instrument for the long-range fulfillment of its mission in Europe. At the same time it was understood that the success of this strategy would depend upon satisfactory completion of the OSO counter-intelligence mission with the operation before the Western German Government was empowered to create an official intelligence service. By official recognition of any individual or element of the Odeum operation before the proper counter intelligence controls were firmly established the Western German Government would find itself able to rob us of our intelligence assets and with serious strategic or political consequences turn them against us.

3. It has been, therefore, our operating principle as intermediaries to control and coordinate to our advantage the demands made upon Odeum assets through the development of official German security organs with the determination of Odeum to become independent of our authority and achieve official recognition. This tactical plan was conceived as the only means of allowing time for a thorough investigation and identification of Odeum assets. This entire process has been accelerated and intensified by the rapid rehabilitation of German economic and political life. These forces have in turn acted in such a way as to complicate and impede the satisfactory fulfillment of the counter intelligence mission within Odeum. In the light of our strategy to date the present candidacy of UTILITY as chief of the Verfassungsschutz must be treated as premature and strategically undesirable since we can at this time claim only partial control over Utility and his organization. At the same time, it has become increasingly evident that our ability to control and hold the loyalty of German intelligence workers, to the extent to which it was hitherto possible, is weakened in direct proportion to the progress of the reestablishment of Germany. It is most doubtful whether we could, under the best of circumstances, go farther in the establishment of control of the future GIS than the gathering of accurate data on personalities and operations within the ODEUM complex. We are not inclined to believe UTILITY after appointment as head of the Verfassungsschutz would attempt secretly to impede us in this endeavor. It will continue to be in the interests of a strong future German intelligence, and hence, at least in UTILITY's eyes, in his interest, that ODEUM be maintained and improved as a cohesive, effective intelligence organization. We have by now made our point with a large fraction of the ODEUM personnel that operational and personality data is our minimum price for support and trusteeship. Thus, even the extent to which the premature official recognition of UTILITY will handicap us in this respect is problematical.

4. UTILITY has risen since 1945 from the position of a relatively obscure member of the German General Staff to the position of a prime political strategist enjoying both the support of conservative political factions and of certain German industrialists. At the same time he enjoys semi-diplomatic relations with the major intelligence services of Western Europe. There is nothing in his past political record or career nor in the course of his operations under our supervision which would promise us any control over his career in the future. At the same time he has the advantage of his prolonged association with American intelligence which has given him the opportunity to make an accurate estimation of our major strategies and our strength. Clearly from the standpoint of German nationalist interests, he would become a most desirable political asset within the Bonn Government. It should also be borne in mind that he enjoys cordial relations with ranking members of the German military and could easily become a focal point of German planning in that direction. It is not unlikely that in the long run this combinations of qualifications and resources could make of UTILITY a more powerful political figure than any present member of the Bonn Government. It is our impression that he would be quick to realize these opportunities and soon range beyond the normal duties assigned to him as chief of the VS. From the standpoint of our control of future German intelligence, UTILITY is too powerful in his own right to be allowed to accept the position.

5. Should UTILITY be offered and accept the position of the chief of the VS, he will accept with the clear understanding that we recognize the act as a clear severance of his relations with an American sponsored intelligence operation. And moreover, his future relations with us will be governed strictly by the regulations affecting his position agreed upon by the High Commissioner and the Western German Government. We must, however, face the fact that although we may formally prescribe a total severance of the ODEUM-UTILITY ties on his

appointment, it will in practice be an impossible dictum to enforce. The opportunities for clandestine, or unreported, contacts between the two, as well as legitimate excuses for official contact will be far too many for us effectively to monitor. This means that with the official status and facilities provided him as head of the Verfassungsschutz and the comparative intelligence wealth of ODEUM more or less available to him UTILITY could, and almost undoubtedly will, become immediately the de facto head of German intelligence. It should be recognized also that to become the de facto head under these circumstances would not be an empty honor, but would put UTILITY in an operationally effective position in which he would hold most of the cards vis-a-vis allied intelligence in Germany.

6. On the other hand his political prestige is such that he represents an operational obstacle in our command of the Odeum operation. It would, however, for the time being, be to our advantage to hold him in our employment rather than to allow him to act independently on behalf of the Western German Government in intelligence matters. It would be to our immediate tactical advantage to place in the position of chief of the VS a highly qualified technician with no political attachments, even though we acknowledge the fact that such a man would soon find himself under the influence of UTILITY. Since ODEUM was founded on the principle of collaboration rather than on that of the paid agent relationship, we are compelled to treat UTILITY's candidacy or similar candidacies ostensibly as a matter between the Western German Government and a private German citizen. It is not our intention to hold UTILITY in Odeum by arguments of indispensability to the operation, nor do we intend to suggest to him or to any other parties concerned that we will interfere in this matter with the authorities of the High Commissioners or members of the Western German Government.

7. Once UTILITY has assumed this position we are prepared to renegotiate

our relations with the remaining German operators in Odeum in a further attempt to reduce them from collaborator to agent status and to insist upon that agent control data which is necessary for the expedition and completion of the OSO counter intelligence mission within the operation. All existing relationships with political representatives and private industry will be subjected to our review and approval. Furthermore, all nominations to key positions within the ODEUM operating staff will be subject to our approval. It will be our intention to treat Odeum from that point onward as any other operation conducted by this organization in Germany. Our success in this program will depend to a very great extent on the degree to which UTILITY maintains, or attempts to maintain, an influence on the organization. It seems fair to assume that ODEUM will represent too big a plum, both for UTILITY personally and for the future GIS, for UTILITY to relinquish meekly all control over it. That UTILITY could, through intermediaries, continue to exert a considerable influence over ODEUM is most probable. It seems likely, that were UTILITY to continue to make his influence felt in ODEUM, our only course of action would be to follow up leads which would take advantage of disaffection and separatist tendencies within the organization. Although in this way we could probably neutralize UTILITY's support within the organization we might find that in the process we had lessened the efficiency of ODEUM by lending support to rival factions.

## II. Political Estimate

1. UTILITY: Judging from his social background, career, and actions since 1945 UTILITY presently or potentially represents the conservative German nationalistic cause. He is on record as believing in the closest possible political and economic collaboration between Germany and Western Europe, particularly with France. Although a Protestant he has allied himself closely with influential Catholic factions both inside and outside Germany. As a

former German general he is closely associated with other prominent members of that class although he has not directly associated himself with what we know of present German militaristic ambitions. It is a fact that with UTILITY's appointment to head the Verfassungsschutz both the Verfassungsschutz and ODEUM would be in the hands of German General Staff types. Regardless of who succeeds UTILITY as head of ODEUM, a sufficient number of general officers will remain in the top staff to exert a definitive influence on the character of the organization. Although he is apparently not closely associated with what we know of present German militaristic ambitions, he does have a direct connection to General SPEIDEL and an unclarified connection with Federal Reconstruction Minister Eberhard Wildermuth. The first of these is viewed, at least by Schumacher, as a protagonist, and the latter as a tool, of resurgent German militarism. He has not shown open antagonism toward leftist political factions with the exception of Communism, but he has ambitiously cultivated prominent German industrialists and members of the landed aristocracy.

2. Political Position within Germany: It is our belief that the appointment of UTILITY to the position of chief of the VS will be immediately interpreted by the leftist opposition to the Bonn Government as a political appointment. There is no reason to believe that UTILITY will find support within the ranks of the SPD. It is much more likely to suppose that he will be branded as a representative of neo-Fascism in Germany. In recent conversations with an OSO representative, Kurt Schumacher inquired as to the internal political ambitions of ODEUM and especially of UTILITY. He explained that regardless of the professional intelligence qualifications involved the SPD could not agree to the establishment of ODEUM as an official CI agency. This view, he said, was due to his conviction that their activities would be aimed against the left only. This alone would seem clear cut evidence that the SPD will oppose UTILITY's candidacy to head the Verfassungsschutz, but we cannot ignore the possibility that Adenauer has

made some sort of deal with the SPD to secure its approval. Vigorous and outspoken opposition to UTILITY in Schumacher's customary fire breathing style could well develop into a diatribe against the Americans and American intelligence methods in Germany. The charge could be made that UTILITY had been chosen for this particular position as an instrument of political oppression in Germany. He is even more vulnerable to collaborationists charges. If it appeared to be a rewarding step in party strategy a personal attack could be launched against him from the standpoint of his collaboration with American intelligence, former German generals and members of the Abwehr and even the SD and the SS which might result in a complete exposure of the Odeum operation and grave embarrassment to our foreign policy.

3. French Political Position: Through our investigations of the Odeum operation, it has become evident that UTILITY would be supported as a candidate by the rightist factions of French intelligence and therefore most likely have the approval of French rightist politicians who were concerned. UTILITY himself has made a consistent effort to ingratiate himself with French intelligence and to advertise his strong faith in a German-French 'entente'. In addition to this we have collected evidence to show that French intelligence has been successful in the clandestine penetration of certain aspects of the Odeum complex. This penetration should have supplied enough information to allow French authorities to come to an independent estimate of the extent of the operation and UTILITY's qualifications for a position in the VS. It is worth noting that in contrast to the British the French have made no official representations to American authorities against the operation.

4. British Political Position: The British have repeatedly since the inception of the operation expressed misgivings about the security and political consequences of the operation. We have received these representations officially and unofficially through British military channels as well as through the Foreign



Office. Successful British penetrations of the operation have allowed them to conclude that the elements of Odeum are to be treated as powerful forces toward German nationalism or the renaissance of Fascism. It is also the British contention that elements of the former German Abwehr are to be treated as constituting present day German intelligence which is primarily aimed at the penetration and neutralization of British and American intelligence in Germany. If these allegations are sincere, it can be expected that the British will strongly oppose UTILITY's candidacy. This would also be in line with their policy toward the SPD. To the best of our knowledge the British are not prepared to propose an alternate to UTILITY which suggests also that the British have not attached great importance to an appointment to this office at this time, but will rely on their right to disapprove any candidate.

5. Establishment of GIS: In all probability, the official recognition of UTILITY, together with his continued, if unofficial, connection with ODEUM, will establish him as the de facto head of German intelligence, and very likely, as one of the most powerful men in Germany. If we regard such a development as inevitable, then we might well welcome UTILITY as the selection. Although he will probably not be unduly swayed by gratitude toward us, he is unquestionably Western oriented, and all three of the Western Allies have penetrated his operations to a degree sufficient to afford at least a window into his future activities. The other side of the coin may or may not be politically more attractive--in setting up UTILITY as the de facto head of German Intelligence, we are taking a long step toward the creation of a strong, effective, friendly intelligence service capable of playing an independent though allied role in the security of Western Europe.

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CHECK NO.

PULLF-579

|                  |                                             |                                   |                                 |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| DATE: 9 MAY 1950 | ROUTINE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> | URGENT <input type="checkbox"/> |
| FROM: PULLF      | MESSAGE No.                                 |                                   |                                 |
| TRANSMIT TO:     | SECRET                                      |                                   |                                 |
| WASHF            |                                             |                                   |                                 |
| INFO: KARLF      | (Classification)                            |                                   |                                 |

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

REQUEST CLEARANCE UTILITY TO GO ITALY CIRCA 22 MAY.

PURPOSE: RECREATIONAL; TAKING 16 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER ON  
HOLY YEAR VISIT ROME.

Wash 4701, 15 May 50 - Trip approved for rec. purposes only. Consider unlikely will actually avoid intell contacts, especially in view of involvement brother, but for record should understand intell negotiations not authorized in absence prior clearance.

Of what duration will trip be? Notify us when UTILITY returns.

Under what name will he travel?

Pull 612, 17 May 50 - Ref para 2, (Wash 4701), duration about 8 days, departure probably 26 May but depends on receipt TTD.

Ref para 3, we obtaining TTD under name REINHARD GEHLEN VAN VAERNEWYK. He will use VAN VAERNEWYK

Pull 685, 9 June 50 ref: Wash-4701, Pull-612

1. UTIL departs tonight w/ daughter for Rome via Switzerland. Returning 18 or 19 June.
2. Sat and Sun sightseeing Zurich Bern for daughter's benefit
3. Mon will pay social visit ULIRICH whom he has not seen since Dec. Will visit MERCIER as courtesy due long absence.
4. Says he definitely on vacation and will not talk business. Says his only reason remain Bern Monday is make these contacts in view of six month interval since last visit. Believe we can depend on this.
5. He departs Bern for Rome Mon night

ORIGINATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: PULLACH ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 10 MAY 50  
ACTION: FDM (1-2) (11 25347)  
INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), STC (5), IID (4), S/C (7-8-9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

PULL 579

TO: WASHF INFO: KAPLF CITE: PULLF

REQUEST CLEARANCE UTILITY TO GO ITALY CIRCA 22 MAY.  
PURPOSE: RECREATIONAL. TAKING 14 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER ON HOLY YEAR  
VISIT ROME.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

*Doyle see att'd*

TOR: 1230Z 10 MAY 50

**SECRET**

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

To: PULLACH, KARLSRUHE ROUTINE  
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 11 MAY 50  
Confirmation: FDM (1-2) OUT 55399  
Information: ADSO (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), IID (7), S/C (3-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 4701

TO: PULLACH INFO: KARLF CITE: WASHF

RE: PULL 579 (IN 25347)

1. TRIP APPROVED FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. CONSIDER UNLIKELY WILL ACTUALLY AVOID INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT BROTHAR, BUT FOR RECORD SHOULD UNDERSTAND INTELLIGENCE NEGOTIATION NOT AUTHORIZED IN ABSENCE PRIOR CLEARANCE.

2. OF WHAT DURATION WILL TRIP BE? NOTIFY US WHEN UTILITY RETURNS.

3. UNDER WHAT NAME WILL HE TRAVEL?

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

JP

DH

RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2217Z 11 MAY 50

**SECRET**

COPY No. /

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

To:

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CONFIRMATION: FDP (1-2)

INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), STC (5), FDM (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

ROUTINE

12 MAY 50

OUT 55527

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) SCAR-380-5

WASH 4824

TO: [ ]

CITE: WASHF

FOR YOUR INFO ONLY ODEUM GERMAN CHIEF PLANNING VISIT ROME WITH DAUGHTER 22 MAY. PURPOSE HOLY YEAR VISIT. HE IS NOT AUTHORIZED MAKE INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

HTC DH

RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0136Z 13 MAY 50

**SECRET**

Copy No. 6

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

*Reinhard Gehlen*

FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: PULLACH

ROUTINE

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

18 MAY 50

ACTION: FDM (1-2)

IN 26265

INFORMATION: (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5*

PULL 612

TO: WASHF

INFO: KARLF

CITE: PULLF

RE: WASH 4701 (OUT 55399)

1. RE PARA 3 DURATION ABOUT EIGHT DAYS DEPARTURE PROBABLY 26 MAY BUT DEPENDS OUR RECEIPT TTD.
2. RE PARA 3. WE OBTAINING TTD UNDER NAME REINHARD GEHLEN VON VAERNEWYK.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

TOP 21Z 18 MAY 50

**SECRET**

COPY No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Form No. 85-6  
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

To: ☒ ☐ ☐ ROUTINE  
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 22 MAY 50  
Confirmation FDP (1-2) OUT 56155  
Information ADSJ (3-4), STC (5), FDM (6), IID (7), S/C (3-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 5421

TO: ☒ ☐ ☐ CITE: WASHF

REF: WASH 4824 (OUT 55527)

1. SUBJECT USING NAME OF REINHARD GEHLEN VON VAERNEWYK.
2. DURATION OF SUBJECT'S TRIP ABOUT EIGHT DAYS WITH DEPARTURE FOR ROME ABOUT 26 MAY.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

☒ ☐ ☐  
RELEASING OFFICER

HTC HOM  
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

☒ ☐ ☐  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

**SECRET**

COPY No.

TON  
2019Z 22 MAY 50

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

3 June 1950

Chief, Foreign Division M

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational  
UTILITY Visit to Bonn

1. I was informed on 1 June by Calhoun Ancrum, HICOG employee of the Foreign Relations Division, Office of Political Affairs, Bonn, that UTILITY, accompanied by Johnny Herwarth von Bittenfeld, chief of the Protocol Office of the German Chancellery, had visited him at his home in Bad Godesberg about six weeks ago. Although Ancrum could not recall the exact date, he remembered that it was about a week after UTILITY's name was first mentioned in the Intelligence Committee, HICOG, for chief of the Verfassungsschutz.

2. Ancrum, who, as you know, [ ] I knew UTILITY some years ago, and Ancrum also knows Herwarth von Bittenfeld, who did not say much during the UTILITY visit. UTILITY appeared under a pseudonym which Ancrum did not recall, and the purpose of his visit was to make clear to some HICOG official his position vis-a-vis the Verfassungsschutz post. He told Ancrum that he did not covet the post, but would accept it if he were offered it, realizing that it was his duty to serve if called.

3. On the basis of UTILITY's statements and at his request, Ancrum wrote an EYES ONLY memo to General Hays on the subject a few days later and delivered it in person. Ancrum's offices adjoin Hays' suite.

4. Ancrum is evidently under the impression that the Army still runs UTILITY and is also aware that I am reporting this minor incident. He will let me know if he sees UTILITY in Bonn again.

Dist:

FDM-2

COS

FOB(B)-1

POB-2

Karl Kottel [ ] 12 June

This is for your info only

[ ] to be discussed

POB-2 [ ]

230.51  
 EU [ ]  
 240  
 FEHLE [ ]  
 CA. Schuler  
 G



FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: FOLLACH ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 9 JUN 50  
ACTION: FDM (1-2) IN 28694  
INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

PULL 685

TO: WASHF INFO: KARLF CITE: PULLF  
RE: WASH L701 (OUT 55399), PULL 612 (IN 26265).

1. UTILITY DEPARTS TONIGHT WITH DAUGHTER FOR ROME VIA SWITZERLAND. RETURNING 18 OR 19 JUNE.
2. SATURDAY AND SUNDAY SIGHTSEEING ZURICH BERN FOR DAUGHTERS BENEFIT.
3. MONDAY WILL PAY SOCIAL VISIT ULLRICH WHOM HE HAS NOT SEEN SINCE DECEMBER. WILL VISIT MERCIER AS COURTESY DUE LONG ABSENCE.
4. SAYS HE DEFINITELY ON VACATION AND WILL NOT TALK BUSINESS. SAYS HIS ONLY REASON REMAIN BERN (~~BECAUSE~~) MONDAY IS TO MAKE THESE CONTACTS IN VIEW OF SIX MONTH INTERVAL SINCE LAST VISIT. BELIEVE HE CAN DEPEND ON THIS.
5. HE DEPARTS BERN FOR ROME MONDAY NIGHT.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 382E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
E 2005

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

TOR: 1731Z 9 JUN 50

**SECRET**

COPY No. /

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: PULLACH

ROUTINE

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

9 JUN 50

ACTION: FDM (1-2)

IN 28694A

INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-340-5*

PULL 685

CORRECTION

IN PARA 4, LINE 2 THE WORD BERN HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.

CORR:  
TOR: 1107Z 11 JUN 50

**SECRET**

COPY No. /

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

To: ☒ ☐ PRIORITY  
FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 13 JUN 50  
CONFIRMATION: FDP (1-2) OUT 5731  
INFORMATION:

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5*

WASH 7000

TO: ☒ ☐ CITE: WASHF

REF:

SUBJECT REF DEPARTED BERN FOR ROME NIGHT 12 JUNE. WILL LEAVE  
ROME 18 OR 19 JUNE.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

W. K. HARVEY

RH

JP

RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2223Z 13 JUN 50

**SECRET**

Copy No. 6

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VIA: AIR  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.

MGK-W-5012

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

DATE: 14 June 1950

FROM : Chief, FDM

Attn: [ ]

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

SPECIFIC - [ ] Information on UTILITY

Reference: MAV-1800, MAVA-5629, MAVA-5559

1. According to referenced Vienna reports, UTILITY recently was contacted by representatives of a movement in Southern Germany which seeks closer rapprochement with France and has as its ultimate goal the establishment of a union of Germany, France and Italy in an anti-Communist front. The group is led by Fürst Erich WALDBURG-ZELL and Dr. Gerhard KROLL and is primarily composed of members of the Christian Democratic Union, the Catholic Youth Movement, clergy and politicians, and is as yet not sponsored by any organized group. KROLL arranged a meeting between WALDBURG and UTILITY early in May 1950 for the purpose of obtaining UTILITY's views on German-French rapprochement and to enable WALDBURG to describe the movement and to request for it the support of UTILITY's organization. [ ]

[ ] was present at the meeting, as were Toni HALTER and a Colonel LANGKAU, an old German Wehrmacht artillery officer who was in charge of some branch of the Heereswaffenamt during the war and also worked on the atomic bomb.

2. At the meeting UTILITY stated that he approved of the movement and that he would be willing to supply WALDBURG with information and contacts, but that his organization was not equipped to give the propaganda support that WALDBURG had indicated he wanted. He warned that the movement would not succeed without German government support and suggested that WALDBURG contact Chancellor ADENAUER as soon as possible. In a thirty minute exposition on the European situation UTILITY then predicted that there would not be a war for at least five years, barring some unforeseen event, and further stated that what Western Europe needed most was a spiritual or ideological concept or weapon which

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3822  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005 FORM NO. 51-28  
MAR 1949

CLASSIFICATION

25.35  
25  
240.15 G  
UTILITY File

would help to unify the various Western European states and groups. UTILITY indicated that he had submitted the substance of his exposition to his American contact.

3. The above mentioned meeting with UTILITY followed almost immediately after the return of WALDBURG, KROLL and [ ] from France, where WALDBURG promotes the movement through Archduchess ADELHEID, sister of Archduke Otto von HAPSBURG. While in France WALDBURG and KROLL met secretly with a more or less clandestine group of Catholic conservatives, many of whom are members of the de GAULLE and PETAIN factions and are wanted by the French police as former Nazi collaborators. The group of Catholic conservatives apparently believes WALDBURG to be the leader of a potential resistance movement which they, as a clandestine group, could join in a war against the Soviet Union. They informed WALDBURG that they could not offer his movement any political influence in France but could introduce him to General WAYGAND and leaders of the young Catholics' labor group. Colonel OLIVIER, leader of the group who <sup>may be identified with</sup> ~~has been identified as~~ Colonel PASSY, ~~former~~ chief of de GAULLE's Intelligence Service, claims to maintain high official contacts with the British and the Americans which were developed during the war, contacts with the Vatican, and with Swiss (or former Swiss) Intelligence circles. His French Intelligence connections are not known but he evinced a particular interest in economic intelligence on the USSR and on Soviet war potential.

4. On 8 May 1950 [ ] met Prince Heinrich LIECHTENSTEIN at Vaduz and drove with him to Berne. Two days later [ ] proceeded to Lugano for a meeting arranged by the Italian MA in Berne with a Mr. "TOMAY", identified as Lieutenant Colonel TESSITORE, head of the Italian Army IS branch dealing with Eastern Europe. During their conversation [ ] asked TESSITORE point-blank if the Italian IS had OFFSPRING connections and was told that there were none. A few days later [ ] asked UTILITY whether OFFSPRING maintained contact with the Italian IS and UTILITY also replied in the negative. UTILITY admitted, however, that he had good personal contacts with high Italian military figures, such as RAY (phonetic), but stated that he had not made use of this contact for intelligence purposes.

E      J

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

*Gehlen*

SECRET

MCHW  
5372

AIR

6 July 1980

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Attn: Fulcosh

Chief, Foreign Division H

Operational

Barbara and Walter von GELLEN

Some months ago [ ] informed [ ] that a sister of Reichard von GELLEN was living in Brazil. I believe that the interrogation of Hans GELLEN (H22-2558) also referred to this sister who allegedly had married a distant relative by the name of Walter GELLEN. A check of all available sources and records in Sao Paulo proved negative on both Barbara and Walter.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

AIR

SECRET

*Reinhardt von Gekler*

MGL-A-2524

7 July 1950

Chief, Foreign Division M

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Interview with UTILITY, 26 June 1950

1. The interview had been set originally for 26 June at 1600 hours in UTILITY's office in the compound at Pullach. I was visited an hour before the appointed time, however, by Mr. HERDARL, who said that UTILITY had changed his mind in favor of tea at his home on the Starnbergsee. And so it was.

2. As with everything that UTILITY does, this interview had been carefully prepared, even down to the brief participation of his wife, a personable woman whose native volubility has obviously been cramped by years of anxious suppression in favor of the more purposeful volubility of her husband. Her arrival coincided roughly with the completion of UTILITY's detailed account of the history of OFFSPRING. After she had joined us, I switched the conversation to the general observations of one who had just come to Germany from Austria and had remarked certain not very subtle differences between the attitude of Americans towards Austrians and the attitude of Americans toward Germans. This prompted Mrs. UTILITY to express herself in rather uninhibited language about categorical de-Nazification and sensational reporting in the German and American press on German nationalism and militarism. Her points were well taken, although made with that uneasy intensity common to European wives of forceful Europeans, and deriving from a well founded uncertainty as to whether and when they will be advised, more or less gallantly, to shut up. Although her language was less guardedly tactful than UTILITY's, she was, I have no doubt, expressing UTILITY's own thoughts on the subject. I pointed out the influence that American public opinion plays in such matters and the impossibility of expecting the American public to be able to distinguish between the Abwehr and the SD or, for that matter, between the Abwehr and Fremde Heere Ost. At about this point UTILITY nodded to his wife in a manner which seemed to say that it was time she got the hell upstairs -- which she did.

3. Our amenities a trois had brought the conversation to the subject closest to UTILITY's heart - the problem of legitimizing OFFSPRING with UPGROWTH and of stage managing the transmutation of OFFSPRING into the future GIS. He feels that there will be increasing popular pressure in Germany for a relaxation of occupation controls and for a corresponding increase in the sovereignty of the Bonn Government. He obviously feels that the Allies are moving too slowly in this direction, although he

*Copy to R.H. 20/7*

SECRET

COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

- 2 -

understands fully the considerations of public opinion in France and England, as well as in the United States, which make speed impossible, not to mention the human factors involved among the occupation bureaucracy who can be expected to resist the loss of any part of the authority to which, over a period of five years, they have become comfortably accustomed. But he also understands - and is driven by - the time element as it plays on the German side. He is openly concerned about the charges of collaboration to which he and his co-workers are certain to be exposed - he cited some minor examples to show that this is already in the wind - as the Government tightens up on the relations of its subordinate officials with the occupation powers and as resentment against Allied controls and "guidance" grows. He is therefore anxious to combat the time element - as it works against him - by securing at least tacit official legitimization with the government as soon as possible. This will serve, in addition to logistical and servicing considerations, the double purpose of paving the way for future incorporation as the GIS and of protecting his people from the charge of being American agents. UTILITY stated frankly that this has been for the past year his primary and almost exclusive preoccupation. And this is where MERKUR comes in. It is MERKUR's job to cultivate and maintain contact with key political figures and to keep UTILITY informed of political developments on the German side.

4. Although UTILITY admits that his contacts are almost exclusively with the CDU, he hastens to point out that this is simply the result of the fact that the CDU/CSU is the governing party. He stresses his personal political non-partisanship, pointing to the apolitical tradition of the German Army, and insists that the future GIS must stand above politics and enjoy the support of all the major parties and of all the western occupying powers. The organization would, he says, like to have contact with the Socialists, but has desisted thus far because of SCHUMACHER's known antipathy to officers and because of the closeness of the German Socialists to the British, with whom, UTILITY points out wryly, if not bitterly, he also has no contact. He seems to feel that the best way to the Socialists would be via the British, and he is accordingly very anxious to make personal contact with a representative of the BIS, - he mentioned General HAYDEN and Mr. BAUMON - with our approval. He is aware of our reservations on this point and seems to have no intentions of violating them, but he is at a loss to understand why we do not sanction the same relation to the British which we have previously sanctioned with respect to the Swiss, the Spaniards, the French, etc. The problem is not, he says, acute at the moment, but he expects it to become acute within a year, and we can expect continued pressure and a lot of carefully formulated persuasion from him in the months to come. As for direct contact with the Socialists, he is afraid of a rebuff. He points out that SCHWERIN was told off by SCHUMACHER in no uncertain terms, from which he derives the reasonable conclusion that any meeting between himself and SCHUMACHER must be carefully prepared and must not, in any case, take place until a favorable reception is guaranteed. He has not met KNOERINGEN, Socialist leader in Bavaria, because of the latter's known closeness to the British - not to mention SCHWERIN. His immediate concern, however, is Bonn, and he intends to go to Frankfurt this week to meet GLOBKE with a view to sounding him out as to the best procedural plan for legitimization.



SECRET

- 3 -

5. As to my own sphere of activity, I told UTILITY that we were well acquainted and favorably impressed with him and his group on an operational basis, but that we felt considerably less completely in the picture with regard to his place in the German political picture. I told him that, in view of our common objectives with regard to the GIS, I thought it would be to our mutual advantage for us to know more about this aspect of his group, i.e., who their friends are, who their supporters are, what their general political orientation, etc. I pointed out that this was particularly important in view of the distance between Washington and Pullach and the suspicions about the German military which so actively influence American public opinion and, consequently, American policy decisions. He agreed wholeheartedly with this view, and promised to arrange a meeting a *trois* with MERKUR next week to discuss steps to be taken in this direction, including the revelation of a complete list of OFFSPRING's "special connections."

6. I had, on the whole, an excellent impression of UTILITY, better, indeed, than when I first met him on the occasion of C J's visit to Pullach. HERDANI told me beforehand when I suggested that it might be well if MERKUR were present at the interview, that "the Doctor is at his best when alone." He was, in any case, frank, serious, intense, thorough and, I think, sincere. He took it very well, for instance, when, during his discussions of the political problems relative to the absorption of OFFSPRING in the Bonn Government, I asked him whether his interests were exclusively in the intelligence field or whether he was not also concerned with keeping the decent elements of the German General Staff together for future use. He was obviously taken by surprise and asked me to repeat the question, which I did in a manner designed to give him time to formulate an answer. He said, "Exclusively intelligence for the time being. It so happens that some excellent General Staff officers, such as HORN, have joined our group, and we also maintain contact with others, such as GUDERIAN and SPEIDEL." He also mentioned some "excellent younger officers" now active with his organization.

7. There was no suggestion of the political naivete reflected in reports of UTILITY's activities a year ago, and I suspect that the past six months have taught him much. He is an uncommonly intelligent man and is certainly capable of learning from political experience. He showed a detailed understanding of persons and issues in the German political theater, and he made no attempt to conceal the fact that it is in politics that his primary interest now lies, not because of personal political ambition, nor because of any native yen for the game of politics, but rather because he knows that the future of his organization cannot be secured without mastery of the political problems involved.

8. Although we did not speak specifically of the "third force" concept, popular with so many Germans and given lip service by ADENAUER, who can hardly believe in it, I derived a strong impression from his discussion of the American role in world affairs that UTILITY is completely committed to

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

- 4 -

the concept of Western Europe as an American bridgehead on the continent. He spoke repeatedly of the obsolescence of any narrow nationalist concept and observed that even England, in the last analysis, must dance to the American tune. He seems, indeed, rather anti-British, although he realizes that he must make his peace with British intelligence if he is to survive within the framework of the German Government. His feeling toward the Socialists is similar. He is not anti-Socialist, and he has great respect for many individual Socialists, but he shares the suspicions of a largely mythical Socialist left wing which is common to conservatives in Europe generally and to conservative military men everywhere.

Dist:

- ✓ 2 - FDM
- 1 - COS
- 2 - File

SECRET

*Gehlen*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AIR

*McKee*  
*5501*

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

18 July 1950

Chief, Foreign Division H

Attn: Pallasch

Operational

Barbara and Walter von GULLEN

R. Reference KEE-4-5372; T. G. R-2292

1. As the result of a request for a name check, I have advised that Barbara von GULLEN arrived in Brazil on 22 May 1948 and at the Service de Registro de Estrangeiros obtained an identity document, model no. 19, No. 263.869, giving as references Hildegard KRIEGER, Rua Nascimento Silva, 215, apt. 102, and Ellen TERTAN, av. Vieira Braga, 630 (on whom there is no information in the files of this office). Formerly she resided in Florianopolis where she had registry no. 57.870. At the present time she lives in Rio de Janeiro at Rua Santa Angelica, 192, apt. 101 (Ipanema). She seldom leaves her home, but works as a piano teacher, having many good pupils who are residents of that area.

2. Walter Carlos von GULLEN, an accountant, lives at the same address and according to the apartment house registry book carries identity document no. 58.524, issued in Joinville, on 12 July 1948.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ADR

SECRET

MCL-A-2658

Chief, Foreign Division M

19 July 1950

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

Information on UTILITY

REF : MGK-W-5212

1. In one of my first meetings with UTILITY I questioned him concerning possible connections to the WALDBURG Kreis. He admitted readily that he had connections to the WALDBURG Kreis and to Prince WALDBURG but that he had grave reservations as to WALDBURG's character. He intimated that OFFSPRING's attitude towards the whole WALDBURG was governed by considerable reservations.
2. Although he maintains a direct personal contact with WALDBURG through Colonel LANGKAU, an OFFSPRINGER known locally as Mr. LANGENDORF, the firm relationship here is Dr. KROLL; a member of the Landtag, Catholic Youth leader, and a politician with wide interest in the economic and constitutional fields.
3. Subsequent to this first conversation with UTILITY, the latter showed me a report, which had been given to him by Mr. LANGENDORF, describing a meeting between LANGENDORF and WALDBURG which had taken place at the Bayrischerhof on the initiative of WALDBURG shortly after the outbreak of civil war in Korea. This report included a highly unfavorable assessment of WALDBURG by LANGENDORF in which WALDBURG was characterized as hysterical, fanatic, fantastic, and otherwise unstable. From the remarks attributed to WALDBURG in the course of this report, it was plain that he was hysterically pessimistic and extremely anti-American in the sense that he feels that the Americans cannot be counted upon for real support. (This meeting took place before American intervention in Korea.)
4. Generally speaking, it seems unlikely that WALDBURG may be considered a particularly close connection of OFFSPRING. KROLL is undoubtedly a close Special Connection but in spite of rather than because of his connections to Prince WALDBURG.

Dist:  
2 - FDM  
1 - COS  
2 - File

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

34015  
6.12

GREEN LIST/1 FEB 51

Personal Documentation

MCLA 7582/90 STAFF { MCLA-11526 BAUN Dia y BAUN D'ary  
MCLA-11678 BAUN Diary MCLA 12873

MCLA 7582/30


STAFF

MGLA-11526  
MGLA-11678

BAUN Dia y  
BAUN Diary

BAUN Dairy  
MGLA 12873

५०

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001-2005 

DATE 2001 2005  
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VIA: \_\_\_\_\_  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO.

MCK-A-22030

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Pullach Operations Base

DATE: 28 August 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT: GENERAL—

SPECIFIC— Newspaper Articles of Interest.

The attached is forwarded for your  
information.

Dist:  
2-POB w/attach  
2-COS  
1-Reg

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD USE EXCEPTION 302E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

25.35

27.31

27.11

11.13

230.51

*Gehlen*  
*240*

*144*  
*Rosenmund, Dr.*  
*@ Dr. Schneider*

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MEKAW  
100-8720

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Berlin

DATE: 19 September 1966

FROM : Chief, Foreign Branch II

Att: E 1

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational Matters - Public  
SPECIFIC: Zipper and Bonn

1. After reading Pull 1067, our only constructive suggestion is that someone should put a cold towel on Utility's head. His reaction to the official announcement of Cappel's appointment gives eloquent support to the various appraisals of his character which have been written by the FOB staff.

2. As nearly as we can analyze it, Utility seems to feel that by some divine ordinance nothing should happen in the military or security fields in Western Germany without either his concurrence or his direct participation. This peculiar preoccupation, particularly well outlined in MASH-3286, is rapidly creating an almost insoluble problem for us. On the one hand we would like to maintain Zipper as an intelligence asset for the U.S. Government. Along this same line, we want to see individuals of the Bonn variety properly placed in any German remilitarization effort solely on the grounds of motivation, capacity, and orientation toward the American viewpoint. On the other hand, we have Utility attempting to use in Bonn the influence of his organization, not as an intelligence asset, but as a political grouping of former German officers.

3. We more hardly know how to suggest that you unravel this circular skoin, but we do share with you a basic concern over what it is we are attempting to advocate with Hecker and Upmistr. We certainly go along with paragraph six of Pull 1024 just as we do with paragraphs three, four and five of Karl 9796. But as we indicated in MASH 14644, there is a legitimate distinction between Zipper as an intelligence package and the use of certain Zipperites on an individual basis in the remilitarization effort. Too, this distinction would not be difficult to work out if it were not for Utility's

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Richard Helms

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RET

-2-

personal ambition and desire to be the only "true prophet". It can be fairly said that a certain portion of Zipper is of little value to anyone except to Utility and his political aspirations. Therefore, would it not be feasible to suggest that we treat Zipper as an apolitical intelligence organization which deserves bona support and localization, thus enabling us to back off from the advocacy of specific members of Zipper in their campaigns for political or military jobs? Stated another way, McCloy should discuss Zipper with Utility as an organization and not get into individual personalities. This would then leave him free to advocate in Allied councils specific German officers, whether Zipper or not, for any jobs he deemed best. In this fashion we could make our influence in individual cases felt through him without each time raising the question of whether or not the person wears the Zipper badge.

4. Possibly the foregoing suggestion lacks realism, but we have got to attempt to make some sort of distinction. Otherwise we will find ourselves bogged down in the ring-around-a-rosy which is bound to continue until there is enough German remilitarization to provide jobs for all interested officers. Also this approach should help us in outmaneuvering the British and French on specific candidates for key posts whereas it is pretty hard to stand behind the scenes and pull strings with the large Zipper organization bulging out on every side and constantly giving our game away.

5. Frankly, on individual cases such as Horn, possibly Speidel, Foertsch and others, we should not hesitate to request Shute to use his influence to see them well placed. American officials, both diplomatic and military, generally bend over backward to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of any country even an occupied one. Consequently they often find themselves outmaneuvered by the British and French who are much less conscience stricken at the use of pressures and under-the-table politicking. For this reason we as an organization should at least make our intelligence needs strongly felt with Shute, and through him with McCloy and Hays, to see to it that a reasonable number of "safe" officers land in top jobs in any remilitarization effort. We would need such individuals regardless of the fate of Zipper.

6. I thought you might be interested in the attached clippings of newspaper articles on the rearming of West Germany.

Attachment

Richard Helms

AS ATTACHMENTS FOR FILE.  
AT.

RET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



E X T R A C T

FROM: MGKA-23504, 20 October 1950, Subj: Weekly Letter from [ ]

6. I visited POB on the morning of the 11th. [ ] described a long and bitter conference he had had with UTILITY some days after the McCloy dinner. During the conference [ ] took the position outlined in your MGKW 6425 and achieved good results. UTILITY, it appears, was practically isolated within his own organization in the matter of the McCloy dinner. All of his senior people were against it, and apparently he had had a bitter showdown with them prior to his meeting with [ ]. Thus [ ] was in a position to deal the final blow.

[ ] and I decided that we would not return to the subject of the meeting on the occasion of my visit, but rather ask UTILITY to brief me for my discussions in Washington. The meeting was laid on as a final one before my return home. The discussion was cordial, and I must say not very revealing.

I will arrange another meeting with UTILITY before leaving the Theater, at which time I will express to him your view about the McCloy dinner.

NWC-002780

SECRET

*Gehlen, G.V.*  
*file UTILITY's*  
*note in*  
*folder*  
*Sp. Conn.*  
*3905*  
*MGL-A-3822*

AIR

Chief, Foreign Division M

30 October 1950

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

ZIPPER - Operational

Special Connections, Personalities, No. 20, UTILITY

REF : WASH KARLA-0129 (NOT G.F.D.M., F.O.B.)

1. It should be borne in mind in reading the following that the writer has known UTILITY only as a politician and has had no experience in dealing with him in intelligence operations or organizational administration.

2. There is nothing about UTILITY to suggest that he is nearly 50. He has always reminded me of a precocious schoolboy politician, 16 or 17 years old, bright for his age and more daring than his fellows in imitating the manners of grown-ups, the kind of boy who tries his political wings as manager of athletic teams or as editor of high school papers, or as manipulator of elections for the student council. This essential boyishness, in view of the fact that UTILITY is actually 48, is an incongruous but important element in his character, sometimes charming, sometimes exasperating, sometimes a little pathetic. One is almost always conscious of it in dealing with him, for it expresses itself in countless habits and mannerisms. When UTILITY smokes a cigar, he always looks as though it were his first, and indulged in only in a brave effort to give an impression of adulthood. In performing his duties as host, particularly when celebrities and important personages are involved, UTILITY is all at ease but resolved to play the Hausherr. He never looks the part, and the act is unconvincing, however determined. Like the schoolboy politician, UTILITY is an inveterate self-salesman. He seldom says an unconsidered word, which is not to say that he doesn't utter many an ill-considered one. He is, indeed, a bad conversationalist. He delivers his canned briefings well and convincingly, but when he departs from the script, his discourse is troubled by countless "Ich moecht' anal sagen" and scorchings for the discreet term or expression. And when the conversation touches upon anything but business, he is inhibited by extensive ignorance. At the root of all this, very probably, is his size. UTILITY is a runt, and, even as runts go, a rather unimpressive one. As [ ] has put it, he suffers from a "runt complex," which is consistent with the simile of the schoolboy politician.

3. This is the background against which UTILITY's erratic, sometimes brilliant, sometimes disreputable behaviour must be examined. It is easy to

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

COPY

32-69-161

assume that UTILITY has had his moments of memorable chagrin as a German Army officer. No one looks the part less than he, and it is inconceivable that he hasn't been uncomfortably conscious of this fact all his life. It probably explains his extraordinary vanity, touchiness on matters of honor and prestige, - and his ambitiousness. He must have worked very hard to get as far as he has, and, lacking physical stature and presence, if not actual strength, he undoubtedly survived by his wits, which are keen, and which would be really formidable in a more stable man, less inhibited by the heebie jeebies of the adolescent boy tortured by suppressed doubts as to whether he can make a go of it in the adult world but determined to buttress a good try with a bold front.

4. Obviously, he doesn't lack important assets. He has initiative, vision and a deal of native shrewdness. His accomplishment in creating ZIPPER is something no one can take away from him, and it is remembered and acknowledged even by his detractors. It took vision, initiative and a lot of nerve, not to mention a grasp of the essentials of organization and some diplomatic talent. But in the early stages of the post-war game, UTILITY had the advantage of dealing almost exclusively with military men, on the American as well as on the German side, and he is understandably more at home with military men than with civilians. More recently he has had to deal almost exclusively with civilians, or with military men in cahoots with civilians, so to speak, and it has been a tougher haul. Politically, he has had, probably for the first time in his life, to do his politicking without the protective rules of honor and convention which distinguish military from civilian politics, and socially he has had to mix with people with whom he shares no common ground of education or experience and who have a disconcerting habit of talking on subjects about which UTILITY knows no more than the subject headings.

5. Throughout this period, concentrated in the developments associated with the Verfassungsschutz and remilitarization, he has performed erratically. He has generally sized things up correctly in his moments of psychological equilibrium, and has made policy accordingly, but time and again he has been disconcerted and sidetracked by events which seemed to threaten his ambition or prick his vanity. At such times he has indulged in petulance, temper tantrums, petty intrigue, slander and deceit. His reaction to [ ]'s emergence as UPTHRUST's military advisor was consistently petulant, colored by jealousy, resentment and frustration. It was climaxed by a disgraceful temper tantrum, touched off by the official announcement of [ ]'s appointment and followed by a week's sulk in Switzerland. An example of deceit and sharp practice was his wangling of an appointment with McCLOY. The campaign of intrigue and slander against [ ] was, to put it mildly, an undignified spectacle. It hurt [ ] not at all, hurt UTILITY very much and contributed nothing to [ ]'s eventual downfall.

6. This performance, as unpleasantly spectacular as it was, does not, however, represent the complete record of the case, and it shouldn't be exaggerated in assessing UTILITY's performance over the past year, although it shouldn't be glossed over, either. The most-impressive aspect of the

counter case is UTILITY's demonstrated resiliency. He is a tough little fellow, volatile in his reaction to punishment, but astounding in his powers of recuperation. After each of his emotional spasms and after each of his sometimes apparently crushing defeats, he has bounced back, with equilibrium restored, capable again of clear, objective thinking, and ready to go back into the ring. Even his repulsive performance in begging the American staff for help against [ ] was balanced in part by his success in getting to McCLOY by an end run. This play represented a kind of double cross of UTILITY's American staff, but at least it showed persistency and resourcefulness.

7. If one were to summarize by compounding a glossary of pertinent adjectives, the result would read somewhat as follows: able, ambitious, bright, calculating, clever, devious, emotional, energetic, honorable, imaginative, impulsive, industrious, insecure (in the psychological sense), intelligent (but not intellectual), proud, resourceful, touchy, vain, volatile.

8. It will be noted that the above glossary includes some contradictions. They simply exist in UTILITY's character, and are usually explicable by reference to the factor of vanity and psychic insecurity which sometimes impels UTILITY to behave in a manner contrary to the dictates of his better nature and which often results, during moments of equilibrium, in tortuous rationalization. It would seem, for instance, that the attributes of deviousness and honor were irreconcilable. UTILITY's honor and honesty have been the subject of much discussion and correspondence. Actually, it is the opinion of those who have worked closely with him over a period of time that he is essentially both honorable and honest. His vanity occasionally persuades him to lie to save face, often foolishly, sometimes even ridiculously, and his ambition sometimes impels him to employ devious means when others fail, but these are invariably courses of second choice, and adopted with the safeguards and modifications to be expected of a man who is, by tradition and personal preference, basically honorable. Both [ ] and I are satisfied that in his reporting of major developments UTILITY has consistently told, if not the whole truth, at least little but the truth, and that at no time has he been deliberately deceitful in a substantial degree or on a substantial matter. As to his not always telling the whole truth, it must be remembered that UTILITY considers himself to be the head of a German organization and that, as such, he feels privileged to make his own decision as to what his relationship with his American sponsors requires him to tell them. In other words, he feels under no obligation to act as our informant on German military politics, although he is perfectly aware that an open exchange of relevant information is essential to effective and harmonious operations and as much in his own interest as ours.

9. The fact that UTILITY has emerged victorious and stronger than ever from this summer's political rough and tumble might reasonably be expected to go to his head and make him a more difficult partner in the immediate future than he has been in the past. It will certainly increase his confidence and bolster his position with his own organization, which was not unaffected by some of the blows he took during the early part of the summer. But UTILITY

SECRET

- 4 -

is too intelligent to make it reasonable to expect the worst. If UTILITY has learned how strong he is, he will certainly not be blinded to the fact that a major and indispensable source of that strength is his American sponsorship and support. He may indulge his vanity here and there along the way, but as between UTILITY's vanity and his intelligence, the former wins a good many battles, but the latter wins the wars.

Dist:

1/2 - FDM  
2 - COS  
1 - FOB  
2 - File

RH

17 Nov 55

Q

SECRET

32-6-9-161

SECRET

10 November 1950

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Richard Holmes

FROM: L 300

SUBJECT: General Reinhardt Gehlen

I made the statement in a recent pouch that the only thing Gehlen lacked in his repertory was a sympathetic press. The opening pages of Jürgen Thorwald's *es begann an der Weichsel* indicate that Gehlen is, in fact, not suffering in that regard. Thorwald's book, which is now in its third printing, portrays Gehlen in the first chapter as one of the unsung heroes of the German Army.

The book opens with Guderian tossing fitfully in his sleeping compartment as his special train takes him, on the night of 8 January 1945, across Germany to a fateful interview with Hitler on troop dispositions. Hitler has consistently and obstinately refused to withdraw the intact but isolated Army Group Nord or to release for the Eastern Front the reserve divisions of the broken Ardennes offensive. Guderian reflects: "The General Staff of the German Army allowed itself no illusions concerning the scale of the coming Soviet offensive. General Gehlen, head of Fremde Heere Ost, who consolidated the reports on the eastern foe, was as clever as he was conscientious, and his estimates of Soviet troop concentrations and Soviet intentions carried an incontestible weight. Guderian had no reason to question for a second the reliability of his colleague...The reports which Gehlen had presented since November had at first given even Guderian--despite all previous experience--an impression of improbability, but nevertheless they were repeatedly demonstrated as being true."

After a sleepless night, Guderian goes to his office car, and buries himself again in his thoughts. He is startled out of his concentration by an opening door:

"In the doorway stood General Gehlen. His sharply chiselled face was pale, with a yellowish undertone. He suffered from the occupational disorder of so many overworked General Staff officers, stomach ulcers.

"Herr Generaloberst," he said, "I have completed another special estimate of the strength ratio in the Baranov beachhead area, and have included the very latest information. According to this information, the enemy is deployed on a 90 kilometer front with five infantry armies, six armored divisions, one self contained armored corps, and five armored

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

SECRET

-21

brigades. The ratio of infantry strength now is 11:1 in favor of the enemy, in armor it is 7:1, and in artillery 20:1. Soviet artillery is deployed at some points in concentrations of 250 pieces to the kilometer. The conclusions are so evident that they should convince even the Führer that we face a catastrophe unless something is done.'

"Guderian looked squarely into Gehlen's face. Gehlen, too, judged on sober reason. He had no contact with the world in which decisions were based on instincts, inspirations, and moods. 'Gehlen,' Guderian said, 'today is our last chance.'"

Only a few days before, Guderian had pleaded with Hitler and gone over the same ground, but Hitler "refused to recognize that his despised opponent, Stalin, could assemble the reported strength. He spoke again of the 'random rabble' and 'plunder divisions' remaining to Stalin. He had screamed that General Gehlen, in company with his estimates, belonged in an insane asylum. He ignored Guderian's objection that Hitler could put him in the same asylum, since he concurred in Gehlen's opinion.

"Now Guderian stopped his pacing. 'We must achieve it today,' he reiterated. 'This is the last chance left for us. Gehlen, don't let yourself be swayed by anything during our conference. Remain calm even if the Führer permits himself to be drawn into insulting the General Staff and you personally.'

"Gehlen understood. He spread out his maps and papers. While Gehlen was thus occupied, Guderian continued his pacing. 'I will repeat once more,' he said, 'the most important parts of our presentation....'"

They arrived in Ziegenberg, were conducted to Jodl's briefing room, Hitler entered, and the conference began:

"Guderian, his face betraying his deep feeling, took his place at Hitler's left side. Hitler gazed across at Gehlen, who remained erect and expressionless. Hitler sensed in Gehlen the personification of cold, unyielding reality--a reality to which he would not surrender until it finally engulfed him and forced his pawns in the East, the South, and the West to pay the price of his obstinacy. His face assumed an expression of rejection.

"'My Führer,' began Guderian, 'I come back to present the facts to you personally again...for this purpose I have brought with me General Gehlen himself...'"

SECRET

7

SECRET

-3-

Jürgen Thorwald, you will remember, is the nom de plume of Heinz Bongartz, a former special reporter for the German Navy, and a ZIPPER Special Connection. According to [ ] the manuscript of es begann an der Weichsel was read and toned down by ZIPPER before publication. Guderian's memoirs, currently in manuscript, have been subjected to the same moderating influence.

SECRET



VIA: AIR KYN-7084  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE

DISPATCH NO. WALA-4153

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division N DATE: 27 November 1950  
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational  
Specific: Wehrmacht Officer WALA-3733

Ref: WALA-3733; WASH-14764

The following additions are submitted:

1. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
2. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
3. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
4. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
5. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
6. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
7. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
8. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
9. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
10. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
11. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
12. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
13. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
14. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
15. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
16. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
17. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
18. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
19. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111
20. SAUER, Hermann; Analyst; radio call DE 1111

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

COPY NO. 1 OF 4  
LOG NUMBER 6475-195  
32-6-6-7584-10 COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

7762 A-4133

21. WESTHOFEN, fnu: former GGS officer, (WESTHOVEN,  
Franz: born ca. 1894; Pz. Gr. Gen lt., 3rd Pz.  
Div, in 1943-44).

Dist:

- ✓ 2 - FDM  
1 - COS  
1 - POB

HAH

③

~~TOP SECRET~~

32-6-6-7484

FORM 85-5  
1 APR 1950

*Seklen, Rheinhard*

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: PULLACH ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 30 DEC 50  
ACTION: ADSO (1) IN 15919  
INFORMATION: S/C (2-3-4), FDM (5-6)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

PULL 1501

TO: WASHA

INFO: KARLA

CITE: PULLA

1. 28 DECEMBER UTILITY, TALKING FROM PREPARED NOTES, INDULGED IN THREE HOUR HARANGUE AGAINST AMERICAN INTERFERENCE IN ZIPPER INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HEREVIEWED U.S. POLICY GERMANY, TEHERAN, YALTA, POTSDAM AND PAST FIVE YEARS; CITED DIFFICULT PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF ZIPPER; PRESENTED PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION OF ZIPPER WHICH WILL CLEARLY MINIMIZE POB INFLUENCE IN ZIPPER AND ISOLATE PRO-AMERICAN STAFF MEMBERS; FLATLY REFUSED EXPAND F-NET IF ADDITIONAL FUNDS CONTINGENT UPON PROVIDING AIS IDENTITIES ZIPPER AGENTS; ATTACKED POB FOR EFFORTS PUSH THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN ZIPPER; LABELLED COMPLETELY CORRECT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WESTERN IS AND UPGROWTH; DENIED HE NEGLECTS INTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN FAVOR POLITICAL INTRIGUE; DEFENDED HIS OWN UNETHICAL APPROACH TO MCCLOY; SEVERAL TIMES CITED POSSIBILITY OF RESIGNATION; CRITICIZED OUR HANDLING OF L J AND CAPOTE AFFAIRS; REPEATEDLY ATTACKED "WASHINGTON" POLICY.

2. HORN, L J AND L J PRESENT.

3. L J DID NOT INTERRUPT UTILITY AND AT END INCLINED TO ACCEPT WITHOUT COMMENT; HOWEVER, TO EXPLOIT HORN'S PRESENCE, MADE BRIEF REMARKS FOR THE RECORD. POUCH VERSION FOLLOWS.

4. ON 29 DECEMBER L J CALLED TO UTILITY'S OFFICE. UTILITY IN STRONGER, SHARPER AND MORE EXPLICIT TERMS AGAIN REJECTED ANY AIS VIOLATION OF ZIPPER INTEGRITY; STRESSED FACT THAT UTILITY, AND UTILITY ALONE, RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF ZIPPER; RETURNED TO BASIC LINE OF SEIBERT-UTILITY CONTRACT ORAL AGREEMENT.

CLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
EXEMPTION 3B2B  
DATE 2001 2005

**SECRET**

COPY No. 5

FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

5. CONTEMPLATE NO ACTION NEXT 10 DAYS. US STAFF INSTRUCTED AVOID ANY NEGOTIATION WITH ZIPPER WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE SITUATION.

6. [ ] GOING ON LEAVE 1 JANUARY FOR WEEK. UPON RETURN INTEND CALL UTILITY IN, REFER TO HIS COMMENTS TO [ ] AND, IN ATMOSPHERE OF NEGOTIATION, REQUEST HIM SUBMIT IN WRITING HIS VIEWS APPROPRIATE RELATIONS HIS AIS-ZIPPER FOR OUR CONSIDERATION.

7. DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS:

A. IMPULSIVE REACTION AGAINST HARD POSITION POB TAKING ON SEVERAL CURRENT ISSUES OR,

B. CALCULATED BID FOR INDEPENDENCE BY UTILITY AFTER CONSIDERATION

- (1) VITAL IMPORTANCE TO US OF ZIPPER OB IN CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
- (2) BARGAINING POSITION OF UPGROWTH ON REMILITARIZATION ISSUE AND
- (3) SOLID BACKING HE COULD EXPECT FROM SUBORDINATES IN UTILITY-AIS SHOWDOWN COINCIDING WITH LANDSBERG EXECUTIONS WHICH RUMORED IMMINENT AND NOW SUBJECT OF INCREASING PUBLIC CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY AMONG FORMER OFFICERS.

SECRET

TOR: 1336Z 30 DEC 50

SECRET

SUMMARY

The attached paper describes a recent outburst by Reinhardt Gehlen, the German head of ZIPPER, against US interference in the internal affairs of that organization, and outlines the nature of past US-ZIPPER agreements. It describes the way in which our interpretation of control, strategic operations, and of attaining future position for ZIPPER have conflicted with Gehlen's, and the reservations we would have on seeing him become the head of a future German Intelligence Service. The dispensability of Gehlen to ZIPPER, and the questions of removing him and of choosing a successor are discussed.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

4 Jan 51

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

On 28 December 1950 Generalmajor Reinhardt Gehlen, German head of ZIPPER, speaking from prepared notes to our senior representative with ZIPPER, delivered a three-hour harangue against American interference in ZIPPER internal affairs. He defended all those activities of his to which we have taken exception in the past year and a half, attacked "Washington" policy, and several times threatened to resign. Our representative, beyond a few comments for the record, did not enter into a discussion with Gehlen. A record of this meeting is being pouched. The following day Gehlen called one of the senior US assistants to his office and in stronger, sharper, more explicit terms covered the same ground. Our representative intends to allow a ten day cooling off period at the end of which he will instruct Gehlen to set out his views in detail and in writing for consideration in Germany and Washington. When these written views have been received and studied here, we believe that we should consider the advisability of a visit to Germany by a high-ranking CIA official for a detailed discussion with Gehlen leading to an unambiguous definition of our concept of the role which the German head of ZIPPER should play. Such a conference should lead to a showdown on whether Gehlen remains on our terms or resigns.

The following paragraphs sketch the background of our disagreement:

Although the tone of Gehlen's dissertation was unnecessarily tactless and embittered, the general strategy of an ultimatum from him was not entirely unexpected. It fits in with the attempts of leading Germans just now to bargain for position, and is not untypical of Gehlen's past approaches to his American superiors. Gehlen has risen since 1945 from the position of a relatively obscure member of the German General Staff to the position of a prime political strategist enjoying the support of conservative political factions, of certain German industrialists, and of the influential remaining portions of the German military. At the same time he enjoys semi-diplomatic relations with the major intelligence services of Western Europe, and he has the advantage of his prolonged association with US intelligence on which to base an accurate estimate of our major strategies and our strength.

Gehlen's present ultimatum, with its rejection of "American interference" harks back to ZIPPER's earlier contractual relationship with the United States Army in Europe. Gehlen's first working arrangement with the Army was based on an oral arrangement between General Edwin Sibert and himself. This was an agreement which gave Gehlen broad personal responsibility for the organization and conduct of the operation, and involved a pledge by Gehlen that he would at all times assume full responsibility for the operation vis-à-vis the Americans. The agreement was reduced to writing in October 1948 in the form of a directive from EUCOM to the US military commander with ZIPPER which, although it placed ultimate direction and control in the hands of the Americans, granted a wide latitude of operational freedom to the German chief. In practice the US Element of the operation was viewed as there only to provide the German Element logistical and liaison support, and the loose control and minimum accountability of this period created a body of precedent against which Gehlen views our position, which is that our financial outlay alone entitles us to intimate knowledge and control of the ZIPPER operation.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

Even when Army control of ZIPPER was from ZIPPER's viewpoint least onerous, Gehlen gave frequent voice to discontent and dissatisfaction with the degree and type of support and supervision. Administrative interference with ZIPPER's lower echelons by inexperienced US intelligence officers, inconsistent financial support, and lack of policy direction, were all criticized by Gehlen, and he frequently, particularly in 1948 and early 1949, supplemented his criticisms with threats to resign and dissolve the operation. It is clear that basically he was dissatisfied with the lack of timely financial planning and of trained US intelligence personnel. He at one point expressed himself as so disillusioned with the lack of US participation in the operational activities of the project that he threatened to resign unless ZIPPER were taken over by CIA. This desire for closer operational supervision had been expressed by Gehlen as early as 1947, when he was having some difficulty in consolidating his personal supremacy in the operation. He claimed at that time to distrust his first deputy's anti-Soviet fanaticism as the basic motivation for the operation, and promised to convert ZIPPER into a strict alliance of German with US interests. It was his suggestion then for the future that enough US personnel be assigned to the operation to supervise and guide it at every point.

In discussions with a CIA investigating officer in November 1948, Gehlen blamed Army pressure in 1946 and 1947 for stimulating unplanned and uncontrolled growth and the resultant violation of most sound operational rules. After our takeover, however, it became apparent that Gehlen intended to maintain the status quo both of organizational and operational procedures, and vigorously to defend ZIPPER practices of loose control, maximum delegation of agent and operational supervision, and minimum accounting and operational reporting. In defending these practices during the period of our examination of ZIPPER's proposals for strategic operations—which later were demonstrated to be more than ninety percent worthless—he bitterly attacked Washington "inflexibility, overcentralization, and lack of operational understanding". His first threat to resign came at this time when, despite previously consistent assurances that he wanted only a stable budget no matter whether large or small, he asserted that it was impossible to continue operations under the budget we proposed for the following year.

We had considered, when we took over ZIPPER on 1 July 1949, the advisability of supplementing the basic EUCOM directive with a written agreement or charter, and our senior representative with ZIPPER did in the Summer of 1949 discuss with Gehlen the tentative draft of such an agreement. It was explained at the time that the draft was solely for purposes of exploratory discussion and had not been approved by Karlsruhe or by Washington. It was in any event an innocuous document, playing heavily on ideological and patriotic themes, and less specific than the EUCOM directive. It was decided in Washington that it would serve no useful purpose to reduce the terms of our relationship to writing, and would very probably put us in the legalistically difficult position of a more binding legal and moral trusteeship than we cared to assume toward ZIPPER. As a consequence we have deliberately attempted to hold our directives to ZIPPER to questions of actual operations, organization, or administration, and have considered philosophical discussions of the US-ZIPPER relationship as unrelated to the main task.

SECRET BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

Our insistent probing into ZIPPER operations and our pressure for administrative and organizational changes, as well as Gehlen's activities outside the ZIPPER framework, have steadily been building up to a major difference of opinion between ZIPPER, or more specifically Gehlen, and us. Gehlen's political aims have been to secure a measure of governmental recognition from Bonn for ZIPPER, to consolidate ZIPPER's position as the dominant contender to become a German Intelligence Service, and to secure positions of influence for ZIPPER staff members and friends in the impending rearmament of Germany. His activities in these directions have included continuance of ZIPPER's influential military contacts, direct contact with the Bonn Government and the US High Commissioner, intensified liaison with various Western intelligence services, and bitter opposition to Bernhard Graf von Schwerin during the latter's tenure as Chancellor Adenauer's military advisor. Much of the impetus for these activities has coincided with our interests; we too have long range interest in the development of ZIPPER into a German Intelligence Service, and we have both long and short range interest in the eventual legitimization of ZIPPER by the Bonn Government. Sharp disagreements have arisen only because of Gehlen's sometimes freewheeling methods, which have often appeared to be evasive and have certainly not considered the complexity of our many intelligence interests in Germany and in Western Europe. Our belief that Gehlen has interested himself in the pursuit of these goals to the detriment of the intelligence mission of ZIPPER is shared by thoughtful top ZIPPER staff members.

ZIPPER's extremely low capabilities in terms of strategic, long range, high level, and deep penetration operations, in large measure the result of Gehlen's neglect of fundamental intelligence issues, were amply documented in the first year of our supervision of the operation. By mid-Summer of this year it was the opinion of all US staff members working with ZIPPER affairs that the organization was a creditable tactical collection and military evaluation agency, but that it was, with some exceptions, definitely second class in intelligence activities of a more difficult or sophisticated nature. This opinion, shared by many of the ZIPPER German staff, was conveyed to Gehlen by our representative with ZIPPER in July 1952, and he was bluntly informed that unless we were to accept and support ZIPPER only as a tactical agency Gehlen would have to institute radical changes in personnel, procedures, and attitudes. After some reflection Gehlen appeared to accept this decision with good grace, and even initiated some organizational changes for the improvement of strategic coverage.

Although his current outburst is the first strong resistance Gehlen has demonstrated for some time, it has long been apparent that Gehlen's frequent evasions and intransigence in the face of our guidance might at some point make it desirable to remove him from ZIPPER. We are in general agreement that, over and above the occasional difficulty now in handling Gehlen, he would prejudice the quality of a future German Intelligence Service of which he might later be head. Although he has been a strong and effective leader of ZIPPER in those fields where his personal interests lie, he lacks an emphatic interest in controlled, strategic intelligence operations, and much of the administrative corruption still present in ZIPPER is directly attributable to Gehlen's neglect of that field. Clearly, also, it is Gehlen's desire

SECRET

AVAILABLE COPY



SECRET

as head of a future OIS to combine internal security coverage with external intelligence, and we have no desire to encourage such a development.

In December 1950 we exchanged views with the field on means of dispensing with Gehlen if the need ever arose, and decided then that we should overlook no opportunity to kick Gehlen upstairs into the service of the Bonn government. Particularly if such a post were military, there is little doubt that Gehlen would cheerfully accept, and in all probability would not continue to exert an undesirable influence on ZIPPER.

The question of his successor was also discussed, and it was decided that the best solution would be a temporary replacement by a forthright Army general with no political ambitions. There is such a general now on the ZIPPER staff who has impressed our staff with his direct and honest approach to certain administrative investigations he has conducted. The other possibility, General Adolf Hauer, because of his impressive character and intellectual stature & more obvious candidate to head ZIPPER, is not personally interested in a career in intelligence, and we believe he would serve Allied interests better in his new capacity as military advisor on German rearmament.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

- 4 -  
SECRET

22. Januar 1951

Lieber Mr. Marshall!

Von allen Seiten sind mir so zahlreiche  
Wünsche und Zudrücken des Gedankens zum Neujahr-  
wächterfest und zum neuen Jahr zugegangen,  
daß es mir schwer fällt, meinem Dank durch  
die geeigneten Worte Ausdruck zu geben. Ich  
bedenke die ausgesprochenen Wünsche auf der  
Nachsicht. Möge das neue Jahr eine Über-  
windung der Schwierigkeiten bringen, mit denen  
das alte Jahr abgeschlossen hat und möge es  
trotz des Fortschritts politischer Schwierigkeiten,  
unter dem es steht, die Grundlage für eine

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Encl 1 - EGMA-64764

CS COPY

friedliche Entwicklung legen - trotz allem.

Auch persönlich für Sie und die Thron möge  
es unter einem regenreichen Stern stehen.

Alle diese Wünsche mögen gegenwärtig etwas  
hüben klingen; aber keine Wünsche und keinen  
gesunden Optimismus ohne Illusionen zu haben,  
bedeutet, ein Ziel und eine Aufgabe aufgeben.

Als letztes dankte ich Herzlichst für die mir  
persönlich von allen entgegen gebrachte Kamerad-  
schaft in der Erfüllung unserer gemeinsamen  
Aufgabe, welche für mich die entscheidende Gewähr  
für den Erfolg unserer Arbeit bildet.

Mit bestem Gruß bin ich verbunden mit  
Empfehlungen an Ihre Gattin.

Ihre ergebener

Kamerade

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO: Office of the Denasification Advisor  
GMB, APO 497-A, U.S. Army  
Attention: Mr. C.H. SHALL

Since the end of World War II, I am residing in the United States of America. Since I do not know at what time I shall return to Germany, I request a trial in absentia by a Bavarian denazification board. My home is in ~~Wittenberg~~, Silesia, located in the Soviet Zone of Germany, to which I cannot return for very obvious reasons. Therefore, I request this trial in absentia by a Bavarian denazification board.

I also have given authority to present my interests in this denazification trial to the lawyer Dr. Otto KERNARDT, residing at FRANKFURT/Main, Gwentersburg-Allee 10, who is also in possession of all documents, copies of which I include in this letter.

Very sincerely yours,

DISTRIBUTION: 23  
34  
017 (for file)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR COORDINATION WITH *ed* *DoD*

MGKA-26544

MGK.2 25547

8 Feb, 1951

Composite C:

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 January 1949

SUBJECT: Denatification of 34

TO : 23 and 34, PERSONAL  
TO: Office of the Denatification  
OMGB, APO 20-40, V. 1, 101.

1. On January 13, 1949, the undersigned visited Mr. G. H. SHELL and Mr. WOOD, both of the Office of the Denatification Advisor, OMGB, with reference to possible assistance for the denatification of 34.

2. Both Mr. SHELL and Mr. WOOD are known by the undersigned for a long period of time and it is the opinion of the undersigned that these two War Department civilians are absolutely trustworthy. The undersigned explained the importance of the denatification case of 34 and also explained that formerly there would have been any difficulties if 34 would not have been in touch with the United States.

3. All different possibilities were discussed, and Mr. SHELL advised that the following method would be by far the best: 34 should pretend to be still in the United States. He should write a personal letter (see enclosed draft) and attach to this letter photostatic copies of all the documents which he wishes to present for his denatification. This letter and the documents directly to Mr. SAOHE of the German Ministry of Denatification, requesting a trial in absentia. Mr. SAOHE then should get in touch with the lawyer of 34 and it is believed by Mr. SHELL that this method would not cause any publicity or compromise. I am most appreciative of this matter.

1 Incl: a/s

Very sincerely,

017

DISTRIBUTION: 23

DISTRIBUTION: 34  
017 (for file)  
017 (for file)

Denatification  
case of 34.

RECEIVED

PER DOI 70-17

~~TOP SECRET~~

Reinhard Gohlew.

AVAILABLE COPY

206

MCKA 2654

5 Feb 49

COMPOSITE

SECRET

COURIER

MOLA 4797

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

16 January 1958

Chief, Pullach Operations Base

Attn: Executive Office

ZIPPER - Operational

Request TTD for Herta GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK and Children

*std 1 Dec 58*  
Enclosed is the application and photos for subject and three children. We have also enclosed ZIPPER's reason for this request.

Attach: 11

Dist:

2 COS w/att

File

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

170.1

*Att to MGLA-4797*

32 / No. 565

15 January 1951

TO : 27.0

FROM : 30 (32)

SUBJECT : Application for Temporary Travel Document in lieu  
of Passport and/or Exit Permit.

It is requested that a Temporary Travel Document  
to Switzerland , Austria, Italy and Spain be procured for :

Herta Gehlen van Vaernewyck .

Reason : Mrs. Herta Gehlen van Vaernewyck is the wife of 30.  
She will not travel on behalf of this organization  
but requires the passport for recreation purposes.

Incls.:

2 Applications

16 Photos

30a  
16/1

Gehlen van Vassnewyck

German

nec von Seydlitz-Kurzbach

Herta .Charlotte, Agnes, Helene

Friedrich Wilhelm v. Seydlitz-Kurzbach/  
German

Leobachwitz, Silesia

Meta v. Seydlitz-Kurzbach / German

married

17 March 1904

Berg near Starnberg

German

No. 68

housewife

159

cms

grey

blue-grey

DAUGHTER

none

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



|                                 |        |           |
|---------------------------------|--------|-----------|
| Christoph Gehlen van Vaernewyk  | male   | 11 Feb 37 |
| Marie Jose Gehlen van Vaernewyk | female | 4 Sep 40  |
| Dorothee Gehlen van Vaernewyk   | female | 28 Feb 43 |

1. Berlin ; 2. Liegnitz ; 3. Liegnitz

Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain

none

none

none

no

no

no

yes, classified : not concerned

none

CONFIDENTIAL

not applicable

3 - 9174a

Starnberg

23 May 1949

Landrat

1 December 1950

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTOS

daughter of Reinhard GEMLEN  
b. 19 Jan 34, Berlin  
photo prob. prior to 1951



van GEMLEN children  
Christoph



Marie Therese



Christoph  
b 11 Feb 37, Berlin  
Marie Therese  
b 11 Sept 47, Berlin  
photo prob.  
prior 1951

GEMLEN, Jaroslava  
b. 28 Feb 43 Leignitz  
daughter of Reinhard



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

MZK-A-

25927

Date: 17 January 1951

TO : Chief, Pullach Operations Base  
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, Germany  
SUBJECT: General -- Operational  
Specific - TTD -- No. 0446935 - Herta GEHLEN VAN VAERNEWICK

Ref: MZL-A- 4797

1. Re your request in referenced memorandum, enclosed please find Temporary Travel Document(s) in lieu of Passport, valid for a period of 2 years, as listed below:

No. 0446935 - Herta GEHLEN VAN VAERNEWICK

2. Please see that subject fills in all the information asked for on the inside cover of the document and signs his name beneath his picture on Page 4 before using the document.

3. Before this document can be used for travel to a foreign country, subject must obtain visas from the appropriate Consulate or representative of the countries he desires to visit.

Encl(s) - 1

Dist:

POB - 2

COS(0)

Files - 2

SECRET

To Arg 22 Jan 51

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY 70.1  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

S E C R E T

NAME: GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, Herta. (nee: von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH)  
 (last first et al) TITLES: ALIAS  
 BORN: 17 March 1904 ; Leobschuetz, Silesia  
 (day month year city/prov. ) App. Age: (+ or - #. of yrs)

Photo (if yes, date & file):

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION:

Ht: 159 cms. Wt: Hair: Grey Eyes: Blue-grey Teeth:

Face-shape: Complexion: Scars: Build:

Prominent/ident. features:

FATHER: SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Friedrich Wilhelm von  
 (last name, first et al) (titles) (birth day-mo.-yr.; city/prov.)  
 OCCUP.: RESIDENCE:

MOTHER: (maiden name): SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Meta v.  
 OCCUP.: RESIDENCE:

SPOUSE: GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, Reinhard Married 1931

CHILDREN: 1. Katharina GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, female, 19 Jan 1934, Berlin, Germany.  
 2. Christoph GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, male, 11 Feb 1937, Berlin, Germany.  
 3. Marie Therese GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, female, 4 Sep 1940, Liegnitz, Germany.

RESID.: 4. Dorothea GEHLEN van VAERNEWYCK, female, 28 Feb 1943, Liegnitz, Germany.  
 (city-suburb/Province No. 68 street #/floor)

BUSINESS: Housewife

TTD # 0446935 issued 17 Jan 1951 for countries: Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain

PASSPORT # issued for countries:

KK # (true): B-91714a issued: 23 May 1949, Starnberg  
 (date city)

KK # ( @ ): issued: COVER UNIT:

ORG: POS'N:

V # S # Payroll # Cryptonym:

E Card # ID Card # Emergency #

SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION:

SUMMARY OF QUALIF., ACTIV.:

16 Jan 51, MGLA-4797. TTD for Herta + 3 children  
 17 51 MGKA-25927. TTD # 0446935, Herta G van V, valid 2 yrs

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

MGKA-25927 ATT

UTILITY  
21 February 1951

MOIA 5259, 16 Feb 51, ZIPPER-UTILITY-UPGROWTH (and MOIA 5247,

15 Feb 51), filed ZIPPER-Western German Government:

1. It seems clear that we have reached a point in our relationship with ZIPPER and in the conduct of our affairs vis-a-vis UPGROWTH, where a general review of a number of related factors is necessary if we are to avoid mortgaging our future relationship with German intelligence \* \* \* \* \*.

2. \* \* \* \* \* Both [ ] and [ ], the only other members of PCB who have had a great deal of contact with UTILITY in political matters, are completely convinced that we should, without further consideration, fire him. \* \* \* \* \* Even considering the consequences, it may be the solution and this may be the time for it. First, however, I feel obligated to summarize what I feel are considerations directly relating to this issue.

\* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

Wash 51

NOTE: Answered by WASH 31871 (OUT 87809), filed ZIPPER-Western  
German Government:

1. ONLY ELEMENT MISSING TO ROUND OUT BASIS FOR DETERMINING UTILITY'S FUTURE IS RELIABLE ESTIMATE WHAT UPTHRUST KNOWS AND THINKS OF UTILITY AS HEAD OF ZIPPER \* \* \* \* \*.

2. CABLE YOUR SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE COULD PROCURE UPTHRUST'S VIEWS THIS DELICATE MATTER. \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947 33-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM: PULLACH ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 18 MAR 51  
ACTION: FDM (1-2-5) IN 29515  
INFORMATION: AD/SO (4), STC (5), IIB (6-7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

PULL 1872

TO: WASHF

INFO: KARLA

CITE: PULLA

IMMEDIATE ACTION.

RE: WASH 31871 (CUT 87809)

1. AGREE PARA 1 REF; FRONTAL APPROACH UPTHRUST VIA MCCLOY COMBINED WITH MORE DISCREET SOUNDING OUT UPTHRUST AIDES VIA THAYER AND SHUTE RECOMMENDED.

2. UTILITY INCREASINGLY CONCERNED EMERGENCE OF [ ] OFFICE IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS; CONVINCED NOW TIME FOR UTILITY AND ZIPPER MOVE INTO UPGROWTH WITH US FOOTING BILL. WE ADVISED UTILITY PREMATURE MOVE ZIPPER ENMASSE INTO UPGROWTH AND SUGGESTED HE CONSIDER INTERIM SOLUTION INVOLVING (A) UTILITY SELLING HIMSELF AND SMALL STAFF TO UPGROWTH AS THE OFFICIAL UPGROWTH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE (B) OSTENSIBLE SEPARATION UTILITY GROUP FROM ZIPPER. EMPHASIZED ZIPPER-UPGROWTH RELATIONSHIP GERMAN PROBLEM AND UTILITY MUST SUCCEED OR FAIL ON OWN MERITS WITHOUT OVERT AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

3. THIS INTERIM SOLUTION WOULD GO LONG WAY IN SOLVING LEGALIZATION AND SUPPORT PROBLEMS, WOULD EXTEND PERIOD OUR MAXIMUM CONTROL ZIPPER OPERATIONS, WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE TEMPORARY SOLUTION POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS CITED MGLA 5259.

4. UNLIKELY UTILITY CAN OBTAIN NECESSARY SUPPORT THIS PLAN FROM BOTH UPTHRUST AND [ ] WE PROPOSE ENCOURAGE UTILITY SALLY FORTH AND TEST OWN STRENGTH. FAILURE ON HIS PART TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM WOULD CREATE MORE OPPORTUNE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSIDER DISMISSAL.

TOR

SECRET

Copy No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

PAGE 2

PULL 1872

IN 29515

SUCCESS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT INDICATION UPTHURST. ☐ ☐ ASSESSMENT  
UTILITY.

5. SUGGEST WE DELAY FRONTAL APPROACHES PARA 1 SEVERAL WEEKS;  
TAKE WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE ON UTILITY EFFORT SOLVE ZIPPER-UPGROWTH  
PROBLEM.

6. UTILITY BRIEFED UPTHURST 13 MARCH; OTTO LENZ PRESENT. LATER  
UTILITY DISCUSSED BROAD ASPECTS GIS PROBLEM WITH GLOBKE. POJCH-  
ING DETAILS.

7. 16 MARCH REQUESTED UTILITY PROVIDE US SOONEST WRITTEN COMPRE-  
HENSIVE PROPOSAL THIS MATTER.

TOR: 1650Z 18 MAR 51

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

Page No.

From: FRANKFURT ROUTINE  
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 19 MAR 51  
Action: FDM (1-2-3) IN 29704  
Information: AD/SO (4), STC (5), IID (6-7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

FRAN 2509

TO: WASHF INFO: KARLF, PULLF CITE: FRANF

RE: WASH 31871 (OUT 87809)

1. CANNOT THINK OF ALTERNATIVE TO PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED PLAN. MCCLOY-UPTHRUST DISCUSSION OF ENTIRE ZIPPER COMPLEX, INCLUDING UTILITY'S PERSONAL STANDING. PREFERABLY ☐ AND SHUTE SHOULD ALSO ATTEND DISCUSSION.
2. UTILITY CANNOT POSSIBLY TAKE EXCEPTION TO ANY DISCUSSION ON THAT LEVEL.
3. IF DESIRABLE ☐ COULD ASK ☐ DIRECTLY. NO REASON TO BELIEVE UTILITY WOULD FIND OUT ABOUT SUCH QUERY.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

TOR:

**SECRET**

Copy No. /

2210Z 19 MAR 51

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

HEADQUARTERS EUCOM, APO 403 US Army

Heidelberg Mil 8633

(Issuing Authority)

20 March 1951

(date)

The following weapon has been registered and its retention is authorized:

Personal Protection

(list purpose)

Class permit F & D

Automatic pistol

(type firearm)

108 477

(serial number)

Belg. Browning

(make)

6.35 mm

(caliber)

REGISTERED CUSTODIAN:

(signature)

Reinhard

Gehlen

(First Name)

MI

(Last Name)

B 03 611

(Kennkarte Number)

Berg, Krs. Starberg, 68 Feldstrasse

(Residence address)

GC 01082

REGISTRATION NUMBER

DESCRIPTION:

Age: 49

Weight: 65 kg

Height: 174 cms

Hair: darkblonde

Eyes: blue

LEFT

RIGHT



Yes

(Ammunition auth.)

25

(No. of rounds)

Yes

(Concealed weapon)

Yes

(Retention in qtrs.)

(Signature of Registration Officer)

D.O. VERDIE, Lt.Col O-1007235


(Name, rank, ASN, typed)

(Thumbprints)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army


Description: 50  
Age 5'8"  
Height 143 lbs  
Weight darkblonde  
Hair blue  
Eyes



Ammunition Authorized: Nr 1  
Class A and B Permits: Standard Authorization (Yes or No)  
Special Authorization (Quantity)  
Class C Permit: Quantity Authorized (Number Rds)  
Class D and E Permits: Quarters Authorization (Not to exceed 25 Rds) (Yes or No)  
Class F Permit: Quantity Authorized 25 (Number Rds)

Ammunition in excess of authorized quantity will be held in custody of Provost Marshal or other appropriately designated official.  
For Class F Permit: Carrying of concealed weapon authorized Yes (Yes or No)  
Retention in Quarters Authorized Yes (Yes or No)  
Permit Expires

This Registration Form must be retained with the firearm.  
ACL (I) 3-51-70M-17793



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

To: KARLSRUHE, PULLACH, FRANKFURT ROUTINE  
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 21 MAR 51  
CONFIRMATION PDM (1-2) OUT 91561  
INFORMATION/STO (3), STA (4), STC (5), IID (6-7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5.

WASH 34530

TO: KARLA, PULLA, FRANA CITE: WASHF

RE: PULL 1872 (IN 29515), FRAN 2509 (IN 29704).

1. INTEND PROCEED PER PARA 1 FRAN REFERENCE. [ ] WILL  
BE FULLY BRIEFED WASH VIEWS PRIOR ARRIVAL. SUGGEST YOU MAKE TENTATIVE  
ARRANGEMENTS SUCH MEETING EARLY APRIL. AT FRAN'S DISCRETION PROCEED  
DISCREET SOUNDING OUT UP THRUST AIDES VIA [ ] AND SHUTE, DIRECT  
QUESTION CACKLER.

2. CENTRAL ISSUE OUR INTENTIONS RE UTILITY AS HEAD ZIPPER MUST  
BE RESOLVED BEFORE CONSIDERATION PARA 2 THROUGH 7 PULL REFERENCE.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

J. ANGLETON VW ET

R. HELMS

RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD

**SECRET**

COPY No. 1

0321Z 22 MAR 51 PROHIBITED TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

AIR

MIL-A- 5930

Chief, Foreign Division M

30 March 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

ZIPPER-UPGROWTH Complex

see FRAN 2561  
(IN 55854)  
results  
this trip.

1. With UTILITY presently in Bonn with a note from us in one pocket telling him to avoid any commitments to GLOBKE and a telegram from HORN in another telling him to make his peace with USANCE, it may be appropriate to undertake another look at UTILITY the politician, if only to bring the sorry record up-to-date.

2. A careful study of the files, beginning with the emergence of the VS problem in the summer of 1949, reveals certain patterns of behavior and performance which have been so consistent over a period of almost two years that their reappearance in any political crisis in the future may probably be anticipated with near certainty. These are:

a. A tendency to make enemies of persons with whom he is trying to make a deal. This has occurred successively in the cases of CAFILA, CAPOTE and [redacted], and has derived in each case from UTILITY's failure to decide whether he wants to join, take over or destroy the party of the second part. He has invariably tried a little of each, usually simultaneously, and the result, inevitably, has been disastrous, sometimes even ludicrous. There is not the slightest doubt that UTILITY, when he was courting CAFILA or trying to persuade CAFILA to court him, was simultaneously slandering him behind his back. This slander was not only ill-advised but also highly indiscreet, with word of it getting back to CAFILA and also to [redacted], about whom UTILITY was broadly hinting that he was CAFILA's case officer for the British. Similar intriguing has been established with respect to CAPOTE, [redacted] and LENZ. Even UTILITY's courting has been inconsistent, punctuated as it is by failures to keep dates and by spells of truculence in dialogues supposed to be conciliatory. This pattern has appeared with CAFILA, CAPOTE and [redacted], including the spectacular stand-ups of CAFILA on 28 September, of CAPOTE on 10 and 11 December 1950 and of [redacted] on 1 February 1951.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

COPY

b. A tendency to run around and, often when a line plunge is clearly in order. The most spectacular example was the McCLOY meeting. Others were his repeated efforts during the summer to circumvent CAFILA via WILDERMUTH, and his more recent efforts to circumvent [ ] via GLOBKE. These have not invariably been unsuccessful, but the yardage gained has been mostly lateral.

c. A tendency to self-deception. This is revealed most convincingly in his reporting. The list of meetings of which we have received one version from UTILITY and a highly divergent one from the party of the second part is too long and too well known to require enumeration. On the basis of a recent review of the record on this score covering a period of a year, I am prepared to accept the probability that in the majority of cases the version offered by the party of the second part is right and UTILITY's wrong, or at least that the former is more nearly right than UTILITY's. This is not necessarily proof that UTILITY is a congenital or pathological liar, although he is certainly neither incapable of nor particularly averse to lying when it suits his purposes. It has always seemed to me that UTILITY, since he is by nature both vain and stubborn in high degree, is inclined to blot out or simply forget facts which are uncomfortable or inconvenient to remember and to arrive, by complex but automatic and probably subconscious processes of rationalization, at versions compatible with his original hopes and intentions. If UTILITY were really lying according to plan and premeditation, it would be easily explicable that he should lie to us, however foolish, but we know that what he tells us he also tells his staff, and this would seem to be not only superfluous but also dangerous. Even lying to us would seem foolhardy where such characters as CAFILA and CAPOTE are concerned, since UTILITY well knows that we have the means of checking on him and that we use them.

d. A tendency to react paranoiacally to any challenge to his exclusive dominance of the intelligence field in Germany. This has been demonstrated time and again with respect to [ ] CAFILA, CAPOTE, [ ], etc., and has resulted in UTILITY's tenacious insistence upon the malevolent designs of the British, CAFILA, [ ], CAPOTE, and [ ]. The fact that in the case of CAFILA he was able to procure documentary confirmation of his suspicions has not eased the tendency, although the fact that half of UFGROWTH, including CAPOTE and [ ], seems to know how he got it has not helped his reputation. This tendency is probably related also to UTILITY's penchant for exclusive management.

3. UTILITY is not really interested in establishing a modus vivendi or a modus operandi with [ ] or CAPOTE, any more than he was really ever prepared to deal with CAFILA. What he wants, and the only thing which will ever satisfy him, is to destroy the rival and take over on his own terms.

This also explains his simultaneous employment of mutually destructive tactics. He pays lip service to the devices of negotiation and compromise, and is encouraged in this direction by his own and the American staffs. He makes elaborate plans and goes through the motions, including a lot of strenuous travel, but his heart is not in it, and his hopes of success are artificial, essentially a delusion. He is really bent on destruction, and the objects of his jealous malevolence sense it, which is not remarkable under the circumstances. UTILITY's destructive impulses are genuine and intense, and he finds it impossible not to translate them into action. The action is usually conspicuous, as, for example, his campaign against CAPILA and his present tireless efforts to prove CAPOTE's oriental orientation. All this is not incompatible with UTILITY's rather successful record in dealing with foreign intelligence services. They are not rivals, and when UTILITY's hisbie-jiebies are not agitated, he is capable of negotiating effectively and of making a good personal impression.

4. So much for the debits. The credit side is hardly less impressive, and it explains why he has survived for so many years, both in the German Army and under American sponsorship, while surrounded by men of such stature as GUDERIAN, MATZKY, SPEIDEL, FOERTSCH, KOERNIG, HORN, MESKER, and WOLLMANN, most of whom outrank him. I do not believe that UTILITY is very well liked, and it is a fact that many of his colleagues recognize his faults and disapprove of his politicking, if not of his policies, which, in his case, are by no means the same thing. But, one and all, they acknowledge his accomplishment in the creation of ZIPPER and his foresight, initiative and diplomatic skill which made it possible, not to mention the courage which it must have required for a German General to make such a deal with the late enemy so soon after the termination of hostilities and at a time when, particularly in France, a good many people were being shot or locked up whose only crime was that of having collaborated, under somewhat similar circumstances, with the Germans only a few years before.

5. Another important factor on the credit side is UTILITY's reputation as the outstanding authority in Germany on the armed forces of the Soviet Union. This derives from his former position as Chief of Fremde Heere Ost, as well as from his present position as the head of an organization which is referred to, by these numerous Germans who know about it significantly as the "Organization UTILITY" or the "UTILITY Organization." UTILITY's great reputation is certainly based on legend as well as on fact, but the one is as important as the other in assessing UTILITY's status. Indeed, for a position of such altitude as that of Chief of the GIS, to which UTILITY unquestionably aspires, the legend is more useful or more inhibiting than the fact, depending upon whether we want to help him or to stop him. Nobody in Germany is as good or as omniscient as many Germans think UTILITY is, but the mere fact that they think so must have a strong bearing on his future. EISENHOWER, for instance, was not chosen for his great office because he is the greatest General in the Western World, although he may be, but because so many people think he is. The same circumstances, on a smaller scale, will influence UTILITY's present and future in Germany and must be taken into serious consideration in any decisions we may make.

SECRET

- 4 -

6. With respect to UTILITY's administrative, executive and operational abilities, they are admittedly not inconsiderable, although certainly influenced for the worse by those aspects of his character discussed in 1-d, above, as reflected in his penchant for exclusive management, his habit of concentrating on matters pertinent to his own career rather than on the operational details associated with career objectives already attained, and a perceptible if not dominant predilection for sysepphants in his immediate entourage. These are not, however, elements of primary importance in speculating on UTILITY's future. He can probably handle adequately any job he gets. His problem is to get the job, which is a problem of politics.

7. As to his prospects? It would be easy to demonstrate that UTILITY is a bad politician, which would seem to augur ill for a man whose career objectives are essentially political. But political talent is not the only prerequisite for political success, least of all for a man whose enthusiasm is power rather than politics as art and science. UTILITY is not interested in the rules. His only concern is results, and his assets of ambition, determination, toughness, resiliency, persistence, single-mindedness, ruthlessness and cunning may pull him through many a rough-and-tumble and enable him to survive occasional defeat. If he succeeds, it will be at a greater expense of effort than a more skillful politician would have required. But his triumph will be absolute, and he will share with none the privilege of determining the fate of his numerous enemies.

[

]

Dist:

- ✓ 2 - FDM
- 1 - COS
- 1 - FOB
- 2 - File

*Cy to be filed for  
W. Gen. Grant  
file*

HR

HTC

APD

*10 Apr*

SECRET

32-6-7-977



SECRET

1.7480 8628

19  
18 April 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott

SUBJECT: MGL-A-5930, attached.

1. We thought you might be interested in reading the attached memorandum on the current status of ZIPPER relations with the West German Government, as well as the appraisal of Gehlen as a politician and a leader. We realize that you have many things to do before your departure on Tuesday, but we know that this is a matter of considerable interest to you and felt that you would want to be kept up-to-date.

2. The attachment is written by Henry Pleasant and is countersigned by James Critchfield. As you know, both of these men are on the Pullach staff.

*There is another cable handled to day that you should see. FDM will get in touch. W. G. WYMAN*

W. G. WYMAN  
Assistant Director  
Special Operations

1 Attachment

MGFA 4882, Meeting with [ ] filed West Germ Govt:

Discussion of [ ] with [ ] in Bonn on 4 April 51, during which [ ] outlines in some detail his objections to UTILITY, his views on ZIPPER, ZIPPER penetration of GROWTH, and so forth.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

MICROFILMED

AUG 8 1968

DOC. MICRO. SER.

A U S T R I A

June 5, 1951 (P/03033)

SUBJECT: Conversation with AUNER

Time : June 5, 1951

Received: June 5, 1951

CC 2

1. This date, at 11:45 hrs. AUNER called CC 2 by telephone, and informed that he urgently wanted to see him. CC 2 - who had not seen AUNER for several months (more specifically in fall 1950) - was surprised, but accepted to meet AUNER at 12:15 hrs. at the office Angela HELMBERGER, 17, Neutorstrasse (which is directed by Franz STEINDL):

2. After a brief introduction concerning generalities, AUNER informed 'he had closed down his shop'. The majority of his collaborators had emigrated, since they had not agreed to the new conditions of a strict centralization in Germany. He himself had declined his move to Germany that had been requested. He had already for some time been requested to return the Volkswagen used by him and would now be obliged to comply. He explained that he was rather glad, since he had no actual use for an automobile in Salzburg.

3. In a vague form AUNER explained that the Gartnerstrasse organization had been completely dissolved, but that some ~~functionaries~~ he named in detail: MALLNER, MANDL and OFFOZAREK. would carry on intelligence work, this in direct connection with the German ~~Center~~ center. It appeared from this conversation that MANDL and OFFOZAREK would be engaged in field intelligence (probably remaining in Austria); whereas MALLNER would move to Germany.

4. Upon AUNER's question regarding CC 1's activity, he was informed that CC 2 and CC 1 were acting as correspondents for US provincial newspapers, and that NN 1 for some time had participated in this work. Since the economic results could not be called brilliant, NN 1 had left some time ago.

CS COPY

SACZ - CIA - Pro - 1

|            |         |
|------------|---------|
| INDEXED    | FILE    |
| 15/12      | 15/12   |
| ABSTRACT * | INDEX * |

5 June 61

Kellen

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

AUNER did not seem satisfied with CC 2's reply and repeated his questions from other angles.

He specifically enquired about Mr. BROMBERG, and whether he was still with MIS. When CC 2 replied that he did not know, AUNER stated that since CC 1 had been on friendly terms with Mr. BROMBERG, he supposed that this would still be the case.

From above conversation CC 2 won the impression that AUNER may have had two reasons for taking up former contacts:

- a- to possibly find out, whether intelligence activity existed here, and to further feel, whether he would possibly find a friendly reception;
- b- to give publicity to his former comrades.

AUNER asked CC 2 for a new meeting on June 6, 1951, at 17:30 hrs (same place) to discuss matters more in detail.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

AIR

SECRET

MCLA- 6789

Chief, Foreign Division M

7 June 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

UTILITY's Visit to the USA

Reference: MGKW-8395

1. Para 6c of reference indicated that your views on UTILITY's trip to the USA would be discussed in a later memorandum. Since this has not arrived here and because time is passing I feel that we should give you our views on what could become a rather sticky problem.
2. In suggesting that selected ZIPPER staff members might have the opportunity to visit the USA, we offered UTILITY, for obvious reasons, the first opportunity to accept such an invitation. [ ] and I had discussed the matter and felt that UTILITY should be the first member of ZIPPER to make the trip. When confronted with our offer UTILITY waived aside the prestige factor implicit in his preceding any of his subordinates and urged that we go ahead and plan their visits; that he would be happy to go as soon as the ZIPPER-UPGROWTH problem appeared to be under control. We bought this and told him to let us know when he felt he would be able to accept our invitation.
3. UTILITY has now accepted our invitation. He feels that late June or early July would be an excellent time for the trip. I've urged that he not make any definite plans at this point until I'm able to examine all factors. However, I indicated that the time he suggested would probably be very satisfactory.
4. At this point the chances that ZIPPER will emerge as the GIS, and a strongly centralized GIS at that, are better than they have been at any time since we first became associated with ZIPPER. During the past few weeks both [ ] and I have had the opportunity to meet Otto LENZ and GLOBKE in the presence of UTILITY. There was nothing in the substance of what they said or the manner in which they treated UTILITY to suggest that they were hedging on accepting either ZIPPER as an organization or UTILITY as its head. Thus, I think it would be politically inept of us to equivocate in the treatment we give UTILITY in the USA simply because of our well documented reservations about him. I think it is reasonably safe at this point to estimate that UTILITY will survive as a dominant figure in German affairs for some time to come.
5. UTILITY will be somewhat difficult to control on this jaunt and I would like to first present what I think UTILITY will want to do and what he will expect and then let you state the limitations which I will pass on to him.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

COPY !

10-6-7-1303

6. UTILITY has stated on numerous occasions that he hopes he will have the opportunity to shake hands with [ ] . This meeting can be limited to almost just that. If he does not meet [ ] he will consider it a brush off. As you know, on his last trip to Spain he was received by General Vigon, C/S the Spanish Army, in spite of a temporary illness which made it necessary to see UTILITY in his home. On several occasions he has met the heads of the French, Swiss and Danish Services and a senior member, if not the head, of the Norwegian Service.

7. UTILITY has stated that he hopes that he will have a little free time in New York since he would like to see John Boker, Eric Warburg and his old friend, Eric Waldman whom UTILITY continues to regard as one of his greatest benefactors.

8. Then there is a certain Ruscheweh (phonetic) who is the American representative of the German-Swiss-American group which controls the patents related to the development reported in PULL 1899. UTILITY has promised full details on this entire matter within a few days. However, I do know that Ruscheweh is a member of a firm called American Technological Development Corporation of New York which is involved, in this matter. UTILITY expressed dissatisfaction with Ruscheweh and indicated that he hopes that John Boker could replace him in the American end of the group. More about this in the next few days when I will get off a report on our visit to Bonn (WASH 35442) which took place ten days ago.

9. Regarding the Boker connection, UTILITY feels that if our organization in Washington established a connection with Boker and Boker were to replace Ruscheweh in the German-Swiss-US group that is continuing further developmental work of the type which resulted in PULL 1899 it would ensure closest cooperation in this field in the future and would provide a suitable business channel instead of an official channel for the conduct of these affairs.

[ ] Comment: At this point I'm merely reporting the conversations on Ruscheweh, Boker et al without attempting to comment or interpret them since the picture is quite incomplete and many of the remarks made by UTILITY do not, at this point, appear to make too much sense to me.

10. UTILITY would unquestionably like to see something of our Armed Forces, including the Pentagon. This, I imagine, depends on whether the Department of the Army is taken into confidence on these visits (as was intimated in WASH-43398) or kept completely in the dark.

11. UTILITY will, of course, measure the success of his trip in terms of how many important people he meets and how many professional conversations he can participate in. Anyone meeting UTILITY need not be concerned about what they can do to get the conversation started. A simple and very general question on any of two or three dozen general topics of intelligence or world political interest will start him off on a presentation of his own views which can be counted upon to occupy all available time. I have observed this type of performance by UTILITY many times — most recently when [ ] visited us.

SECRET

U  
-3-

12. Parenthetically I may state that I do not think that any of the above applies to the rest of the ZIPPER staff scheduled for visits to the USA. They are all coming primarily to see something of the US; do not expect to meet anyone of great importance; do not expect to see anything of our organization; and will measure the success of the trip in terms of their own observations of the life, people, cities, geography and industry of the US.

13. As a cover for UTILITY, I suggest either a straight research (Historical Division) cover or an investigative and research cover in the field of international patent rights. UTILITY's working cover in Germany is a patent office connected with the Bavarian Light Metal Works owned by his friend Kaiser. This is a field in which UTILITY has an actual interest (para 2 above). He is an interesting enough figure that his cover story might actually be checked back to Germany. If so, the patent cover would hold up best under examination. Also, I imagine that the patent problems that exist between Germany and the United States are complicated enough to make a US visit quite normal.

14. I think the UTILITY trip should be limited to 14 days. The problem of escort has been discussed here at length. UTILITY has expressed the hope that I can accompany him. [ ] feels that I should. I'm not personally anxious to do so, but can see where it makes sense that I do. I would, for future reference, like to be present to hear what anyone of any importance professionally says to him and what he says to them. Also, I already have a fairly compact program planned here in Pullach this summer before I come home TDI in August. Related to this is the fact that the developments in the ZIPPER-UPGROWTH and Remilitarization fields have been so complicated during the past six months that a Washington debriefing of [ ] and an exchange of ideas with the Washington staff would be very helpful in bringing the Washington and Germany points of view into line. We believe that it would be desirable if [ ] flew to Washington several days in advance of UTILITY and [ ] and completed his debriefing and arrangements for any meetings for UTILITY before the arrival of UTILITY and me. [ ] has worked closely with UTILITY for a year and would be the ideal individual to act as interpreter where necessary. As soon as the Washington end of the visit had been completed (including sight-seeing in Washington and vicinity) [ ] or [ ] could return to Germany and the other could accompany UTILITY on any travel undertaken. I do not think that more than four or five days in the Washington-New York area would be necessary. I then suggest a train and plane trip Westward and back to New York to catch the plane to Frankfurt.

15. I will continue to delay giving UTILITY a firm answer on the trip to the US until I hear from you. His trip, more than any of the others, can obviously produce a variety of political embarrassments unless properly handled. I hope that a cable reaction on this problem will be forthcoming soon after the arrival of this memo in Washington.

[ ] [ ]

2-FDM  
1-CUS  
2-POB

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

#34  
13 June 1951

TO : 25.37  
FROM : 30 (30a.)  
SUBJECT: Application for the Purchase of a Motorvehicle.  
REF. : MEMO No. \_\_\_\_\_, dated \_\_\_\_\_, LEG. PROJ.No. \_\_\_\_\_

1. It is requested that approval be given for the purchase of  
one Opel-Kapitaen

The corresponding indications read as follows:

- a) Org.-member or Agency to which vehicle will be assigned:  
30
- b) Name of Org.-member on whose name vehicle will be registered:  
Sinduer, LTD.
- c) Job-description of Org.-member to whom vehicle will  
be assigned:  
Chief 30
- d) Intended place of location: Munich
- e) Monthly kilometers (approx. estimate): 3000 kilometers
- f) Intended purpose for which vehicle will be used:  
Official trips
- g) Reasons for exchange of vehicle:  
Works entirely under German cover
- h) Type, make, police-registration number of exchange-  
vehicle which is to be returned:

2. This is ~~an~~ an application for an additional vehicle.

Receipt for DM. 11, 125.30 for purchase of Opel-Kapitaen, motor no. 50-16081, license  
no. B 149-1986, purchased for GEHLEN in name of Suedd. Industrievertretung GmbH, Schoen-  
felderstr. 11, Munich - dated 13 June 1951  
Signed: 37.0

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

COURIER

REL-A 6849

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

14 June 1951

Chief, Pullach Operations Base

Attn: Executive Office

ZIPPER - Operational

Request TTD for Reinhard GEHLEN

1. Attached is an application for a TTD for Reinhard GEHLEN. As you know, he is already well documented. However, this request is for UJ-DRACO, and in keeping with our intention to obtain and use one special TTD for UJ-DRACO only.
2. Unfortunately, time is pressing and GEHLEN will not be personally available for over a week. For this reason we have forwarded the application unsigned. However, your files should already contain a previous signed application in this name.
3. Please complete the TTD and forward by return pouch.

Attach: 1

Dist:

- 2 - COS w/att
- ~~2 - FIM~~
- 1 - SRPG
- 2 - File

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

11D COPY

SECRET

*To spec 19 June  
for action  
me*

6-6-1951



SECRET

23 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit of German Chief of ZIPPER  
to United States

1. When it was decided some moths ago that selected ZIPPER staff members have the opportunity of visiting the United States, our senior representative with ZIPPER, James Critchfield, offered Reinhard Gehlen the first opportunity to accept such an invitation. Gehlen declined the offer and stated he would be happy to make the trip as soon as the ZIPPER-West German Government problem appeared to be under control. At the same time he urged that planning proceed for visits to the United States by his subordinates.

2. Gehlen has now suggested that he visit the United States in September. Since his trip can obviously produce a variety of political embarrassments, I recommend that you discuss the advisability of it with General Truscott and Gordon Stewart during your forthcoming trip to Germany.

3. Attached hereto is a summary of James Critchfield's views on the proposed visit of Gehlen to this country.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

[ ]  
Assistant Director  
Special Operations

Attachment: 1

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947, 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: PULLACH ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 25 JUNE 51  
ACTION: ~~ADM~~ (1-2-3) IN 49934  
INFORMATION: IID (4), AD/SO (5), STA (6), S/C (7-8-9), DDP (10)

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5*

PULL 2325

TO: WASHF

INFO: KARLF, FRANF (C 3)

CITE: PULLF

UTILITY SEEING C 12 OR 13 JULY. IN VIEW THIS MEETING  
AND PROBABILITY FURTHER POLITICAL CONTINGENCIES REQUIRING HIS PRESENCE  
GERMANY UTILITY SUGGESTED HIS UUDRACO TRIP BE POSTPONED UNTIL EARLY  
SEPTEMBER. THIS CONVENIENT TO US SINCE IT WOULD COINCIDE C 3  
STATESIDE LEAVE AND ELIMINATE EXTRA TRIP. WE THEREFORE CONCURRED  
UTILITY'S SUGGESTION.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

TOR:

**SECRET**

COPY No. /

1740Z 25 JUN 51 IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

AIR

MGLA-7382

Chief, Foreign Division M

19 July 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

UJ DRACO/UTILITY's Visit

1. In view of the fact that [ ] GLOBKE discussions will probably not be underway until early September and for other reasons, we propose to set UTILITY's departure date back to coincide with Group III on or about 22 September.

2. Thus far I have not attempted to work out an agenda for UTILITY and would, in fact, be perfectly willing to leave that up to you. Complicating it will be his often repeated desire to see Boker, Waldman, Hilger et al. Aside from that he would like to travel the length of the country to San Francisco and back.

3. I have had no reaction to our MGLA-6789 outlining UTILITY's views on the trip. However, it seems to me that we might gain something by letting UTILITY see some of his old friends and sitting in on the conversations.

4. Another matter is whether to include UTILITY with Group III for his westward junket. With HOEBEL this would bring the group to six without considering the escort. Also there may be possible advantages in my spending several weeks with UTILITY.

5. I should be in Washington prior to 1 September. If it is convenient to do so, I suggest we discuss the handling of UTILITY upon my arrival. In any case, we are tentatively planning on putting him on the plane at Rhein/Main on 22 September.

6. UTILITY feels that his cover story should be that of his working business cover, i.e., international patents.

FDM  
C/O

Distribution:

2 - FDM

1 - CCS

2 - POB

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

COPY  
BEST AVAILABLE COPY  
32-6 1-1429

James Critchfield's Comments on Gehlen's Visit to the U.S.A.

1. At this point the chances that ZIPPER will emerge as a strong, centralized German Intelligence Service are better than they have been at any time since C.I.A. took over the management of the project. I think it is reasonably safe to estimate that Reinhard Gehlen will survive as a dominant figure in German affairs for some time to come. Thus, I think it would be politically inept of us to equivocate in the treatment we give Gehlen in the United States simply because of our reservations about him.

2. Gehlen will be somewhat difficult to control on this trip. He has stated on numerous occasions that he hopes he will have the opportunity to shake hands with General Walter B. Smith. If he does not meet General Smith, he will consider it a brush-off. On his last trip to Spain Gehlen was received by General Vigon, Chief of Staff of the Spanish Army, and on several occasions he has met the heads of the French, Swiss, Danish, and Norwegian Intelligence Services.

3. Gehlen has also stated that he hopes he will have some free time in New York where he would like to see John Boker, Eric Warburg, and Eric Waldman.

Note: Boker and Warburg are New York businessmen with numerous contacts in Germany. Boker escorted Gehlen and members of his staff to the United States in 1945 and has remained in contact with Gehlen during the past few years. In October 1950 Warburg arranged in Germany a dinner for Gehlen with Mr. McCloy. His device in making the arrangements through an officer of RICOG turned out to be embarrassing for ourselves and Mr. McCloy. Waldman is a former Army officer who was very closely associated with the ZIPPER operation while it was under Army control.

4. Gehlen will, of course, measure the success of his trip in terms of how many important people he meets and how many professional conversations he can participate in. He would unquestionably like to see something of our Armed Forces, including the Pentagon.

5. I think Gehlen's trip should be limited to fourteen days, with no more than four or five days in the Washington-New York area.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

To: PULLACH, KARLSRUHE, FRANKFURT ROUTINE  
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 20 JUL 51  
CONFIRMATION: FDM (1) OUT 65686  
INFORMATION: AD/SO (2), OPS (3), PLANS (4), DDP (5), S/C (6-7-8)

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5*

WASH 00815

TO: PULLA INFO: KARLA, FRANP CITE: WASHF  
RE PULL 2325 (IN 49934), MGLA 6789

1. WE REQUESTED PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE WASH THAT ROBERT A. ASCHAM DURING VISIT GERMANY DISCUSS WITH [ ] AND [ ] ADVISABILITY UTILITY COMING UNITED STATES AT THIS TIME.

2. POUCH UTILITY PRQ SOONEST SO THAT WE CAN OBTAIN ALL NECESSARY CLEARANCES IN EVENT ASCHAM AGREES YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

RICHARD HELMS  
RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

OFFICER

**SECRET**

COPY No. /

TOD: 1815Z 20 JUL 51

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

GEHLEN, Re Card dossier

MGLA 7440 23 July 51 Utility and the British (filed British file)

[ ] suggests that someone have a clear statement of our policy  
on Zipper-British liaison ready to give Utility when he comes to U.S. A.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: FRANKFURT ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 4 AUG 51  
ACTION: DCI (1) IN 19093  
INFORMATION: ADP (2), AD/SO (3), S/C (4-5-6), FDM (7-8), OPS (9), PLANS (10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

FRAN 4043

TO: WASHDPA

CITE: FRANP (ASCHAM)

1. AT MEETING YESTERDAY WITH UTILITY, [ ] AND [ ] REVIEWED ZIPPER SITUATION AND HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO U.S. END OF SEPTEMBER.

2. IN PARTICULAR WE IMPRESSED UPON UTILITY VITAL IMPORTANCE THAT ZIPPER ORGANIZATION SHOULD KEEP ITS HANDS OUT OF LOCAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AS AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OPERATING SOLELY OUTSIDE OF COUNTRY.

3. WE MENTIONED TO UTILITY RUMORS WE HAD HEARD THAT ZIPPER WAS VIEWED AS NUCLEUS FOR FUTURE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF AND ALSO AS A KIND OF LOCAL SECRET SERVICE THAT WAS ENDEAVORING TO PENETRATE DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES AND WE STRESSED THE DANGER THAT SUCH RUMORS MIGHT LEAD TO POLITICAL OR OTHER PUBLICITY.

4. UTILITY RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS SOME INTRIGUING AGAINST ZIPPER AND THAT HE HAD CAUGHT CERTAIN PENETRATION ATTEMPTS RED-HANDED. HE ALLEGED THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THESE ATTEMPTS WAS DUE TO BRITISH INITIATIVE. HE FELT THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO TAKE BRITISH HEAT OFF THE ZIPPER ORGANIZATION BY GETTING THEM INTERESTED IN MAINTENANCE OF ZIPPER AND CLARIFYING TO THEM ITS NON-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 5 OF 4031 (IN 19085) FRAND ALTHOUGH UTILITY DID NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST AN EXCHANGE OF ZIPPER MATERIAL WITH BRITISH.

5. MCCLOY FULLY INFORMED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

TOR: 509Z 4 AUG 51

**SECRET**

Copy No. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

AIR

NOV-10040

6 August 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Chief, Foreign Division M

Attn: [ ]

Operational

U-DRACO/UTILITY's Visit

REFERENCE: MOLA 7882

1. No action of any kind has been taken here in preparation for a trip by UTILITY. The political significance of such a visit is all too clear and there can be no doubt that it will boost his prestige tremendously. Regardless of how we interpret his trip we can be certain that Utility himself will make capital of it in Germany. For these reasons we are awaiting the decision of Robert A. Ascham (Wash 00815).

2. Pending receipt of Ascham's views no action will be taken other than to request security clearance for the trip as soon as UTILITY's PRQ is received. This should be done strictly because of the time element.

3. The preparation of an agenda for UTILITY and any travel arrangements should definitely await your arrival in Washington. If Utility does come, we feel that you should act as escort during his entire stay. Including him with Group III for a westward trip does not appear to be desirable. [ ] encountered many difficulties in handling four persons, so a group of six would be too burdensome for the escort.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



R. Gehlen dossier

EXTRACT

780  
MOLA-7730

10 Aug '61

L I. GLOBKE meeting  
9 Aug '61

9. At the end of the talk, we asked GLOBKE confidentially whether the personality of UTILITY is acceptable to WETHRUST. His answer was "yes" - and he made it in a direct and emphatic way. He went on to say that both he and WETHRUST realize that UTILITY is no CANARIS but that WETHRUST has been most impressed with UTILITY's calm and objective analysis of items of intelligence. He particularly mentioned the time a month or so ago when Minister President ZINN, of Hesse, arrived in WETHRUST's office with a hot report, and UTILITY, being there, dissected the report item by item, differentiating between those bits of information already known, analyzed and not believed to be alarming; those not known but probably dubious; and the hasty conclusions that had been arrived at in the report. UTILITY's professionalism on this case seems to have made a deep impression.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DI. TCH NO.

MDL-A-7847

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division  
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
SUBJECT: GENERAL— ZIPPER - Operational  
SPECIFIC— UJ-DRACO

DATE: 18 August 1951

1. Attached herewith for your retention are two completed PRQ forms for Reinhard GEHLEN. The original was done by GEHLEN himself, while POB staff completed the other one.

2. Also forwarded are statements concerning past membership in the NSDAP and related organizations, signed by Kurt KOHLER (whom you have probably identified by now under the name listed in para 5 of MGKW-9866), and HENGL. Through a misunderstanding, HENGL signed his cover name rather than his true name.

*RLB*

*IPK*

*DOI 70-17*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

DIST:

✓ 2 - FDM (w/attach)  
1 - COS  
2 - File

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PRQ - Part I

1. Reinhard GEHLEN.
2. Not applicable.
3. not applicable.
4. Dr. Schneider, operational alias.
5. a. 3 April 1902; b. Erfurt, Thuringia.
6. German.
7. Same as 6.
8. Waldstrasse #68, Berg bei Starnberg, Germany.
9. Same as 8.
10. Historical research analyst.
11. None given.
12. John R. Baker, Jr., 101 Duane St., New York City  
Eric Waldman, 1204 Lebanon St., Silver Spring, Md.
13. Walter Gehlen, born 1871; German; deceased.
14. Katharine nee von Vassnewyok, born 1881, Germany; deceased.
15. Herta von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, born 17 April 1904; Leobersdorf, Germany.  
Married November 10 1931, Glogau, Germany; presently resides  
Berg, Germany.
16. Katharina, January 19, 1934, Berlin; German.  
Christoph, February 11, 1937, Berlin; German.  
Marie Therese, September 4, 1940, Liegnitz; German.  
Dorothea, February 28, 1943, Liegnitz; German.
17. Johannes Gehlen - March 15, 1901; Rome  
Barbara von Gehlen - May 7, 1912; presently resides in Rio de Janeiro.
18. None given.
19. Temporary Travel Document; Kambarta.
20. Protestant.
21. None.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SECRET

**SECRET**

22. 1933 - recreation trip to Rome  
1937 - recreation trip to Finland and Sweden  
During World War II with the German Army in Poland, France,  
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Russia.  
1945 - brought by the War Department to the USA; returned 1946.  
Since 1946 - several private trips to Switzerland, Italy, Austria,  
Spain, and France.
23. Gymnasium, Breslau, Germany.
24. Subject speaks, reads and understands English quite well; reads and  
understands a fair amount of French but does not speak French well.
25. Subject entered military service as an artilleryman in 1920; was  
commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant December 1925; became a General Staff  
Officer as a Captain in 1935; adjutant to General Halder, Chief of  
Staff German Army 1940; chief of Friends House Oct 1945; dismissed  
by special order of Hitler 9 April 1945; highest rank attained  
Brigadier General 1944; POW of the U.S. Army May 1945 to June 1945.
26. None.
27. None given.
28. 1000 DM a month salary.
29. See para 28.
30. None.
31. None.
32. None given.
33. Routine demerification.
34. 49 normal  
1.74 m 72 kg  
blue good  
-- dark blond  
fair none  
male slight

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

**SECRET**

Personal Record Questionnaire - Part I - Biographic

1. Full Name : Richard GEHLEN  
First Middle Last

2. Name in native script \_\_\_\_\_

3. Name at birth (if different from 1) \_\_\_\_\_

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason & place of use):

a. UTILITY, cryptonym used only by POB in correspondence with WASH and KARL;

b. Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER, covername used within compound; \*

c. Richard Garner \*

d. Robert GONTARD \*

\* German identity papers used in connection with cover names mentioned above give birth dates as follows:

b. SCHNEIDER 4 March 1905

c. GARNER 3 April 1902

d. GONTARD 4 March 1905

e. Hans HOLBEIN, name used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria (AGO-card D-147 996 in this name);

f. Dr. GROSS ) Names used whenever special precautionary measures

g. Dr. ERNST ) are warranted and wherever mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable.

5. Date of birth : 3 April 1902 Birthplace : Erfurt, Thuringia

6. Nationality at birth : German (no other subsequent nationality)

7. Present citizenship : German

8. Present residence : Berg a/Starnberger See, Bavaria #68 Wald

9. Permanent address : \_\_\_\_\_

10. Present occupation: (Full title, salary, etc. ) DM 1000 a month (brutto and netto)

CHIEF of ODEUM

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the U.S.

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in U.S. Explain relationship.

Friends: John B. Boker, Jr - 101 Duane St, N.Y.C.  
Eric Waldman - 1204 Leavenworth St, Silver Spring, Md.

13. Father - Full name, occupation, present residence, year and place at birth and subsequent nationalities

Walther Gehlen, Director of a Publishing firm in Leipzig, German

national, deceased in 1943; date of birth 24 July 1871; former Army officer, retired after World War I with the rank of Lt.-Col; reactivated in World War II; held unimportant administrative position.

14. Mother same information as under 13.

Katharina Gehlen, nee von Baernewyck, born 12 June 1881, nationality

German deceased in 1921

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

15. Wife (or husband) - Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data on all previous marriages)

Hertha Gehlen, nee von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, born 17 April 1904, nationality German, place of birth Loebischowitz/Silesia; married in 1931

16. Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Katharina Gehlen, daughter, born 1934 19-1-34 - Berlin  
Christoph Gehlen, son, " 1937 11-2-37 - Berlin  
Marie-Therese Gehlen, daughter " 1941 1-5-40 - Leipzig  
Dorothee Gehlen, " " 1943, 28-3-43 - Leipzig  
German nationals, residing in Berg a/Starnberger See, Bavaria

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Giovanni (Johannes Hans) Gehlen, alias BAUM, Johannes), born 15 March 1901 in Rome, Italy; first passport held US passport, validity 6 months; now German citizen;

Walter Gehlen, born approx. 1905, German citizen, died 20 Feb 1945;

Barbara Gehlen, born 1912 in Germany, German citizen, married to a distant relative Walter von GEHLEN, lawyer and former civilian official of German Navy - living in Rio de Janeiro

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

Brother-in-law Walter von GEHLEN, employed in autumn 1946 by British authorities in Kiel (present status unknown)

Brother Giovanni (Johannes Hans) GEHLEN, Head of ODEUM group in Rome

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

✓ Auslands Passport No. 000 63291 in the name of GEHLEN, Reinhard

✓ Auslands Passport No. 186 070 in the name of GONTARD, Robert

AGO-Card No. D-147 996 in name of HOLBEIN, Hans,

TTD under name GEHLEN, Reinhard, valid for Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France

German identity papers (not specified) in the name of SCHNEIDER, Dr. Richard; GARNER, Richard, and GONTARD, Robert, passport

20. Religion - Degree practiced, membership religious orders. No. 186070

21. Present and past political affiliations.

NONE

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.

Sent to USA by War Department at end of 1945; returned 5 June 1946

before WW II - 1933 trip to Italy (Rome, on leave); 1937 to Finland & Sweden (leave)

During WW II - troop duty in Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Russia

after WW II - several trips to Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain; 1 to France (duty trips)

23. Education - School, location, course, degree, dates  
1908 - 1920 Gymnasium Breslau (Reifezeugnis)

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)  
Language English Speak fair Read good Understand fair  
Language French Speak good Read fair Understand fair  
Language \_\_\_\_\_ Speak \_\_\_\_\_ Read \_\_\_\_\_ Understand \_\_\_\_\_

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war.  
Entered military service (artillery) in 1920; commissioned 2nd Lt. Dec 1923; promoted to 1st Lt. 1928; General Staff Academy 1933-1935; Promoted to Captain 1934; 1935-1938 General Staff assignment; 1938-1939 Battery Commander; March 1939 promoted to Major; Sept/Nov 1939 Chief of Staff 213th Inf. Div.; Nov 1939-Spring 1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff; Spring 1940 - Fall 1940 Adjutant to Gen Halder, Chief of General Staff; Nov. 1940 - April 1942 Chief Gruppenleiter I (Section Chief within Department for Plans & Operations Spring 1942 - Spring 1945 Chief of Department Fremde Heere Ost; dismissed by special order of Hitler 9 April 1945; American POW, arrived at Army Group IC on 27 May 1945

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

None

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property.

Deutsche Reichsbank, Munich  
Salary (Basic and Brutto) DM 1000 a month; (payroll number 3002)  
Housing Loan No. 8 1 April 1951 - DM 5,000

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Army career, see above

Present cover occupation : Connected with Bavarian Light Metal Works

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (Individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

32. List five (5) character references.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

*no court record*  
*complete clearance in routine denazification procedure*

34. Description (Use American standards of measurements, if possible.)

|                     |               |                            |                   |
|---------------------|---------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
| Age                 | 48            | Posture                    | <i>normal</i>     |
| Apparent Age        |               | Weight                     | <i>92 kg.</i>     |
| Height              | <i>1.74 m</i> | Teeth                      | <i>normal</i>     |
| Eyes                | <i>blue</i>   | Hair                       | <i>dark blond</i> |
| Face-shape          |               | Scars                      | <i>none</i>       |
| Complexion          | <i>normal</i> | Build                      | <i>normal</i>     |
| Sex                 | <i>male</i>   | Other identifying features | <i>none</i>       |
| General appearances |               |                            |                   |
| Prominent features  |               |                            |                   |

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

For cover purposes, subject's permanent residence had been given for the period 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949 as WASHINGTON; he had full documentation for this purpose. The notional trip from the USA to Germany took place in late November 1949.



August 1951

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE  
PART I BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

/PRQ/

1. Full name Reinhard Gehlen  
First Middle Last
2. Name in native script Reinhard Gehlen
3. Name at birth (if different from 1) \_\_\_\_\_
4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (state briefly time, reason and place of use). \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
5. a. Date of birth 3.4.1902 b. Place of birth Erfurt
6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate German
7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6). German
8. Present Residence (owner, tenant, sub-tenant) \_\_\_\_\_  
Berg bei Starnberg
9. Permanent address (if different from 8). Berg b. Starnberg, Waldstr.  
Nr. 68
10. Present occupation (full title, salary, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States, (give date and name in which certificate was granted). \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. Explain relationship. friends: John R. Boker, Jr. 101 Duane Street, New York 7, N.Y.  
Eric Waldman, 1204 Lebanon Street, apt. 6, Silver Spring Md.
13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities. \_\_\_\_\_  
Walther Gehlen, born 1871, German
14. Mother - same information as 13. Katharina Gehlen nee von Vaerneuyck  
born 1881, German

FALL 1951

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

15. Wife (or, husband) - Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment, (Give data for all previous marriages)

Herta von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, born 17.4.1904 Leobschütz  
married 11.10.1931 Glogau, German, resident at Berg

16. Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Katharina, fem, 19.1.1934, Berlin, German  
Christoph, male, 11.2.1937, " "  
Marie Therese fem. 4.9.1940 Liegnitz "  
Dorothee, fem. 28.2.1943 " "

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Johannes Gehlen, 15.3.1901, Rom, German, living in Rom  
Barbara von Gehlen, 5.7.1912, Breslau, German " in Rio de Janeiro

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

20. Religion - Degree practiced, membership religious orders.  
protestant

21. Present and past political affiliations.  
none

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

23. Education - School, Location, course, degree, dates

Abitur, humanistisches Gymnasium

24. Languages and dialects (Indicates proficiency as good, fair, poor.)  
Language native German Speak good Read good Understand good

Language English Speak fair Read good Understand good

Language French Speak poor Read fair Understand fair

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if over prisoner of war.

last rank brigadier general;

details and dates about my military carrier are in the US files.

PoW from 23.5.1945 to July 1946

Since then cooperation with USIS

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

none

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

none

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property.

Bayerische Vereinsbank, Munich

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

see 25.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (Individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

32. List five (5) character references.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc..

34. Description (Use American standards of measurements, if possible.)

|                     |      |                            |
|---------------------|------|----------------------------|
| Age                 | 48   | Posture                    |
| Apparent Age        |      | Weight                     |
| Height              |      | Teeth                      |
| Eyes                | blue | Hair                       |
| Face-shape          |      | Scars                      |
| Complexion          |      | Build                      |
| Sex                 |      | Other identifying features |
| General appearances |      |                            |
| Prominent features  |      |                            |

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

For cover purposes, subject's permanent residence had been given for the period 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949 as WASHINGTON; he had full documentation for this purpose. The notional trip from the USA to Germany took place in late November 1949.

# PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

1. FULL NAME : Reinhard - GEHLEN  
First Middle Last
2. Name in native script \_\_\_\_\_
3. Name at birth (if different from 1) -
4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use):
  1. UTILITY - Cryptonym used only by POB in correspondence with WASH and KARL
  2. Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER, covername used within compound
  3. Richard GARNER
  4. Robert CONTARD

Identity papers (German) used in connection with above covernames give birth dates as follows:

  2. SCHNEIDER 4 March 1905
  3. GARNER 3 April 1902
  4. CONTARD 4 March 1905
5. Hans HOLBEIN, name used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria. (AGO card-D-147-996 in this name).
6. Dr. GROSS - Names used whenever special precautionary measures are warranted
7. Dr. ERNST - and where mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable.
5. a. Date of birth : 3 April 1902  
b. Birthplace : Erfurt, Thuringia, Germany
6. Nationality at birth : German  
(no other subsequent nationality)
7. Present citizenship: German
8. Present residence : Berg a/Starnberger See, Bavaria
9. Permanent address : -
10. Present occupation (full title, salary, etc.): *President of the DM1000*  
Chief of ODEUM *(Pg. 3002)*
11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the U.S.
12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in U.S. Explain relationship

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

/PRQ/

13. Father - Full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Walther Gehlen, Director of a Publishing firm in Leipzig, German citizen, deceased in 1943,  
Date of birth 24 July 1871  
(former Army officer, retired after World War I with the rank of Lt.-Col; reactivated in World War II; held unimportant administrative position)

14. Mother - Same information as 13.

Katharina Gehlen, nee von Vaernewyck, born 12 June 1881, Nationality German, deceased in 1921.

15. Wife (or husband) - Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Herta Gehlen, nee von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, born 17 April 1904, nationality German, place of birth Leobschuetz/Silesia

Married in 1931

16. Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Katharina Gehlen, daughter, born 1934

Christoph Gehlen, son " 1937

Marie-Therese Gehlen, daughter, born 1941

Dorothee Gehlen, " " 1943

German nationals, residing in Berg am Starnberger See, Bavaria

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Giovanni (Johannes Hans) Gehlen, alias BAUM, Johannes), born 15 March 1901 in Rome, Italy; first passport held-U.S. passport, validity 6 months; now German citizen

Walter, born approx. 1905, deceased on 20 Feb 1945, German citizen,

Barbara, born 1912 in Germany, German citizen, married to a distant relative; Walter von GEHLEN, lawyer and former civilian official of German Navy

\_\_\_\_/PRQ/\_\_\_\_

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

Brother-in-law Walter von GEHLEN employed in autumn 1946 by British Authorities in Kiel (present status unknown)

Brother Giovanni (Johannes Hans) GEHLEN, Chief of ODEUM group in Rome

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.  
~~Auslands-Passport No. 186070 in the name of Robert CONTARD~~  
~~Auslands-Passport No. 0006329 in the name of GEHLEN, Reinhard~~  
~~AGO Card No. D-177996, issued in covername HOLBEIN, Hans~~  
German identity papers (not specified) in the name of SCHNEIDER, Dr. Richard, GARNER, Richard, and CONTARD, Robert \*\*\*
20. Religion - degree practiced, membership religious orders.

21. Present and past political affiliations

None

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.  
End 1945 or beginning 1946 sent by War Department to USA, returned 5 June 1946

23. Education - School, location, course, degree, dates  
1908 - 1920 Gymnasium Breslau (Reifezeugnis)

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language English Speak fair Read        Understand fair

Language        Speak        Read        Understand       

Language        Speak        Read        Understand       

\*\*\* Temporary Travel Document under Reinhard GEHLEN, <sup>valid</sup> for Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

/PRO/

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war.  
1920 Entered military service (artillery); Dec 1923 2nd Lt; 1st Lt. 1928; 1933 - 1935 General Staff Academy; 1934 promotion to Captain; 1935 - 1938 General Staff assignment; 1938 - 1939 Battery Commander; March 1939 promotion to Major; Sept-Nov. 1939 Chief of Staff 213th Inf. Div.; Nov. 1939 - Spring 1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff; Spring 1940 - Fall 1940 Adjutant to Chief of Gen. Staff, Gen. Halder; Nov. 1940 - April 1942 Chief Gruppenleiter I (Section Chief within the Department for Plans and Operations); Spring 1942 - Spring 1945 Chief ABT Fremdherrschaft Ost. \* leader of German Eastern Military Intel. American POW, arriving at Army Group IC on 27 May 1945. 9 April 1945 dismissed by special order of Hitler.
26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)  
No membership in political party or affiliated associations, neither at present nor in the past.
27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)
28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property.  
*Don't relay 1000.-*  
*Basic 1000.- (Payroll number 3802)*
29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.  
Army career, see above  
Cover occupation : Connected with Bavarian Light Metal Works



APR 4

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

32. List five character references.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

PRO

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 48 Posture

Apparent age 45-50 Weight

Height Teeth

Eyes blue Hair

Face - shape Scars

Complexion Build

Sex m.

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

For cover purposes, subject had his permanent residence in WASHINGTON from 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949 with full documentation. The notional trip from the USA to Germany took place in late November 1949.

1. Full Name : Reinhard GEHLEN  
First Middle Last

2. Name in native script \_\_\_\_\_

3. Name at birth (if different from 1) \_\_\_\_\_

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason & place of use):

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER, covername used within compound; \*

c. Richard Garner \*

d. Robert GONTARD \*

\* German identity papers used in connection with cover names mentioned above give birth dates as follows:

b. SCHNEIDER 4 March 1903

c. GARNER 3 April 1902

d. GONTARD 4 March 1905

e. Hans HOLBEIN, name used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria (AGO-card D-147 996 in this name)

f. Dr. GROSS ) Names used whenever special precautionary measures

g. Dr. ERNST ) are warranted and wherever mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable.

5. Date of birth : 3 April 1902 Birthplace : Erfurt, Thuringia

6. Nationality at birth : German (no other subsequent nationality)

7. Present citizenship : German

8. Present residence : Berg a/Starnberger See, Bavaria #68 Waldstr.

9. Permanent address : \_\_\_\_\_

10. Present occupation: (Full title, salary, etc.) DM 1000 a month  
(brutto and netto)

Chief of ODEUM

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the U.S.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in U.S. Explain relationship:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

13. Father - Full name, occupation, present residence, year and place at birth and subsequent nationalities

Walthar Gehlen, Director of a Publishing firm in Leipzig, German

national, deceased in 1943; date of birth 24 July 1871; former Army officer, retired after World War I with the rank of Lt.-Col; reactivated in World War II; held unimportant administrative position.

14. Mother same information as under 13

Magdalena Gehlen, nee von Baernewitz, born 12 June 1881, nationality

FALL 1951

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE: METHOD 5XEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DIVISION  
DATE 2005

15. Wife (or husband) - Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages)
- Hertha Gehlen, nee von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, born 17 April 1904, nationality German, place of birth Loebachuetz/Silesia; married in 1931
16. Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.
- Katharina Gehlen, daughter, born 1934  
 Christoph Gehlen, son, " 1937  
 Marie-Therese Gehlen, daughter " 1941  
 Dorothee Gehlen, " " 1943;  
 German nationals, residing in Berg a/Starnberger See, Bavaria
17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.
- Giovanni (Johannes Hans) Gehlen, alias BAUM, Johannes), born 15 March 1901 in Rome, Italy; first passport held US passport, validity 6 months; now German citizen;  
 Walter Gehlen, born approx. 1905, German citizen, died 20 Feb 1945;  
 Barbara Gehlen, born 1912 in Germany, German citizen, married to a distant relative Walter von GEHLEN, lawyer and former civilian official of German Navy
18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.
- Brother-in-law Walter von GEHLEN, employed in autumn 1946 by British authorities in Kiel (present status unknown)  
 Brother Giovanni (Johannes Hans) GEHLEN, Head of ODEUM group in Rome
19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.
- Auslands Passport No. 000 6829 in the name of GEHLEN, Reinhard  
 Auslands Passport No. 186 070 in the name of GONTARD, Robert  
 AGO-Card No. D-147 998 in name of HOLBEIN, Hans,  
 TTD under name GEHLEN, Reinhard, valid for Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France  
 German identity papers (not specified) in the name of SCHNEIDER, Dr. Richard; GARNER, Richard, and GONTARD, Robert, passport No. 186070
20. Religion - Degree practiced, membership religious orders. No. 186070
21. Present and past political affiliations.
- NONE
22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.
- Sent to USA by War Department at end of 1945; returned 5 June 1946

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

23. Education - School, location, course, degree, dates  
1908 - 1920 Gymnasium Breslau (Reifezeugnis)

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)  
Language English Speak fair Read        Understand fair

Language        Speak        Read        Understand       

Language        Speak        Read        Understand       

25. Military service:- dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war.  
Entered military service (artillery) in 1924; commissioned 2nd Lt. Dec 1923; promoted to 1st Lt 1928; General Staff Academy 1933-1935; Promoted to Captain 1934; 1935-1938 General Staff assignment; 1938-1939 Battery Commander; March 1939 promoted to Major; Sept/Nov 1939 Chief of Staff 213th Inf. Div.; Nov 1939-Spring 1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff; Spring 1940 - Fall 1940 Adjutant to Gen Halder, Chief of General Staff; Nov. 1940 - April 1942 Chief Gruppenleiter I (Section Chief within Department for Plans & Operations Spring 1942 - Spring 1945 Chief of Department Fremde Heere Ost; dismissed by special order of Hitler 9 April 1945; American POW, arrived at Army Group IC on 27 May 1945

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

None

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property.

Salary (Basic and Brutto) DM 1000 a month; (payroll number 3002)

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Army career, see above

Present cover occupation : Connected with Bavarian Light Metal Works

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

no

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (Individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.



Photo taken during UG-Procs  
Aug. 10, 1951

32. List five (5) character references.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

no court record

Complete clearance in routine denazification procedure

34. Description (Use American standards of measurements, if possible.)

|                     |        |                            |            |
|---------------------|--------|----------------------------|------------|
| Age                 | } 49   | Posture                    | normal     |
| Apparent Age        |        | Weight                     | 72 kg      |
| Height              | 1.74 m | Teeth                      | normal     |
| Eyes                | blue   | Hair                       | dark-blond |
| Face-shape          |        | Scars                      | none       |
| Complexion          | normal | Build                      | normal     |
| Sex                 | male   | Other identifying features | none       |
| General appearances |        |                            |            |
| Prominent features  |        |                            |            |

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Annex to PRQ 22. Travel outside  
country of present residence

a) before World War II. :

1933 trip to Italy (Rom) ( leave)  
1937 " to Finland and Sweden (leave)

b) during World War II. :

during troop duty in Poland, France, Yugoslavia,  
Greece, Russia.

c) after World War II. :

several trips to Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain,  
one trip to France  
( duty- trips)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

30

Dr. SCHNEIDER

MGMA 878 Staff of German chief. Consists of Chief of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4,  
Annex D,1 Communications Section, Camp-Administration. Approximately 57 individuals.  
Dec. 48 Subordinate sections: 41, 56, 100, 9999, 34.41, 45, 7.

MGLA-2599 The following individuals requested travel documents as special connections of  
13 July 50 30: Hans H. HERWARTH von BITTENFELD; Hugo Prince v. THURN & TAXIS; Robert  
GONTARD (30) and Annelore KRUEGER (secretary of 30).

MGLA 1593 20 548 was later directed through 34 (now 30).

MGLA-4089 17 Nov 50

Reinhold Bartenstein, Paul Bartenstein and Edith v. Schoeler req. new TTD's for Favor. All  
Rec'd 14 Nov 50. Special connections of 30. Alix von Fransecky and Giovanni Gehlen req  
Extension of Travel Documentation for Favor. Both Special connections of 30.

MGLA 4717 10 Jan. 51 ZIPPER Staff R organization Overall staff work previously done by  
staff 30 will now be under 30a. ~~Staff~~ 30 will take over the responsibility of 31.  
30b will be in charge of all functions concerned within the staff of 30 and  
take over the staff of 31. The personal office of 30 will have the designation 30c.  
35 remains subordinated to 30. Within the staff of 30, 30c is in charge of matters  
concerning 35.

MGLA 7847 18 Aug 51 submitted PRO on Gehlen

von GEHLEN, Reinhard

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



Pull 2583

In 24315

28 August 1957

To WASHF

INFO Karl

Cite PULLF

RE MGKW 10040

1. ASSUME YOU HAVE RECEIVED UTILITY PRO POUCHED WITH MGLA 7847
2. SINCE REF DOES NOT ENTIRELY RULE OUT UTILITY TRAVEL WITH GROUP THREE, SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS WITH L J AND GIVE US DECISION BY CASE AS AIRLINE BOOKING DIFFICULT OBTAIN ON LESS THAN TWO WEEKS NOTICE.
3. WE HAVE ALREADY BOOKED GROUP THREE PLUS HOEBEL BUT MIGHT BE ABLE GET UTILITY ON SAME PLANE IF YOU INFORM SOONEST.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~64009~~  
#3

7 September 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, I & SS  
Attn: ☐ ☐

FROM : Chief, FDM

SUBJECT: UJ-DRACO (Reinhard Gehlen)

Ref : FDM Memorandum subject UJ-DRACO, dated 29 May 1951

1. Transmitted herewith is biographical information on Reinhard GEHLEN. Mr. GEHLEN, the chief of ZIPPER, is expected to arrive in the United States on 23 September.

2. IR and division files contain no disqualifying derogatory information.

3. Local field traces developed no disqualifying derogatory information.

4. OSO operational files and documents contain no information of investigative value or security interest in addition to that set forth herein.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

Bronson Tweedy

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CRT 21 SEP 51

IP/TS

FORM NO.  
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: PULLACH ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 18 SEP 51  
ACTION: FDM (1-2-3) IN 28612  
INFORMATION: IR (1-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), S/C (9-10-11),  
STC (12), ODP (15)

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (D) 60A AR-380-5*

PULL 266L

TO: WASHF

INFO: KARLF

CITE: PULLF

RE: WASH 07223 (OUT 75765), PULL 2648 (IN 27908)

UTILITY TRAVELING AS REPRESENTATIVE GERMAN BUSINESS GROUP  
WHICH INTERESTED DEVELOPING GERMAN AND FOREIGN PATENTS IN USA AND  
FURTHERING EXCHANGE TECHNICAL INFO US-GERMAN FIRMS. FOR THIS PURPOSE  
WILL CONSULT VARIOUS US FIRMS. GROUP HEADED BY DR. JUR REUSS ZIPPER  
SPECIAL CONNECTION LIVING MUNICH WEINSTR 8 WHO INFORMED UTILITY COVER

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

TOR 2000Z 18 SEP 51

**SECRET**

COPY No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

*g. l. l. m.*

• 1 OCT 1951

TO : Assistant Director for Special Operations  
THRU : Staff C, SPB  
ATTN : Chief, FDM (For  
FROM : Chief, Special Security Division  
SUBJECT: UJ-DRACO  
#54150 - R.G.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 7 September 1951 requesting the appropriate security clearance so that the Subject might enter the United States, receive certain training and return to his field of operations.

2. This is to advise that this office grants the necessary security approval desired so that the Subject can be utilized as set forth in Paragraph 1 and in your memorandum of 7 September 1951.

3. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of this organization.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE: NETHO05 EXEMPTION 382E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

A memorandum for the record dated 8 Oct 1951 subject:  
DCI's Meeting with General Gehlen, written by Lyman B Kirkpatrick,  
Acting Assistant Director is filed in Policy file.

OFFICIAL COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

9 October 1951

TO : Assistant Director for Special Operations  
THRU : Staff C, SPB  
ATTN : Chief, FDM (For [ ]  
FROM : Chief, Special Security Division  
SUBJECT : UJ-DRACO - Operational Support - Project (OSO)  
54150 - R.G.  
52757 - H.D.H.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 2 October 1951 requesting hotel accommodations for the Subjects in Washington, D.C., on October 8, 1951, through October 9, 1951.

2. This memorandum will confirm the following:

a. The only suite available in Washington, D.C., that would fulfill your request was at the Hotel 2400, on Sixteenth Street.

b. [ ] of your office was telephonically advised by [ ] of this office that the reservations were made in the names of the Subjects. Mr. James Critchfield, employed by the Army, resided in Washington, D.C., and Germany. The other two were private individuals from Germany.

c. The Subjects occupied this suite on October 8, 1951.

3. If we may be of assistance to you in the future, do not hesitate to say so.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

CLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
E.O. 12958

SECRET

SECRET

TO : Assistant Director for Special Operations  
THRU : Staff C, SFD  
ATTN : Chief, FIM (For [ ]  
FROM : Chief, Special Security Division  
SUBJECT: UJ-DRACO  
#54150 - R.G.

*Feblen*

9 OCT 1951

1. Reference is made to your request for assistance in facilitating the entrance of the Subject into the United States on 23 September 1951.

2. This will confirm previous telephonic advice from [ ] of this Division, to [ ] of your office, on 23 September 1951 that the operation was successful and no untoward incident occurred.

3. If we may be of assistance to you in the future, do not hesitate to say so.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 38 FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

SECRET

*Golden*  
16 OCT 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Director for Special Operations  
THRU : Staff C, SPB  
ATTN : Chief, FDM (For [ ]  
FROM : Chief, Special Security Division  
SUBJECT : UJ-DRACO OCT 1<sup>st</sup> ENT'D  
54150 - R.G.

1. This will confirm telephonic advice from [ ], this Division, to [ ] your office, of our compliance with your request for assistance in Subject's exit from the United States.

2. The operation incident to Subject's mission in the United States was successful and departure was accomplished on schedule with no untoward incidents.

3. If we can be of assistance at any future date, please so inform us.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SECRET



*Gukler*

SECRET

Air

SECURITY INFORMATION

MOX-H//233

30 October 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Attention: C 7

Chief, Foreign Division M

Operational

Personal Letter for Dr. Schneider

Attached are two envelopes containing identical copies of a personal letter from Mr. Critchfield to Dr. Schneider. Items of operational interest (paragraphs 3 and 4) contained have been extracted and appear in the report on Richter's visit to the USA now ready for forwarding to you. It is requested that the sealed envelope be delivered to Dr. Schneider and that the second copy be filed with other correspondence with Dr. Schneider in my care.

J. Critchfield

Attachments: 2

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Washington, D. C.  
30 October 1951

Dear Doctor Schneider,

Since your departure a fortnight ago, I have been in Washington concentrating on the problems that require action here before I return to Europe. Foremost of these problems are, of course, the involvements related to the contractual agreement negotiations and the rather pressing attendant financial matters. I am reasonably optimistic that a solution to our immediate financial problems can be reached in the near future.

I have been following the discussions between the Bonn government and the Western Allies with much interest. I fear that there are still many unresolved differences and misunderstandings involved in the discussions related to the contractual agreement; a recent personal letter from Mr. Pleasants did not reflect a particularly optimistic outlook. I am increasingly anxious to be back to make any contribution possible to minimize these differences and misunderstandings. However, it does not appear that I will be sailing until sometime in December.

It appears that the matter which brought Roger to the United States has again been dropped into my hands. It appears that the General whom you met on 8 October learned of the matter and discussed it with the General with whom you had the talk on the 25th of September. They agreed that my organization would assume responsibility for representing the United States Government interest in continuing the negotiation with the Athenaeum Institute represented by Mr. Roger. This arrangement, it was felt, would not basically modify the nature of the negotiating privately and independently initiated by Mr. Roger; but would offer the most expeditious and secure means of coordinating these negotiations, with our and your more specific interests.

Would you kindly convey this information to Mr. Roger. The plans for the travel of two technicians to Germany has not been altered by this arrangement; however, I have been informed that the trip will be delayed until late November or early December due to other pressing commitments.

The trip through the United States with you and Heins was for me a pleasant and significant experience which, I feel, further strengthened the bond of personal friendship and professional understanding that has characterized our association during the past three years.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MGR-W-11233

(attachment)

SECRET

- 2 -

SECURITY INFORMATION

I am looking forward with great enthusiasm to my return to Germany. Please give the gentlemen of your staff my warmest regards and assure them that their contributions to assist Mr. Gengelmen's efforts to keep us fully advised of existing problems, both professional and personal, have been most helpful. I look forward to seeing all of you sometime before Christmas.

Sincerely yours,

James H. Critchfield

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

FORM NO. 33-3  
DEC. 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

FROM: VIENNA ROUTINE  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 20 NOV 51  
ACTION: FDM (1-2-3) IN 41727  
INFORMATION: IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), STC (9),  
S/C (10-11-12), ODP (13)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

VIEN 6450

TO: WASHF INFO: PULLF BERNF CITE: VIENF  
FROM: SALZBURG

1. UTILITY TOLD ☐ ON 18 NOV 51 IN PRESENCE  
MERKER AND HALTER HE HAD MET ☐ "FEW DAYS BEFORE" AND "ESTABLISHED  
CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS".
2. UTILITY CLAIMS ☐ DENOUNCED ☐ TO HIM FOR HAVING  
CONTACTED CAPOTE GROUP WITHOUT CLEARANCE AND FOR FREE WHEELING IN  
GENERAL.
3. AT MEETING WITH ☐ UTILITY:
  - A. GAVE LONG WORLD SITUATION REPORT.
  - B. OFFERED PROCURE INFO ON FUTURE GERMAN ARMY ORGANI-  
ZATION FROM HORN FOR ☐.
  - C. STATED COULD NOT PASS INTELL MATERIAL AS LONG AS  
U.S. SPONSORED.
  - D. EMPHASIZED HIS CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH  
ADENAUER.

TOR:

**SECRET**

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

VIEN 6450

SECRET

PAGE TWO

IN 41727

E. SAID HORN "HIS MAN" IN GERMAN ARMY PLANTING  
PICTURE.

F. DENOUNCED CAPOTE AND KIELMANNSEGG AS CARRY  
OVER FROM SCHWERIN REGIME.

G. ASKED [ ] NO QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS OR  
[ ]'S ACTIVITIES.

H. SAID EAGER TAKE UP LIAISON WITH AUSTRIAN I & S.  
WHEN OFFICIALLY CONSTITUTED.

1856Z 20 NOV 51

SECRET

2. 12. 51

Lieber Herr. Critchfield!

Meiner Frau und meine herzlichsten Grüße  
zum Weihnachtstag, denen wir unsere besten  
Wünsche für das neue Jahr. anschließen. Möge  
es Ihnen und den Ihren Glück, Leben, Gesund-  
heit und neue Erfolge bringen! Ich möchte  
Ihnen nochmals danken für den Brief, der  
unsere Zusammenarbeit im vergangenen Jahre  
getragen hat. Wenn ich jetzt zurückblicke, so  
hat uns das Jahr 1951 doch in jeder Be-  
ziehung einen großen Schritt vorwärts gebracht.  
Mit herzlichem Grüßen von Hans zu Hans

Arts Th

W. Allen.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE AC  
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Encl 2. EGMA-64764

CS COPY

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR POUCH

SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. WSMA-1738

SECURITY INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, IDW

DATE: 6 December 1951

FROM : Chief ☐ ☒

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

SPECIFIC: Activities of Otto SKORZENY

1. On 5 December 1951 Major Robert B. Bieck, Assistant Air Attaché, informed ☐ that Otto SKORZENY is planning another trip to Germany. For the first time in SKORZENY's travels, he is apparently having difficulty in getting a visa to enter Germany. Other details regarding the present activities of SKORZENY are included in the attached memorandum from Major Bieck.
2. Bieck was asked regarding any new developments in the alleged penetration of the various High Commissioners offices in Germany by Soviet agents. To this Bieck replied that SKORZENY had mentioned that this operation cannot continue to go on indefinitely due to a lack of funds. Although SKORZENY did not apparently ask directly for financial aid, it was nevertheless strongly implied. SKORZENY did not show Major Bieck any additional information allegedly coming from the penetration, and presumably has received none recently. SKORZENY expects that on his next trip to Germany he will receive additional information regarding this operation.
3. Bieck also mentioned the fact that SKORZENY is afraid of an organization run by General GEHLEN (fnu). GEHLEN is a German officer who, according to SKORZENY, is an active collaborator with both the U.S. OIG and CID. Bieck is not completely clear as to why SKORZENY fears the organization headed by General GEHLEN, but he is presumably afraid of some of GEHLEN's assistants and not GEHLEN himself who, according to SKORZENY is a gentleman.
4. According to Bieck, the SKORZENYs seemed happier to him in their last meeting on 4 December than they have ever been. Major Bieck has concluded that their lightheartedness is probably due to the fact that some money will be forthcoming shortly from one source or another. Bieck ventured that it might be that SKORZENY expects some financial returns from his contact with the industrialists mentioned in the attached memorandum. In speaking of industrialists, Bieck also mentioned that SKORZENY expected to meet an important industrialist from Venezuela at the Barajas airport on 4 December, but that the expected industrialist did not arrive.

Secret

CLASSIFICATION

IR COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODOSEXP/1002E  
KAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

FOR COORDINATION WITH

Army

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

MSMA-1738

5. SKORZENY also informed Major Bieck at their last meeting that he had recently conferred with General Agustin ~~MAC~~ <sup>MAC</sup> ~~GRANDES~~, Minister of the Army, regarding his plan to set up a "hard core cadre" in Spain.
6. Comments: [ ] continues to press Bieck to procure from SKORZENY actual copies of the product of the alleged penetration of the High Commissioners offices in Germany. Bieck agrees to continue efforts to get this information.

~~Attachment~~ 1/11  
Wash 3  
Karl 1  
Pull 1  
File 2

Secret

b7E c. 9.1



C O P Y

Office of the Air Attaché

The American Embassy  
Madrid, Spain  
5 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]

FROM: Major Black

SUBJECT: Further Activities of Otto Skorzeny

1. Last night, Otto Skorzeny and his wife called at my home. The purpose of the visit, as near as I can make out, was to inform me that both he and his wife are planning another journey to Germany. Ilse will depart on Thursday for Stuttgart and Cologne via aircraft. Skorzeny, himself, will, in all probability, have to wait perhaps another week before he, too, can make the journey. It seems that he is now having his problems obtaining a German visa. Apparently the Germans, due to their new setup, retained the right of visas. Skorzeny is undoubtedly on a caution list and full approval must be obtained from Bonn prior to giving him the visa. As near as I can tell, this trip involved meeting big steel industrialists and construction people in Cologne and other cities of Germany. From what Ilse let on, last night, they do have an exceptionally big deal in the offing and with any degree of success, they can make a killing.

2. I have referred to you in the past of one Leon Degralle, the famous or infamous Belgian Fascist. I believe that one of the offices of our Embassy has been greatly interested in the past as to his whereabouts. I believe he is still wanted by the Belgian Government for his nefarious activities with the Germans during the War. This man is definitely living in or very near Sevilla, the Skorzeny's having seen him only several days ago. Another interesting development is our flighty little friend, the Red Duchess of Valencia, is madly in love with Degralle, who is not having any. For your information, Degralle is coming to Madrid about the 15th of December and at that time I plan to meet him. Skorzeny is still definitely interested in "talking to somebody."

C O P Y

SECRET COPY [ ]

File : Reinhard Gehlen 201

See: Odeum Reports file Jan 1952

for copy of Director's letter to General Gehlen thanking him  
for Zipper's Estimate of the International Situation as of  
March 1952.

Director's letter dated 9 May 1952

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

PAGE No.

FROM: BONN  
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
ACTION: FRAN

SECURITY

|        |       |        |
|--------|-------|--------|
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |
| IP/TOI | IP/MB | IP/CRU |

ROUTINE

25 JAN 52

IN 16213

INFORMATION:

IR (1-2), AD/SO (3), OPS (4), FDM (5-6-7), STC (8),  
S/C (9-10-11), BDP (12)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

*sub: Situation of the Intelligence*

*West German Govt. Op.*

BONN 017

TO: FRANF INFO: WASHF, PULF CITE: BONNF

1. GLOBKE INFORMED ☐ AND ☐ HE PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH UPTHURST INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ON JAN 26 IN EFFORT TO CLEARLY DEFINE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS EXISTING GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES INCLUDING ZIPPER. GLOBKE HOPES THEREBY TO MINIMIZE PRESENT FRICTION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS.

2. REACTION OF DR GUMBEL AND DR GRAU WHO HAD MADE BRIEF SURVEY OF ZIPPER PERSONNEL AND FINANCES COMPLETELY FAVORABLE BOTH (RECD TOTH) AS TO BACKGROUND LEADERS AND SALARIES BEING PAID WHICH WERE IN ACCORDANCE GERMAN CIVIL SERVICE.

3. GLOBKE PLANS TO HAVE CAREFUL ESTIMATE MADE OF GERMAN FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO ZIPPER. RESULTING BUDGET WILL BE SUBMITTED TO FINANCE MINISTER AND SPECIAL BUNDESTAG FINANCE COMMITTEE. FINANCE MINISTER ALREADY INFORMED CONCERNING ZIPPER.

4. NO GERMAN INTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN YET APPOINTED FOR QUADRIPARTITE WORKING COMMITTEE TO ADVISE ON CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS. GLOBKE CLAIMED HE UNAWARE SUCH PERSON NEEDED AND MADE TENTATIVE SUGGESTION THAT RADTKE MIGHT BE SUITABLE AND COULD BE SUPPORTED BY ZIPPER STAFF IF REQUIRED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2003 2005

TOR 2147Z 25 JAN 52

**SECRET**

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-62332-2

A 32W-5-131

|             |   |    |     |
|-------------|---|----|-----|
| 32          | 6 | 12 | 283 |
| JAN 30 1952 |   |    |     |
| RECORDS     |   |    |     |
| INDEX       |   |    |     |

Utility

NASA-1245

Chief, Foreign Division M  
Attention: [ ]  
Chief of Station, Vienna

28 January 1952

Operational

KERNMAYER Report on Zipper

1. Following is translation of a report dated 2 October 1951 passed by [ ] [ ], who attributed it to Erich KERNMAYER, who gave it to [ ] [ ]:  
"From a confidential source it is known that in West Germany a large intelligence organization is operating under the direction of Utility, former Brigadier General in the OKW and manager of the office for Fremde Heere Ost, who previously had been active with the AST. The majority of his colleagues are former SD-personnel. The organization depends directly on the American High Command for support and receives from the Americans its general assignments. The processing of reports and regular evaluations is done by the organization itself. The organization works primarily against eastern targets."

2. Original, which contains Utility's true name, is retained with file copy here. One would think that KERNMAYER is well enough informed not to accuse Zipper of primary SD membership, and one would suspect that this bit is deliberate slanting to prejudice the Austrian police against Utility.

2-Wash.  
2-Vien.  
2-Salz. files, att.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COPY

1-2028

*file: von Hehler Reinhard domini*

International Phone Calls made by UTILITY'S Personal phone-Munich 793 409

MGLA-8097, 10 Sept 51

- Rome 39 07 66 (S-1933) called on 25 July 51 for 3 minutes.

MGLA-8486, 8 Oct 51

- Bern 54 225 (MERCIER) called on 4 and 24 Sept 51 for total of 6 minutes.

MGLA-9563, 12 Dec 51

- Rome 39 06 66 (S-1933) called on 19 Nov 51 for 3 minutes.

- Bern 54 225 (MERCIER) called on 16 and 19 Nov 51 for total of 8 minutes.

- Bern 55 993 (identification requested) called for 3 minutes on 24 Oct 51.

MGLA-9974, 14 Jan 52

- Bern 55 993 (identification requested) called on 13 Dec 51 for 3 minutes.

- Rome 39 07 66 (S-1933) called on 7, 10 and 12 Dec 51 for total of 15 minutes.

- Zurich 24 67 80 (identification requested) called for 3 minutes on 10 Dec 51.

MGLA-10331, 12 Feb 52

- Bern 54 225 (MERCIER) called on 18 Jan 52 for 3 minutes.

- Bern 61 26 12 (identification requested) called on 9 Jan 52 for 3 minutes.

- Zurich 24 67 80 (Hotel EDENAU LAC (identification requested)) called on 1 Jan 52 for 3 minutes and on 7 Jan 52 (two calls) for 4 minutes.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

*page 1*

*12 Feb 52*

UTILITY International Phone Calls Cont'd.

MOLA-10833, 24 Mar 52

— Bern 54 225 (MERCIER) called by U. on 22 Feb 52 for 5 minutes.

— Hochselden 22 ( ) called by U. on 15 Feb 52 for 3 minutes.

— Rome 390 766 (S-1933) called by U. on 21 Feb 52 for 6 minutes.

— Zurich 24 67 80 (Hotel Eden au Lac) called by U. on 2 Feb 52 for 3 minutes.

MOLA-11099, 4 April 1952

— Bern 54 225 (MERCIER) called by U. on 11, 14, 17 March 52 for total time 9 minutes.

— Rome 39 07 66 (S-1933) called by U. on 26, 27, Feb and 10 Mar 52; calls totaled 15 minutes.

— Zurich 24 67 80 (Hotel Eden au Lac) called by U. on 29 Feb and 22 Mar 52 for total of 6 minutes.

4 April 52

page 2

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. MGLA-10303

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, RE  
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *Army*

DATE: 12 February 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational  
SPECIFIC— General GEHLEN

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

1. The attached clipping appeared in the Westfaelische Zeitung published in Bielefeld, Germany on 6 February 1952.

2. The article originally appeared in the Journal-American in New York and describes the former role of General GEHLEN in the German Army department responsible for intelligence on foreign armies. More interesting, it states that his intelligence network has been reorganized in the last two years, more or less within the American secret service which has financed it. This department has at its disposal excellent information concerning the Russian and Chinese Armies.

3. Commenting on the final sentence, Gehlen states: "Schoen Ware".

Distribution:

2 - RE w/1 incl.  
1 - COS  
2 - POB

General Gehlen  
New York  
Journal-American  
"Da gibt es den deutschen General Gehlen, der selten zu sehen ist und"

Der Chef jener Abteilung im deutschen Generalstab war, die man unter der Bezeichnung Abteilung ausländische Armeen - Ost kannte. Es war die Aufgabe dieser Abteilung, alles Wissenswerte zusammenzustellen über die sowjetrussischen und über die anderen östlichen Armeen, über ihre Größe, Bewaffnung, Ausbildung, Reserven, über die Offiziere und über die Kampftechnik, besonders aber auch über die Generale und Feldmarschälle. General Gehlens großaufgebautes Nachrichten-Netzwerk ist in den letzten zwei Jahren reorganisiert und mehr oder weniger in den amerikanischen Geheimdienst einbezogen worden, der diese Abteilung auch finanziert. Diese Abteilung verfügt über ausgezeichnete Informationen über die sowjetrussischen und chinesischen Armeen.

WESTFÄLISCHE ZEITUNG

BIELFELD, 6.2.52

SECRET  
CLASSIFICATION

Reinhard GEHLEN  
[illegible]

MGLA-10458 dated 20 February 1952 (filed West German IS dossier)

UTILITY is cold, forceful, intent, completely preoccupied with his professional ambitions, untalented and disinterested in things cultural, completely lacking in informality and warmth of personality ... and never takes a drink. Otto JOHN is everything UTILITY is not; possesses all the talents and personal charm that UTILITY lacks; lacks the drive, intensity of purpose and complete personal dedication that UTILITY has. In the final analysis, [ ] suspects that JOHN is the more moral of the two, but where UTILITY is the simple, resolute and uncomplicated man, JOHN is probably a highly complex man, irresolute and no match for UTILITY in the knock-about of German intelligence politics.

was

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005



**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Daily Log Item for 11 March 1952

On 13 February a Zipper consultant in Bonn reported to the OSO representative in that city that the German Federal Government intended to replace Dr. Theobald Mosheim, spokesman of the German delegation discussing intelligence matters in quadripartite meetings on the Contractual Agreement. Hans Globke, Internal Affairs Chief of the Federal Chancellory, when asked to comment stated that it had been agreed to withdraw Mosheim from the discussions because of his inexperience in secret intelligence matters. Globke was of the opinion that Reinhard Gehlen would be much more qualified to discuss these subjects but since he was not a member of the Federal Government, Globke would be glad to front for him if the allies had no objection. Globke was assured by the OSO representative that the Allies were entirely satisfied with the progress of the discussions held with the German delegation.

The OSO representative was later instructed to inform Globke at a subsequent meeting that there would be strong objections to the presence of Gehlen at the quadripartite talks; but that there would be no objection to Globke's presence without Gehlen whom he could consult in private as he saw fit.

Based on MGFA 6340

EE/SO

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

**SECRET**

REINHARD GEHLEN

(13B) Berg B. Starnberg. den 16.3.1952  
No. 68

*Reinhard Gehlen*

16.3.1952

Dear General:

Attached hereto I send you a short summary of the results of our evaluation work, based on the Intelligence production of this organization during the last year. In spite of the fact that since the completion of the study the political situation developed further, the study might give you an impression of our work and our January estimate on the situation.

I am always remembering the very nice time I had last year in the United States on your invitation. Please be so kind to give my best regards to Mr. Dulles and all the other gentlemen I had the pleasure to meet.

I also inclose a letter of Mr. OXENIUS, who was very happy to get news from you via me. He will enter this organization as soon as he makes his last graduation.

With best regards, dear General,

Very sincerely yours,

Reinhard Gehlen

*NCLA 10851  
origin on DCI 2 APR.*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

Air Pouch

NSA-5170

Chief, EE

Chief of Station, [ ]

Operational

[ ] UTILITY, et al.

|                |          |
|----------------|----------|
| DIS 834        | 100      |
| 25             | 25.35    |
| 28 March 1952  |          |
| CAR            |          |
| File: 242 LCHL | Reinhold |

1. The problem of continuing the [ ] case has been the subject of several intensive discussions among the staff here, leading to the conclusion, in which I wholeheartedly concur, that it should be left with [ ] exclusively if possible. [ ] is at least sufficiently removed from the scene, which I am not, to keep [ ] from developing into a millstone around his neck.

2. I have been much impressed by [ ]'s elaboration of the ways in which [ ] has contrived to make a nuisance of himself, including importunate and indiscreet telephone calls involving any number of minor favors, for which he gives next to nothing in return. There is little evidence in the files of any of the officers who have been involved in the case at one time or another that [ ]'s interest in maintaining contact is based on anything other than self-interest and profit.

3. This is not to say that there may be no contact between [ ] and me. He knows that I am here and certainly knows something about where I have been. He may get in touch with me at any time by letter or phone. But the initiative must come from him; and if he wants to see me, he will have to come to [ ]. The same applies to [ ]. [ ] is full of such garden paths and it is hardly likely, and possibly not even desirable, that I avoid them all; but the [ ] and [ ] will have to do the walking.

4. I am encouraged in this attitude by reluctance to become overly-identified with Germans in the eyes of our liaison contacts. Both [ ] and [ ] know of my previous whereabouts. There is no indication that they take them amiss. But I would not want to give them occasion to feel that these former associations were being too intensively pursued here. It is, after all, still unfashionable to speak German in [ ] as much so, indeed, that I have found it expedient to temper my German with an occasional lapse into Wienerisch.

5. Thus it was that when I breakfasted with UTILITY on 24 March in Bern that I went prepared to decline the anticipated invitation to accompany him on a tour of his Swiss contacts. As it happened, the subject was not mentioned. Possibly UTILITY was too full of his Paris trip to speak or think of anything

DISTRIBUTION:

Washington

3

Frankfurt

2

Pallach

1

[ ]

1

SECRET  
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

UTILITY  
Chrono

1  
1

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

MSBA-5170  
28 Mar 52

else. He did not, for instance, even allude to the fact that I had been in the States or behave in any way as though we had not seen each other in almost three months. He just launched right into his Paris adventures, passing on with emphasis and relish Bourgeois's disparagements of the British. I have not reported separately on this conversation, since it developed nothing that UTILITY might not have been expected to report to [ ] on his return to Pullach.

6. For PULLACH: UTILITY did inform me that MERKER's successor as Chief of 35 will be KALLENBERG, heretofore Chief of UV-H. I assume you have his clear name. If not, I shall forward it upon request. UTILITY indicated, incidentally, that with MERKER's gradual withdrawal from this scene, the activities of 35 will be scaled down, eventually to be absorbed in 40.

*eye work! Must watch this closely. There will be many activities that will never be absorbed by H.D. 11*

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

6 May 1952

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

| FROM: RI |         |            |       | NO. MGNA-104       |                             |
|----------|---------|------------|-------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
|          |         |            |       | DATE               |                             |
| TO       | ROOM NO | DATE       |       | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS                    |
|          |         | REC'D      | FILED |                    |                             |
| 1. EE/so | 2203 K  | JUN 1 1952 |       | EEC                |                             |
| 2. GB    | 2203 K  |            |       | SPAK               |                             |
| 3. Z/DH  | 2212 K  |            | 10    | ZV                 | Note - Indications page 2-B |
| 4.       |         |            |       |                    |                             |
| 5. EE/so | 2203 K  |            | 20    | PK                 | would like back for CAPOTS  |
| 6.       |         |            |       |                    |                             |
| 7.       |         |            |       |                    | 3-5 will                    |
| 8.       |         |            |       |                    | 1 fine 2th                  |
| 9.       |         |            |       |                    | 2th                         |
| 10.      |         |            |       |                    | Copy made for               |
| 11.      |         |            |       |                    | EE/so/z                     |
| 12.      |         |            |       |                    |                             |
| 13.      |         |            |       |                    |                             |
| 14.      |         |            |       |                    |                             |
| 15.      |         |            |       |                    |                             |

RECORDS  
INTEGRATION  
STAFF  
JUN 2 1952  
ABSTRACT INDEX

FORM NO. 81-10  
FEB 1950

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 382E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Secret - Security Information

1:CHIA-104

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

6 May 1952

Chief, Bonn Liaison Office

Operational

Erich Gustav JAHNKE

R.F. 1:CHIA-070 (Coburg)

1. About six weeks ago during my last meeting with [ ] of RI-6, I asked him if he could tell me something about JAHNKE. I explained to him that on several occasions JAHNKE had requested a HICOG employee (Miss A. H. Matzenhain) to introduce him to some American intelligence official to whom he could make some rather interesting disclosures. [ ] admitted that he was familiar with JAHNKE's case, whom he considered an intelligence peddler involved in all sorts of shady deals. For example, the German Soft Drink Association gave JAHNKE some of their trade secrets as a basis for his investigation of the trade secrets of American soft drinks. JAHNKE sold the German secrets to the Coca-Cola representative in Dusseldorf for 10,000 DM, and the German Soft Drink Association is now considering the advisability of suing JAHNKE for breach of confidence.

Repsi. who has  
the spec. T.

2. About two weeks after my talk with [ ], I learned that JAHNKE had been arrested by the British. Knowing our interest in the case, the British liaison officer this morning brought me the attached extract of their interrogation report. He was careful to explain that the report contained only items that would be of interest to us, but should we want additional details we should get in touch with [ ] in Wahnroide, who is handling the case. If you wish to send a representative to talk to [ ] I shall be glad to arrange an appointment with him.

DIST:

2 - COB (w/2 attach)  
1 - FCB (w/1 " "  
1 - POB " " "  
1 - EL " " "  
2 - Bonn

Secret - Security Information

IR COPY

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

COPY

1. Interrogation was designed to bring out details of JAHNKE's dealings with Buero BLANK, and other similar agencies, apart from those concerned with the handling of the stolen documents.

2. JAHNKE sent papers on the following military subjects to his old CO, Gen Heinrich EBERBACH:-  
End 50

Discipline and Drill for Recruits,  
The Part of the Infantryman in Arm warfare,  
The composition of Arm Fighting Gps with  
Commandos, Air Strike wings and Parachutists,  
The Defence of Europe against the East.

These papers were passed into Buero BLANK by EBERBACH jun at the beg 51, and JAHNKE later heard that they had received flattering attention. However, he was not called to personally enlarge on them.

Spring 51 During his manifold activities, Prof CLASSEN had established contact with Prof FOCKE, the aircraft designer, who had recently completed plans and models for a hover plane and a speed boat, which allegedly represented revolutionary advances in their several fields. CLASSEN asked JAHNKE if he knew any parties likely to be interested in the development of these projects, and JAHNKE mentioned it to EBERBACH, at that time already in contact with Buero BLANK. As a result, a meeting was arranged at CLASSEN's home, at which the following were present:-

Hulf BLIX, industrial merchant of WUPPERTAL,  
representing Prof FOCKE,  
General der Flieger SEIDENANN (8 Flieger Corps),  
unofficial representative of Buero BLANK,  
One unknown, representing industry,  
CLASSEN and JAHNKE.

BLIX described the projects and spoke of the necessity of raising money for further development. It was suggested that the Americans be approached, but this suggestion was dropped since no-one present had the necessary access. The meeting ended inconclusively, SEIDENANN privately telling JAHNKE that it was too early to consider the realization of such ambitious plans.

Beg Aug 51 JAHNKE however reported to EBERBACH that a trial speedboat was being built at VLOSBACK, and a further conference was held in the premises of Buero BLANK, after EBERBACH had officially joined that organisation.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

-2-

(NOTE: Also after the documents had passed from JAHNKE to EBERBACH.)

Present were:-

Kapitän ZENKER, described as "Seefahrt Nr 1"  
at Buero BLANK,

Wulf BLAY,  
JAHNKE,  
EBERBACH Jun.

It was reported that the trial boat was completed and it was arranged on the spot for Admiral "BAY" (Komm der Kleinkampf Mittel) to represent Buero BLANK at the first runs.

(NOTE: These were actually later shown in the German newsreel.)

After the meeting, BLAY and JAHNKE took coffee together, BLAY questioning JAHNKE as to his occupation. Nothing loathe, JAHNKE described his plans for the INDAG, whereupon BLAY exclaimed that he could effect JAHNKE's introduction to the "greatest detective in the world". Interested, JAHNKE was told of the existence of a certain 'Col' HEINZ, WIESBADEN, Bahnhofstr 62, to whom BLAY promised he would write on JAHNKE's behalf.

(NOTE: JAHNKE now says he had no previous knowledge of HEINZ's existence. In the first interrogation summary he is quoted as saying that HEINZ should be excluded from access to the stolen documents, when these were handed to EBERBACH in Jul 51.)

28 Sep 51 JAHNKE visited his mother in MAINZ, Freiherr v. STEINSTR. 9.

22 Sep 51 He called at HEINZ's address, which he noted was camouflaged as the "Michael Verlag". On mentioning BLAY's name, he was immediately received by HEINZ, although the latter said that BLAY had not effected the promised introduction. JAHNKE gave the purpose of his visit as being calculated to arouse interest in his INDAG plans, which he proceeded to describe. HEINZ asked him if he had been in the Abwehr and, receiving a negative answer, said that he was not concerned with industrial security, but was engaged in espionage in the spheres of high level politics and military affairs in RL and Russian occupied AUSTRIA. JAHNKE asked HEINZ if he were connected with Genl G. HILN, of whose activities he had heard from EBERBACH Jun. HEINZ said that he was not, and, during the course of subsequent conversation, gave the following facts about the GELN organisation:-

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



# SECRET

-3-

- a) that it employed 50/60 Analysis officers, and was thus better staffed than the Abwehr had been,
- b) that it employed 1000 operatives,
- c) that it conducted operations all over RUSSIA and the Satellite Countries,
- d) that Gen. KUSINOW was GUBLEN's 2 i/c,
- e) that its Hq were in a village near MUNICH,
- f) that it was financed by the Americans.

JAHNKE expressed interest in establishing contact with the organization, so that HEINZ promised to see what he could do; he did not appear keen. When JAHNKE said that GUBLEN, with such an apparatus under his control appeared to be the natural successor to CANARIS, HEINZ denied this saying that part was reserved for himself, that he was already espionage chief in Buero BLANK, with OSTEN as his 2 i/c. Describing his wartime activities, HEINZ said that he had commanded the BRANDENBURG Regt, and had conducted radio deception operations against Britain from Holland. On parting, he extended a cordial invitation for JAHNKE to visit him at Buero BLANK, where he spent about three days each week.

Why in hell didn't  
Heinz shoot him on  
the spot?

He would, too.  
He didn't.

On return home, JAHNKE described his interview with HEINZ to ERBRACH Jun, and expressed wonder that HEINZ should be so indiscreet to a escaperative stranger.

8eg Nov 51

JAHNKE described his encounter with GERSTENBERG, saying that his intention had been to subvert a secretary, but that GERSTENBERG had been pre-warned of his visit by GLASSEN, so that they parted after an exchange of insults. His account of the LEVERKUSEN incident is subjective but agrees with GERSTENBERG's in all essentials.

17 Nov 51

Charged by Coca-Cola with investigating the source of an article against CC which had appeared in the FRANKFURT KPD newspaper, "Sozialistische Volkszeitung", which was assumed to have been inspired by the German soft drink industry, JAHNKE again called on HEINZ to see if the latter would give him a lead into the local KPD. HEINZ could not, but he put JAHNKE on to the HIEGBADEN LSV, as a result of which he had an interview with the chief, Fw. MEYER. MEYER was also unable to help but he arranged for JAHNKE to meet his FRANKFURT vis-a-vis in Cafe KRAENZLER, FRANKFURT at 1000 hrs on 20 Nov 51.

19 Nov 51

JAHNKE discovered that a KPD member, Reinhard SCHMIDT, was working the OPPELHEIM Coca-Cola concession, Peter HERDT & Sons. He briefed SCHMIDT to ascertain the source of the SVZ article, which SCHMIDT agreed to do.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

-4-

20 Nov 51 JAHNKE kept the RV in Cafe ERANZLER, duly meeting a certain SEPACK, who, on hearing JAHNKE's business, regretted that he had no source in the local KPD.

28g Dec 51 JAHNKE visited Buero BLANK to pick up LEBERBACH jun. LEBERBACH was out and, while JAHNKE was waiting, HILTZ came into the vestibule, greeted JAHNKE and, assuming that JAHNKE had called to pay the promised visit, took him into his office. Here he showed JAHNKE a map pinned to a cupboard, which bore a number cabalistic signs and which he described as prepared by OSTER under his direction to show the extent of their espionage operations. Referring again to GENLIN, against whom he seemed to bear a grudge, he said that GENLIN had recently suffered severe operational losses, but that he was still financed by the Americans to the extent of \$6,000,000 yearly. JAHNKE then took his leave to collect LEBERBACH.

where did he  
get that idea?

He described his conversation with HILTZ to LEBERBACH, who asked him to report it in writing. At first unwilling, JAHNKE eventually complied, later learning that LEBERBACH had passed it to FLUGENBERG, who had in turn shown it to HILTZ.

(NOTE: JAHNKE says that this incident led to LEBERBACH first losing favour with BLANK, since his report was apparently not believed.)

LEBERBACH jun then left for PARIS.

JAHNKE assumed that it was at this time that GEN. TIMBERG first repaired to KIELMANNSLUG to report GLASSEN's loose allegations regarding himself and LEBERBACH. He later learned from LEBERBACH jun that these were:-

- a) that JAHNKE was informed of all the PETERSBERG military discussions five minutes after they had taken place by LEBERBACH,
- b) that JAHNKE was employed by BLANK, from which he had received large sums of money and the promise of a regtl command,
- c) that he maintained a dwelling with mistress for LEBERBACH in a large town, where alcoholic and sexual orgies took place.

Jan 52 LEBERBACH was called back from PARIS, faced with the allegations, ordered to break contact with JAHNKE and suspended from duty without pay.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

-5-

Gen EBERBACH communicated these facts to JAHNKE and asked him to attend a council of war in BAD BOLL, enclosing DM 50 traveling expenses. Gen EBERBACH, his son and JAHNKE duly conferred, as a result of which JAHNKE learned of CLASSLH's (or GERSTONBERG's) allegations and the fate of his report on HEINZ. At Gen EBERBACH's request, he prepared a written refutation of the charges on the spot, later supporting it with a sworn statement prepared by his lawyer.

3. Interrogation was broken off at this point.

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY